MITI and the Japanese miracle

alliances, clan networks, deliberation councils, senior-junior relations, and the ministerial clubs of all retired bureaucrats (for example, MITI's Kayo-kai*, or Tuesday Club, had some 588 members in 1963).

⁹²

The human element also enters. Some bureau-

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TABLE

6

MITI Vice-Ministers and Their Amakudari Positions (as of 1978)

(Parentheses under names indicate years of active service in MITI)

Name

Vice-minister dates

Amakudari position(s)

1. Yamamoto Takayuki (19291952)

5/493/52

Vice-president, Fuji Iron and Steel; died May 17, 1961.

2. Tamaki Keizo * (19301953)

3/5211/53

President, then chairman, Toshiba* Electric Co.

3. Hirai Tomisaburo* (19311955)

11/5311/55

President, then adviser, New Japan Steel Corp.

4. Ishihara Takeo (19321957)

11/556/57

Vice-president, then auditor, Tokyo Electric Power Co.

5. Ueno Koshichi* (19321960)

6/575/60

Vice-president, then adviser, Kansai Electric Power Co.; president, Kansai Oil Co.

6. Tokunaga Hisatsugu (19331961)

5/607/61

Vice-president, New Japan Steel Corp.; then president, Japan Petroleum Development Corp.

7. Matsuo Kinzo* (19341963)

7/617/63

Chairman, Nippon Kokan* Steel Co.

8. Imai Zen'ei (19371964)

7/6310/64

President, Japan Petrochemical Corp.

9. Sahashi Shigeru (19371966)

10/644/66

Sahashi Economic Research Institute; chairman, Japan Leisure Development Center.

10. Yamamoto Shigenobu (19391968)

4/665/68

Executive director, Toyota Motor Co.

11. Kumagai Yoshifumi (19401969)

5/6811/69

President, Sumitomo Metals Corp.

12. Ojimi* Yoshihisa (Spring 19411971)

11/696/71

President, Arabian Oil Co.

13. Morozumi Yoshihiko (Autumn 19411973)

6/717/73

President, Electric Power Development Company.

14. Yamashita Eimei (19431974)

7/7311/74

Managing director, Mitsui Trading Co.; president, Iran Chemical Development Co.

15. Komatsu Yugoro* (19441976)

11/747/76

Director, Kobe Steel Corp.

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crats simply do not like amakudari because they feel that it is beneath them as officials to become involved in business for profit or because they do not want to come back to their old ministry to lobby their younger colleagues. Iwatake Teruhiko, for example, joined Kobe Steel after retirement from MITI, but he did not approve of amakudari. When a Ministry of Finance official, Inoue Yoshimi, beat him out as president of Kobe Steel, he was offered the presidency of a satellite company, but he resigned instead and became a lecturer in literature at Todai *, something he had wanted to do for many years.

⁹³

The Japanese government-business relationship does not always work as smoothly as it appears to on the surface. A major check to its effectiveness, one that often alters the various relationships within the establishment in unforeseen ways, is competition among ministrieswhat the