Much of the information was obtained in some sixty interviews conducted specifically for this book. I guaranteed anonymity to all those I interviewed and therefore cannot thank them by name. About eight were ex-members of special forces (the SAS and Army surveillance unit 14 Intelligence Company); twelve had been in senior positions in the security forces and at Stormont; and a further ten or so had been involved in specialist intelligence work in Ulster. Where I attribute information to ‘an intelligence officer’ that is a person who has worked on the collection, collation, analysis or dissemination of intelligence. It could be a member of the Army, RUC Special Branch or the Security Service (MI5). I also conducted interviews with a wide range of people including solicitors, republican activists, constables and soldiers on the streets, and members of the public who had witnessed gunbattles.
Almost all of the interviewees who agreed to meet me unofficially were approached on an informal basis. Some people approached in this way did not agree to take part. As defence correspondent of the Independent, between 1986 and 1990, I was entitled to seek non-attributable briefings from the Ministry of Defence – official information given on the basis that it is not sourced to any individual or section within the Ministry of Defence. I did make two visits to the Army in Northern Ireland while in that post, and these provided important background knowledge, but I decided not to request such a briefing for this book. I have also received briefing and guidance from the Army and the RUC in my subsequent work for BBC TV’s Newsnight. In some places I have made use of such information, although I have tried to make it clear in the text where information was gleaned during briefings arranged as part of those visits.
The decision not to seek the co-operation of the Ministry of Defence was a difficult one. In my dealings with members of the department, they have never volunteered a potentially damaging story, but they have very rarely avoided confirming something I have discovered. None the less, my research for this book has uncovered many instances of the Army and police deliberately giving the press false information about covert operations in Ulster. In 1990, Tom King, the Secretary of State for Defence, told the House of Commons that the authorities used disinformation to protect lives and for ‘absolutely honorable security reasons’. In several of the incidents related in this book journalists have been used to relay these untruths. In view of this, I decided to seek the opinions of senior Army and police officers in private, without the presence of Whitehall or Stormont officials and their tape recorders. This did not provide absolute insurance against deception, but I am convinced that it did lead to greater candour and often resulted in interviewees giving accounts of incidents which differed significantly from the official version.
It may be that some of those interviewed were willing to talk to me because I had been a member of the regular Army for nine months in 1979. I served in the Royal Tank Regiment, but I did not do so in Northern Ireland, and this book is not based in any way on my own reflections and experiences while in uniform. It is a journalist’s appraisal of the dilemmas facing both police officers and soldiers, and of the government policies they are expected to carry out.
I am aware, of course, that certain categories of information are useful to terrorists, and consequently I have not used the names of living people unless their views have already been published. This rule has been applied to protect the potential victims of loyalist as well as republican terrorism. I have not given the location of barracks housing Army and police special units, to avoid them being chosen as targets. And I have concentrated on tactics and technology used by undercover units already known to have been compromised.
Some members of undercover units whom I interviewed argued that an emphasis on incidents in which people had been killed would provide a false impression of their duties in Ulster. I have tried to give examples of operations where nobody was killed, but the fatal incidents are, by their very nature, the most documented and the most open to question.
I do not examine the shooting of three IRA members in Gibraltar in 1988 in any great detail, as I wanted to concentrate on events that have been less subject to media interest and scrutiny. It is in any case these events which provide the context crucial to an understanding of the soldiers’ behaviour and of the authorities’ attitude during the inquest procedures in Gibraltar.
Shortly before this book was published, I was contacted by the Secretary to the D Notice Committee, a semi-official body which liaises between journalists and government departments. His intervention followed expressions of concern from the Army and the Security Service about the possible contents of my book. I agreed to allow them sight of proof copies, which were by that stage circulating among certain journalists. The Secretary asked that changes be made to the book on fifteen separate topics. In only four cases was I satisfied that alterations were required. The Secretary presented new and compelling arguments that
