However, despite all of his precautions, An was always at risk of blunder or betrayal and there were many times when he feared for his life. Through his contacts, he once ‘borrowed' confidential documents with the aim of photographing them in the secrecy of his bathroom. Even though he had stationed his two German Shepherds outside to alert him to the slightest suspicious noise, he was still putting himself at risk. Transmitting the information he obtained was an additional risk, as the system of using dead letterboxes was not infallible.
Yet despite the dangers, the information he gathered was so important that General Giap, who only knew him by his codename, would one day say that ‘thanks to him, I had the impression that I was actually in the US operations room!'.
Olivier Todd
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With large, regular features and wielding impeccable English and excellent French, the courteous An never failed to impress. Always well-informed and a full-time member of the Time office in Saigon, he had entry in to the major military and political circles. He worked with the Christian Science Monitor and at Reuters. He lived and worked in the United States on a scholarship from the Asia Foundation who, rightly or wrongly, was considered a nursery for potential CIA agents. An loved dogs and birds and provided at least 80 per cent of the copy for Time from Vietnam.
Based on the information he obtained, Pham Xuan An was able to really analyse the enemy's strategy and therefore work out a response. He sent his interpretation to his bosses in Hanoi and his suggestions were often used. Since 1961, when the recently elected US President John F. Kennedy had decided to come to the rescue of his South Vietnamese counterpart, Diem, An was in a position to gather all the plans of this ‘Special War', as the Pentagon called it. This meant that the communist generals knew what to expect.
A year and a half later, the SouthVietnamese Army, flanked by the US, launched a major offensive in the Plain of Reeds, a dozen or so kilometres from Saigon. Helicopters were used for the first time, but despite the obvious inferiority in both size and equipment, the Viet Cong inflicted heavy losses on the South Vietnamese troops: An had clearly communicated the enemy's plans in advance. This success led to him receiving his first military decoration and the journalist spy would tell his fellow correspondents that this lost battle would be a mortal blow to the ‘Special War' dreamed up in Washington.
Indeed, the Pentagon strategists decided to engage further inVietnam. Rid of President Diem, who was assassinated on White House orders, the US generals would now lead the war themselves.Again, thanks to An, Hanoi knew everything. His information became increasingly important and was always taken seriously. Another example was the famous communist Tet Offensive in 1968, at a time when the US had already lost half a million men.
Pham Xuan An had known about it several months in advance. For the first time, he left his role as a spy when his superiors asked him to specify a certain number of targets, especially in Saigon. On this occasion, the journalist took an incredible risk by bringing a Viet Cong leader into the capital from the surrounding countryside.This impudence was out of character, but An was never deemed suspicious, so no one was surprised to see him around town in the company of an unknown friend.
Even if the Tet Offensive did not lead to success for North Vietnam, it strongly undermined the US war machine. It was a warning shot that decided the fate of the war and led to the negotiations in Paris between Washington and Hanoi, which began in May 1968. Meanwhile, the communists launched a new offensive, but An intervened. He believed that the bombings, which were hurting civilians more than the military objectives, were useless. After informing Hanoi, the offensive was ended. An's influence was clearly decisive and it would be seen again a few years later.
1975 saw the fall of Saigon and the end of the war. At the time, after the signing of the Paris Accords in 1973, the US was no longer directly involved in the fighting, although they were still present, albeit in fewer numbers, ready to fight if necessary. They also continued to provide significant material and military aid to the South Vietnamese Army.
A crucial question now faced the communist leaders. Their victory seemed at hand, especially as the weakened South Vietnamese government could break up at any time. But how would the Americans react if Hanoi gave the signal for one final offensive? Would they come to the aid of their South Vietnamese allies? Once again, An had the answer to this important question; an answer upon which would depend whether or not the war would continue if the communists managed to win.
It was a heavy responsibility for the journalist, who would once more prove to be extraordinarily daring. Through is high-level contacts in the South Vietnamese government, he managed to get his hands on a top-secret report. This document, written for the attention of President Thieu by a committee for strategic studies, accurately described the state of decay of the army. On paper at least, the army was superior in equipment and numbers to the troops that Giap could commit to the south, but it was extremely unmotivated.
Yet there was something even more important. According to this top-secret document, which had been signed by a South Vietnamese general, it was there in black and white that the Americans, who day by day were reducing the numbers of US soldiers
