The defenses at Kommerscheidt collapsed on 7 November. The 28th Infantry Division’s offensive ended in failure at the cost of six thousand casualties, thirty-one Sherman tanks, and sixteen M10 TDs. The division and its attached units moved to the quiet Ardennes sector to recover.47
Company C, 628th Tank Destroyer Battalion accompanied CCR/5th Armored Division into the gloomy forest in early December to support the doughs of the 4th Infantry Division, who had replaced the men of the 28th Infantry Division. The 628th recalled this as “by far the most intense period of combat experienced by any unit of this battalion.” Artillery fire confined the men to their armored vehicles for long periods, but the open turrets on the M36 still left them vulnerable to air bursts and shrapnel. After a shell caught two crews in one turret—the second had taken refuge after the M36 hit one of the ubiquitous mines—the battalion resolved to build armored covers for all its TDs (accomplished by January). At one point, only a single Company C M36 was operational because of combat losses in vehicles and crewmen.48
On 13 December, the newly committed 83d Infantry Division finally emerged on the far side of the Hurtgen Forest. But the Germans still held Schmidt and the Roer River dams.49
The Ninth Army had drawn the assignment of driving to the Roer River from north of Aachen in conjunction with First Army’s VII Corps. The terrain was generally flat, and villages across the plains provided strongpoints that the Germans typically reinforced with trench lines. The terrain offered the German tank killers long fields of fire that gave maximum advantage to their excellent optics and high-velocity antitank weapons. The frequent rains restricted armor on both sides to the roads, which gave even greater advantage to the defender.
The Ninth Army’s offensive began at 1245 hours on 16 November. The Roer River lay at its farthest point twelve miles east of American lines.50 Nineteenth Corps, supported on the left by gradual commitment of XIII Corps, made good initial progress, but German resistance built and forward progress slowed.51
The 702d Tank Destroyer Battalion was operating as usual with the 2d Armored Division—which was the northernmost element in XIX Corps—while the newly arrived the 771st Tank Destroyer Battalion had been attached to the neighboring 102d Infantry Division. The former battalion was just converting to the M36.
The 2d Armored Division captured the town of Puffendorf within hours of jump-off on 16 November. The Germans viewed this effort as the most pressing threat, and von Rundstedt authorized the use of the reserve 9th Panzer and 15th Panzergrenadier divisions to contain the menace. The former, accompanied by a Tiger tank battalion, struck back on 17 November.52 The panzers included the new Mark VI Royal Tiger—a 70- ton monster with 150mm (six inches) of sloped frontal armor and an 88mm gun with an even higher muzzle velocity than that found on the regular Tiger.53
Combat Command B’s Task Force 1 was just forming up for the day’s attack when about twenty panzers, supported by infantry and artillery, burst through heavy morning mist into its positions. A tank battle ensued which the Americans lost decisively. 9th Panzer Division attacks struck other CCB task forces during the morning. The M36s (and a few remaining M10s) from the 702d Tank Destroyer Battalion engaged the attackers and KO’d six panzers during the day. The fighting cost the 2d Armored Division eighteen medium and seven light tanks destroyed and about the same number damaged.54
The Germans and Americans generally took a defensive posture the next day, but the 2d Armored and 29th Infantry divisions captured the town of Setterich, which provided enough room to commit CCA. On 20 November, the 9th Panzer Division retaliated with a force of between sixty and eighty Tigers and Panthers. LtCol John Beall, CO of the 702d Tank Destroyer Battalion, threw an old North Africa German trick back at the enemy. A few American tanks approached the Germans and then fled, which lured the Germans within range of his new 90mm guns.55
The Jerries had their own tricks, however. The 702d’s AAR for 17–21 November recorded: “The enemy used the heavy armor of his Mark VI tanks to full advantage. In several instances, the enemy maneuvered his heavily armored tanks into position between three thousand and thirty-five hundred yards from our TDs and tanks and opened fire. At this distance, our TDs could not penetrate the front of the Mark VI and the enemy evidently knew this for he [kept] only his heavily armored front exposed. At this distance, our 90mm gun would ricochet off the Mark VI, and usually the high-velocity gun of the Mark VI would penetrate and knock out our vehicles.”
The 9th Panzer Division attack also struck the positions of the 102d Infantry Division’s 405th and 406th RCTs on 19 and 20 November, and the crews from the 771st Tank Destroyer Battalion experienced a major tank battle as their first real action. Shortly after dawn on the first day, the German thrust penetrated the American lines. Company C’s Lt George Killmer ran from vehicle to vehicle in the confusion and brought his guns to bear against four Mark IVs and four Panthers. When wounded crewmen evacuated one M10, Sgt Walter Nedza recruited two riflemen to help him serve the gun. The three climbed into the turret under fire and dispatched a Mark V. The rest of the company eliminated the remaining seven panzers and lost only one M10 in the fire fight. A few hours later, the company’s gunners KO’d three more Panthers.
The action on 20 November cost Company C more dearly. The TDs in the course of three engagements accounted for two Royal Tigers, but the massive panzers knocked out six M10s. Several times, the crews watched in frustration as their 3-inch rounds bounced off the Tigers, thick hides. Company A, meanwhile, fired on Royal Tigers about noon and stopped two of them. The battle against the panzers cost the battalion five men killed and twenty-two wounded.56
By 21 November, the 2d Armored Division was again making slow forward progress, although German tanks, often dug in, remained a major problem. The 702d Tank Destroyer Battalion gunners had destroyed a total of twenty-four panzers in the course of the 9th Panzer Division’s attack. The battalion lost three M36s in exchange.57
Ninth Army did not clear the west bank of the Roer River until 9 December. Army headquarters in late November sought permission from 12 Army Group to convert two of its four towed battalions to M10s on an emergency basis because “self-propelled tank destroyers of all types are urgently needed in combat.”58 The tough fighting cost ten thousand American battle casualties.59
Cannons at Climbach
The M20 scout car advanced cautiously toward yet another picturesque but probably deadly French village on the margins of the Siegfried Line. It was 14 December 1944, and a task force under command of LtCol John Blackshear had as its objective the town of Climbach, France, and a German armored concentration reported to be there. The task force consisted of one company from the 411th Infantry Regiment, 103d Infantry Division; a heavy weapons platoon with machine guns and mortars; one platoon of tanks from the 14th Armored Division; and 3d Platoon, Company C, 614th Tank Destroyer Battalion (towed).60
Company C’s Lt Charles Thomas, commanding the TD detachment, was riding in the lead scout car, followed by a section of his 3-inch guns. As the vehicles reached some high ground three hundred yards east of Climbach, a storm of fire erupted from German tanks and antitank guns about seven hundred yards away. Thomas’s M20 was hit, and although severely wounded, the lieutenant motioned the column to halt and helped evacuate his crew from the wrecked vehicle. He suffered additional wounds to his chest, legs, and left arm. Thomas nevertheless directed the deployment of his two guns so that they could engage the Germans, and only then turned command over to platoon leader Lt George Mitchell. The guns unlimbered in an open field affording no protection. This was the only place from which they could fire on the German positions.
The bombardment by the 3-inch guns drove the panzers to pull back and seek defilade positions. But small-arms, mortar, and artillery fire began to strike the American gun positions. Men dropped, killed or wounded, and one gun was quickly knocked out. Mitchell ordered his other two guns forward, but he fell wounded. Despite the loss of their commanders, the crews of the two guns manhandled their weapons into position. The American tanks had become mired and could not advance to help them, and the infantry remained behind the gun positions.
The Germans now mounted an attack using a few tanks and some infantry. Skeleton crews manned the guns by now. Private First Class Whit Knight manned one gun alone. He sighted, loaded, and fired his weapon at
