As Mayor of Berlin, Brandt refused to have any contact with any Soviets who might remember him fondly. He knew that the KGB had hold of the famous receipt that he had foolishly signed, however, he did not seem to fear being blackmailed as a result of his wartime activities - another argument in favour of his not being an agent. However, Moscow was not willing to give up such a big fish so easily, especially one who undoubtedly had a bright international future.
Having failed thus far, the KGB now changed their tactics. With help from the Stasi and the collaboration of Markus Wolf's HVA, they launched a veritable smear campaign against Willy Brandt, which was helped largely by the German right. After unsuccessfully spreading the rumour that he had been a US intelligence agent during the war, they highlighted his suspected communist convictions by recalling his commitment to the Marxist group that joined with the SPD. This was certainly a juicy rumour if it really did come from eastern intelligence agencies.
They also questioned his patriotism: had he not spent the war in exile while his fellow Germans had suffered at home? The primary aim was to try and make him as uncomfortable as possible so it would be easier for the KGB to trap him in their net. The smear campaign certainly made Brandt vulnerable, and it could not have occurred at a worse time: the party had just appointed him as opposition candidate for chancellor against Konrad Adenauer. He consequently lost the 1961 election and would not become chancellor until 1969. 1961 was also the year the Berlin Wall was erected and Brandt came into his own during this period. He took an international stance and fought hard against its construction, even appealing to Kennedy and the West. At one point he compared the building of the wall to Hitler's occupation of the Rhineland, although as we know, it was all in vain. In this instance, however, Brandt had shown himself to be a true opponent of Moscow and the Kremlin was once more keen to try and get around him.
In late 1961 or early 1962, Moscow sent a KGB agent (probably a journalist or diplomat) to blackmail him. He suggested that if Brandt returned to the excellent relationship he had had with the NKVD during the war, then it would be possible to begin serious negotiations with Moscow regarding the status of Berlin. Once again, Brandt refused and the blackmail had failed. The KGB agent tried to speak to him about the infamous receipt, but he was bluffing: the receipt had disappeared from the ‘Poliarnik' file. As unbelievable as it may seem, after the first blackmail attempt had failed, someone in the KGB had decided to destroy what was then deemed to be a useless document. Such an act would prove irreparable and Brandt would never become a KGB agent. In any intelligence service, any document that might be used to blackmail an agent should never be destroyed. However, Moscow was still not quite finished with Willy Brandt.
Before proceeding further, it is perhaps useful to look at Brandt's politics towards the East, which are a key factor in this story.
As Chancellor, Brandt remained deeply influenced by the Berlin Crisis and the construction of the Wall in 1961. It had all happened during the time when he was the mayor of the former Third Reich capital and so he had experienced everything first-hand. Despite all the good words and speeches in support of the people of Berlin, the West had proved powerless to prevent the Wall's construction. Even Kennedy's famous visit did nothing: ‘Ich bin ein Berliner!’ (‘I am a Berliner!') were only words, not actions. At the time, the future chancellor believed that nothing could be done in Berlin, or the rest of Germany, to combat the USSR. Consequently, as soon as he came to power in 1969, he strongly asserted his intentions to open political negotiations with the East: he believed that the only way forward was through dialogue, but not only with East Germany, but with the entire Soviet Bloc, beginning first, of course, with Moscow. Intentions such as these could not fail to worry the West. However, at the same time the German Chancellor ensured that he remained firmly anchored in the western camp and was committed to European integration.
It is true that by choosing ‘Ostpolitik', Brandt was breaking a taboo. Since the creation of West Germany, Bonn did not consider East Germany to be a ‘Soviet Occupied Zone'. However, Brandt was ready to discuss this allegedly occupied zone with West German leaders. Once more, the right-wing began to speak up and again reminded everyone of Brandt's suspected communist leanings. The chancellor did not care and had the support of most of the population: the majority of Germans also wanted reconciliation and peace.
Brandt wanted to move fast and so established contacts with the Kremlin and its counterpart in East Germany, Willy Stoph. The Moscow Treaty was signed in 1970 and was later followed by the Treaty of Warsaw (1970). Federal Germany recognised the post-war frontiers, such as the famous Oder-Neisse line between Germany and Poland, but even more spectacularly, the border between the two Germanys! Willy Brandt accepted the partition, the existence of which West Germany had previously refused to acknowledge. Brandt believed that this was the only way to achieve reunification eventually and that it was important to be realistic by admitting that it existed in the first place. He therefore opted for reconciliation rather than permanent hostility. Furthermore, he stated that even if there were two states, there was still only one Germany and so both the GDR (East Germany) and the DDR (West
