Pale Blue Dot: A Vision of the Human Future in Space

The scope and audacity ofJohn Kennedy’s May 25, 1961 message to a joint session ofCongress on “Urgent National Needs”—the speech that launched the Apollo program—dazzled me. We would use rockets not yet designed and alloys not yet conceived, navigation and docking schemes not yet devised, in order to send a man to an unknown world—a world not yet explored, not even in a preliminary way, not even by robots—and we would bring him safely back, and we would do it before the decade was over. This confident pronouncement was made before any American had even achieved Earth orbit.

As a newly minted Ph.D., I actually thought all this had something centrally to do with science. But the President did not talk about discovering the origin of the Moon, or even about bringing samples of it back for study. All he seemed to be interested in was sending someone there and bringing him home. It was a kind of gesture. Kennedy’s science advisor, Jerome Wiesner, later told me he had made a deal with the President: If Kennedy would not claim that Apollo was about science, then he. Wiesner, would support it. So if not science, what?

The Apollo program is really about politics, others told me. This sounded more promising. Nonaligned nations would be tempted to drift toward the Soviet Union if it was ahead in space exploration, if the United States showed insufficient “national vigor.” I didn’t follow. Here was the United States, ahead of the Soviet Union in virtually every area of technology—the world’s economic, military, and, on occasion, even moral leader—and Indonesia would go Communist because Yuri Gagarin beat John Glenn to Earth orbit? What’s so special about space technology? Suddenly I understood.

Sending people to orbit the Earth or robots to orbit the Sun requires rockets—big, reliable, powerful rockets. Those same rockets can be used for nuclear war. The same technology that transports a man to the Moon can carry nuclear warheads halfway around the world. The same technology that puts an astronomer and a telescope in Earth orbit can also put up a laser “battle station.” Even back then, there was fanciful talk in military circles, East and West, about space as the new “high ground,” about the nation that “controlled” space “controlling” the Earth. Of course strategic rockets were already being tested on Earth. But heaving a ballistic missile with a dummy warhead into a target zone in the middle of the Pacific Ocean doesn’t buy much glory. Sending people into space captures the attention and Imagination of the world.

You wouldn’t spend the money to launch astronauts for this reason alone, but of all the ways of demonstrating rocket potency, this one works best. It was a rite of national manhood; the shape of the boosters made this point readily understood without anyone actually having to explain it. The communication seemed to be transmitted from unconscious mind to unconscious mind without the higher mental faculties catching a whiff of what was going on.

My colleagues today—struggling for every space science dollar—may have forgotten how easy it was to get money for “space” in the glory days of Apollo and just before. Of many examples, consider this exchange before the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee of the House of Representatives in 1958, only a few months after Sputnik 1. Air Force Assistant Secretary Richard E. Horner is testifying; his interlocutor is Rep. Daniel J. Flood (Democrat of Pennsylvania):

Horner: [W]hy is it desirable from the military point of view to have a man on the moon? Partly, from the classic point of view, because it is there. Partly because we might be afraid that the U.S.S.R. might get one there first and realize advantages which we had not anticipated existed there…

Flood: [I]f we gave you all the money you said was necessary, regardless of how much it was, can you in the Air Force hit the moon with something, anything, before Christmas?

Horner: I feel sure we can. There is always a certain amount of risk in this kind of undertaking, but we feel that we can do that; yes, sir.

Flood: Have you asked anybody in the Air Force or the Department of Defense to give you enough money, hardware, and people, starting at midnight tonight, to chip a. piece out of that ball of green cheese for a Christmas present to Uncle Sam? Have you asked for that?

Horner: We have submitted such a program to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. It is currently under consideration.

Flood: I am for giving it to them as of this minute, Mr. Chairman, with our supplemental, without waiting for somebody downtown to make up his mind to ask for it. If this man means what he says and if he knows what he is talking about—and I think he does—then this committee should not wait five minutes more today. We should give him all the money and all the hardware and all the people he wants, regardless of what anybody else says or wants, and tell him to go up on top of some hill and do it without any question.

When President Kennedy formulated the Apollo program, the Defense Department had a slew of space projects under development—ways of carrying military personnel up into space, means of conveying them around the Earth, robot weapons on orbiting platforms intended to shoot down satellites and ballistic missiles of other nations. Apollo supplanted these programs. They never reached operational status. A case can be made then that Apollo served another purpose—to move the U.S.—Soviet space competition from a military to a civilian arena. There are some who believe that Kennedy intended Apollo as a substitute for an anus race in space. Maybe.

For me, the most ironic token of that moment in history is the plaque signed by President Richard M. Nixon that Apollo 11 took to the Moon. It reads: “We came in peace for all mankind.” As the United States was dropping 7? megatons of conventional explosives on small nations in Southeast Asia, we congratulated ourselves on our humanity: We would harm no one on a lifeless rock. That plaque is there still, attached to the base of the Apollo 11 Lunar Module, on the airless desolation of the Sea of Tranquility. If no one disturbs it, it will still be readable a million years from now.

Six more missions followed Apollo 11, all but one of which successfully landed on the lunar surface. Apollo 17 was the first to carry a scientist. As soon as he got there, the program was canceled. The first scientist and the last human to land on the Moon were the same person. The program had already served its purpose that July night in 1969. The half-dozen subsequent missions were just momentum.

Apollo was not mainly about science. It was not even mainly about space. Apollo was about ideological confrontation and nuclear war—often described by such euphemisms as world “leadership” and national “prestige.” Nevertheless, good space science was done. We now know much more about the composition, age, and history of the Moon and the origin of the lunar landforms. We have made progress in understanding where the Moon came from. Some of us have used lunar cratering statistics to better understand the Earth at the time of the origin of life. But more important than any of this, Apollo provided an aegis, an umbrella under which brilliantly engineered robot spacecraft were dispatched throughout the Solar System, making that preliminary reconnaissance of dozens of worlds. The offspring of Apollo have now reached the planetary frontiers.

If not for Apollo–and, therefore, if not for the political purpose it served—I doubt whether the historic American expeditions of exploration and discovery throughout the Solar System would have occurred, The Mariners, Vikings, Pioneers, Voyagers ,and Galileo are among the gifts of Apollo. Magellan and Cassini are more distant descendants. Something similar is true for the pioneering Soviet efforts in Solar System exploration, including the first soft landings of robot spacecraft–Luna 9, Mars 3, Venera 8-on other worlds.

Apollo conveyed a confidence, energy, and breadth of vision that did capture the