Other explanations are, of course, possible. Wladyslaw Mroz had certainly been unmasked by this past defector and his employer was well aware of the fact. But did Mroz himself know? An agent whose cover has been blown becomes unnecessary, but by sending him to France, the Polish services may have been attempting a diversionary tactic: while the counterintelligence agencies were concentrating on him, they could save other, more important agents, whose true identities were at risk of being revealed.
On a similar theme, another even more cynical hypothesis can be developed: for one reason or another, the Poles may have wanted to get rid of this agent and so sent him to France on the certain belief that he would be arrested. Although this seems unlikely, as at the time, the East had far more radical means of liquidating someone they no longer deemed useful. That being said, the Polish communist regime had evolved as a result of de-Stalinisation and it was becoming increasingly difficult simply to remove a bothersome figure.
The third hypothesis is probably the most likely: Wladyslaw Mroz, a man already identified by western intelligence agencies as an eastern agent, crosses the Iron Curtain. There is little doubt that he will be picked up quickly, especially as he is travelling under his own name. Does this mean that he chose to expose himself by revealing his identity to counterintelligence services? This would suggest that he ‘chose freedom', as they used to say, by intentionally becoming a defector who would then pass on his precious information.
So far, everything has been consistent. However, if Mroz was knowingly sent to the West by his Polish employers, then the story takes on a different appearance. In this case, Mroz would be playing the role of a ‘false' defector, who role was to provide poisoned information to the DST.
In reality, nothing in this case is especially clear and there is one question in particular that proves the most puzzling: how did Mroz make contact with the DST? Was he arrested or did he approach them? Assuming that he was, in fact, a false defector, it is more plausible for him to have expected the DST to come to him sooner or later.
However, in this instance, it was Mroz who took the initiative and came knocking on the door of the French authorities. This approach would support the theory of a man who had already chosen to defect and move to the West. These cases are always a headache for counterintelligence agencies: how can you trust a man who is willing to intentionally betray his country? In the midst of all this there is usually a poisoned chalice to be found somewhere. After all, we have already seen how Moscow was willing to give up certain truths and even sacrifice its own agents in order to pass on further false information that would prove beneficial in the long run.
It all means that dealing with a defector is a very delicate process. The Americans preferred to use a lie detector and firmly believed in its effectiveness. Yet a well-trained agent can easily slip through the cracks and many of the agents that Moscow sent to the West had been taught how to control their emotions. Rather, it is much better to rely on the virtues of psychology, observation and patience when dealing with defectors.
Marcel Chalet and Thierry Wolton:
26
If we had to rank those in order of who caused the most harm, at the head would be whoever revealed themselves after the arrival of an important defector, who themselves had many revelations to make. This Defector Number 2, as we shall call him, has been put there in order to discredit whatever had been said by Defector Number 1, and to convince the enemy that he is the one telling the truth. This is the prototype of a dangerous defector. However, if one is able to break him, then he can become useful. In such cases, Defector Number 1 becomes more important and the whole operation will expose the enemy’s dark intentions and offers a remarkable opportunity to see what he has planned. It also allows one to determine what importance the enemy attaches to the information supplied by Defector Number 1, as opposed to the secondary information of Defector Number 2. In short it is a useful way of breaking the enemy and the whole process is intellectually fascinating. Capturing defectors is one of the favourite operations of any counterintelligence agency.
Let us now return to Mroz. Upon arriving in France, he presented himself at the prefecture of police in Paris and submitted his case for political asylum. His name immediately drew the attention of the officials present, especially as several members of the general counterintelligence unit were based at the prefecture.As soon as they realised Mroz was a Polish agent, his file was passed on to the DST.
When questioned, Mroz had no hesitance in admitting that he was a captain in the Polish State Security Service and was consequently place under immediate observation. Whether he was a genuine defector or not, it was important for the DST to continue to maintain a good relationship with the service. At the same time, it was necessary to take care of Mroz's material needs, such as finding him a house and a job. The Americans would have been green with envy at such an opportunity as this, but altering them would also alert the Polish authorities as to what had taken place on the other side of the Iron Curtain. They therefore had to take the risk of leaving Mroz to supply his information ‘naturally' and to try and diffuse any mistrust that he would understandably have had.
Mroz first provided very valuable information on how the Polish intelligence agencies were organised.
