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and budgets of the ministries are ratified. Given their skills and background in government, former bureaucrats also advanced more rapidly to the cabinet level of power within the LDP: according to one calculation, a former bureaucrat turned politician must be elected an average of seven times to reach this level, whereas an ex-journalist or a representative of an economic interest group will require nine successful elections, and a local politician ten.
35
Not surprisingly, the influence of former bureaucrats within the Diet has tended to perpetuate and actually strengthen the prewar pattern of bureaucratic dominance. Spaulding notes that 91 percent of all laws enacted by the Diet under the Meiji Constitution (18901947) originated in the executive branch and not in the Diet.
36
The pattern is similar in the postwar Diets. For example, in the first Diet under the new constitution, May 20 to December 9, 1947, the cabinet, which acts on behalf of the bureaucracy, introduced 161 bills and saw 150 enacted, while members of the House of Representatives introduced 20 bills and saw 8 enacted. In the 28th Diet, December 20, 1957, to April 25, 1958, the cabinet introduced 175 bills and saw 145 enacted, while members of the House of Representatives introduced 68 bills and saw 15 enacted.
37
This pattern more and more has become unfavorable to private members' bills. Cabinet bills originate and are drafted exclusively within the ministries. They are then passed to the LDP for its approval and introduction in the Diet. As a matter of routine, ministerial officials are also present in the Diet to explain their legislation and answer questions.
Genuine deliberation on laws takes place within and among the ministries before they are sent to the cabinet, and civilians do play some role. A kind of ministry-dominated quasi deliberation occurs in the 246 (as of 1975) 'deliberation councils' (
,
*,
*, and
, known collectively as shingikai) that are attached to the ministries. These are official standing organs created by a minister and composed of civilian experts selected by him to inquire into and discuss policies and proposed legislation of his ministry. In 1975 the largest number of deliberation councils (51) was attached to the Prime Minister's Office, but MITI operated the next largest number (36).
To the extent that laws are scrutinized and discussed at all in Japan by persons outside the bureaucracy, it is done in the councils. Even such critical matters for a parliament as tax and tariff laws are merely rubber-stamped by the Diet after having been considered by the deliberation councils. For example, the Tax System Deliberation Council (Zeisei Chosa* Kai) annually recommends revisions of the tax laws and
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tax rates with no input from the Diet, and usually no Diet changes in its recommendations. Similarly, the Customs Duties Deliberation Council (Kanzeiritsu Shingikai) sets tariff rates and procedures, and the Diet then approves them without change.
38
There is no question that the deliberation councils handle some very important matters; the problems relate to the selection, procedures, and degree of independence from the bureaucracy of the councils.
And on those questions there is considerable debate. Do the councils actually provide civilian input to the bureaucracy's decisions, or are they merely covers for bureaucratic power, intended to provide the public with a facade of consultation and consensus? Former MITI Vice-Minister Sahashi said in an interview that as far as he was concerned deliberation councils were important primarily as a device to silence in advance any criticism of the bureaucracy.
39
Kawanaka Niko* believes that deliberation councils are actually important weapons of the bureaucracy in the struggles that occur within and among ministries to promote particular policies: the important names that appear as members of a council are not so much intended to impress the public as they are to influence and warn off rival bureaucrats, one ministry's clients serving to counterbalance those of another ministry.
40
Some Japanese journalists are even harsher. A group of
economic specialists calls the deliberation councils ''gimmicks,' noting that the councils do not have independent staffs and that all proposals submitted to them have been approved in advance by the sponsoring ministry. On the other hand, they believe that the most important councils in the economic spherethe Economic Council (Keizai Shingikai) attached to the Economic Planning Agency, the Industrial Structure Council (Sangyo* Kozo* Shingikai) attached to MITI, and the Foreign Capital Council (Gaishi Shingikai) attached to the Ministry of Financeare not mere 'ornaments.'
41
Concerning one of these, the Foreign Capital Council, the MITI Journalists' Club disagrees, suggesting that at least before capital liberalization it was a
a magic fairy cape thrown over something (in this case MITI's influence over all foreign capital ventures in Japan) in the hope of making it invisible.
42
If these criticisms are at all valid, we may ask why the Diet itself does not perform the vital tasks of writing and deliberating laws. The answer is that the Japanese Diet is not a
