Howard, a small, clever young man with plenty of qualifications, had been recruited by the CIA in the early 1980s. He was assigned to the Soviet division and the aim was to send him to Moscow where he would be responsible for processing agents. This was an important and sensitive post and Howard underwent rigorous training before embarking on his mission. At Langley, he was shown all the files of the agents who had infiltrated the USSR that he would have to monitor. However, before his departure, Howard was also subjected to a lie detector test.The Americans, having absolute confidence in this device, were thus guilty of both using and abusing it.
In this instance, the results proved disastrous: Howard was not only dishonest and a liar, but was also a drinker and an occasional drug taker. There was now absolutely no question about sending him to Moscow. The CIA specialists, by waiting until the last moment for him to take the test, had committed an unforgivable mistake that was to cost them dearly. Failed by the CIA, Howard was left to himself, but as he now possessed confidential information, he needed to be strictly monitored.
However, this was not the case and now the CIA committed their second major error: Howard easily escaped his watchmen and it was not long before he contacted the Russians. He sold them his information and in order to finally escape the CIA, decided to escape behind the Iron Curtain, whereby he proceeded to denounce, one after another, all the American agents in Moscow, causing considerable damage and destroying years of work.
Yurchenko had put the CIA on Howard's trail, but it was too late: the damage had already been done and Howard could not even answer for his betrayal as he was now safe in the East. Nevertheless, the defector had satisfied the Americans' curiosity, who now finally understood why such an epidemic or arrests had hit their Moscow post.
However, by revealing the source of their woes, and thus betrayal of Howard, Yurchenko had only shed light on some ancient history and his information could hardly help any new developments. Denouncing a now un-active Soviet agent would hardly worry the KGB, but it did allow the defector to have some form of credibility.
Le Matin
111
Spies are like dominoes, standing upright in a game the Japanese love to play: all it takes is a flick and the line of hundreds of dominoes falls down in one great wave. This theory of ‘domino rockers’ can shed light on the information revealed by the Los Angeles Times regarding the case of the Soviet diplomat, Vitaly Yurchenko, who disappeared in Rome in the middle of August. The domino theory of ‘one falls, they all fall’, is true, and could be seen in the great commotion that seized the secret services such as the West German intelligence agency, during that month of August. On 8 August, the Italian authorities announced the disappearance in Rome of Vitaly Yurchenko from the Soviet embassy.
On 19 August, Hans-Joachim Tiedge, head of the West German counterintelligence unit, crossed over to the East. The Corriere Della Sera announced that Tiedge’s flight was directly related to Yurchenko’s disappearance and the USSR recalled many of its spies who were operating in the West lest they fall as the result of Yurchenko’s revelations. Several secretaries who worked for the West German authorities also disappeared: the moles were running around in their underground corridors. The dominoes had been tumbled. Another network was also savaged, that of the Soviet spies in Britain, who were expelled after the man in charge of KGB operation in Britain, Oleg Gordievsky, was handed over to the British.
Debriefing a defector is like dealing with a ball of yarn that has unravelled. You need to be patient and act like a psychologist. It is an art, so in the first few weeks you need to leave a bit of slack. The method was clearly effective and Yurchenko provided accurate, consistent information, and also delivered more names, even if they were for spies who were no longer operational. But once passed those first few weeks, Yurchenko got bored. He was living alone in a big house in the woods. He wanted to see the world and speak Russian. The head of the CIA himself, Bill Casey, even came and had dinner with him: a flattering recognition of a man who had held such high office in the KGB.
Casey promised that as soon as his questioning was finished,Yurchenko would receive a minister's salary, would have a house bought for him and receive free health care. The good life! However, this was not enough and Yurchenko longed to flee his gilded cage. This would have been dangerous for an ordinary defector, unless he already knew that he would not be at any risk.
On 2 November, four months after his defection in Rome and two weeks before an important meeting in Geneva between Reagan and Gorbachev, Yurchenko was allowed to dine in Washington - a decision that had nothing to do with chance.
Yurchenko was obviously accompanied by a CIA agent whose role it was to keep an eye on him and keep him safe. The Russian chose a chic restaurant in Washington that was renowned for its excellent cuisine, Le Pied de Cochon. Yurchenko was enjoying his meal with his guardian when he suddenly got up from the table. Smiling, he looked at the CIA man and said, ‘If I get up and leave, what would you do? Would you shoot me?'. Dumbfounded, the other man said no. Yurchenko laughed and said he was going out for about twenty minutes. He left the restaurant and quickly disappeared. A few minutes later, he calmly walked into the Soviet embassy. If it was Yurchenko who chose Le Pied de Cochon, it was because of its location close to the embassy!
There was worse still to come for the Americans. Indeed, the next day Yurchenko gave a press conference
