By late October, when no action had been taken against Berkeley’s FAECT, Stimson wrote a reminder to Roosevelt.22 The president had, in fact, already brought the matter up with Murray, who promised FDR that “this would end at once.”23 But it took the intervention of the regional director of the War Manpower Commission before the CIO leader finally issued the necessary orders.24 FBI agents were listening in when disbelieving officials of FAECT’s Local 25 were informed that their union was out of business for the duration.25
* * *
On August 23, 1943, less than a week after Groves’s briefing on Russian spying, Oppenheimer returned to Berkeley for what was ostensibly another recruiting drive. Following Lansdale’s visit to Los Alamos, Oppie had become curious about the activities of his former graduate students. Dropping by the New Classroom Building, Oppenheimer asked Lyall Johnson if the army had any objection to his talking to Lomanitz in Lawrence’s vacant office.
Following a testy exchange with Lomanitz—Oppenheimer urged Rossi to “get straight” with the security people, to which the latter retorted that he was being persecuted for his union organizing—the two continued their discussion on the street outside.26 When Oppie returned, Weinberg and Bohm were waiting. They, too, complained that Lomanitz was being “framed” for his politics and expressed fears that they might be tarred by the same brush.27 Oppenheimer reassured them they had nothing to fear so long as they stayed away from politics.28 When Lawrence briefly appeared, Oppie requested that he be a witness to this promise. Asked by Weinberg if this meant he would still go to Los Alamos, Oppenheimer denied that it had ever been his intention to send Joe to the desert lab.29
During dinner that night, Oppie told Robert Bacher—and army undercover agents eavesdropping nearby—that he “gave EOL hell” about the security mess at the Rad Lab.
Earlier, when stopping by Johnson’s office, Oppenheimer had casually mentioned that if the army was concerned about security, George Eltenton was someone who might also bear watching.30 Johnson had immediately telephoned Pash, who arranged a meeting with Oppenheimer for the following day. On the morning of August 26, Pash interrogated Oppenheimer while a technician in the adjoining teletype room recorded the conversation.31
When Oppie brought up the subject of Lomanitz, Pash interrupted to say that it was not Rossi but Eltenton and “other groups” that interested the army.32 Oppenheimer then surprised Pash with a lengthy and complicated story.
Several months earlier, Oppenheimer said, he had been contacted by “intermediaries” who were in touch with an unidentified official at the Soviet consulate. One of these individuals had talked about passing along information regarding the project at Berkeley. Oppenheimer told Pash his response had been that, while he had no objection to the president telling the Soviets about the bomb, he thought it inappropriate to do so by “having it moved out the back door.”
Oppie admitted to knowing of subsequent approaches—which “were always to other people, who were troubled by them, and sometimes came and discussed them with me.” Because he felt that those contacted had been picked by chance, he was reluctant to divulge names. However, two of the three men he knew to have been approached were now at Los Alamos, Oppie said, and the third was scheduled to be sent to Oak Ridge in the near future. All three had been approached independently, the first two within a week of one another, Oppenheimer claimed.
Under prodding by Pash, Oppenheimer identified Eltenton as one of the intermediaries. However, it was not Eltenton but another man who had approached his colleagues on behalf of Eltenton and the consular official, Oppie explained. Since this particular go-between was a friend of his as well as a member of the faculty at Berkeley—and, moreover, had acted in good faith, Oppie said—he saw no point in revealing his identity.
As diplomatically as he could, Pash pressed Oppenheimer for the names of the intermediary and his three contacts, but without success. Hinting that the unidentified professor had since left town, Oppenheimer told Pash that there was scant danger of any future such incidents.33
The interview lasted some forty-five minutes. That evening, while Oppenheimer returned to Los Alamos by train, Pash had an army stenographer transcribe the recording. After hurriedly adding his own last-minute corrections by hand, Pash couriered the transcript to Groves and Pieper, asking that the FBI also put Eltenton under surveillance.34
This time the bureau had no trouble complying with the army’s request. Three weeks before, an anonymous letter, written in Russian, had been sent to Hoover by a disgruntled Soviet intelligence officer. The FBI determined that the missive had been mailed from a post office near the Soviet embassy in Washington, D.C. The letter identified Zubilin, Kvasnikov, and Kheifets as three of Russia’s top spies in the United States.35 Shortly thereafter, King’s “one-man Commie squad” had ballooned to a force of 125 agents, or nearly half the complement working at the bureau’s San Francisco office.36
The extended dragnet was eager for evidence that the spy ring was still active in Berkeley. On the morning of September 3, an army agent followed Weinberg on foot to a French laundry on Telegraph Avenue and then to a candy shop. Weinberg’s next stop was the post office at Sather Gate, where he mailed a thick, business-sized envelope.37
Three days later, Pash received a photostat of the letter’s contents from CIC agent Jim Murray. In addition to a thirteen-page typewritten manuscript—“The Communist Party and the Professions”—the package contained a brief, unsigned note:
Dear A., Please do not communicate with me during this period, nor discuss with others my reasons for this request. I should like you to pass on this message to S. or
