10Special Branch in the Ascendant
When the Troubles began in Northern Ireland the RUC’s Special Branch had been small, numbering only around eighty, and somewhat disorganized. The Branch, like that of police forces in Britain, was meant to provide intelligence on terrorism and subversive groups. But at the beginning of the 1970s, at the time of internment, much of the information it provided on republican paramilitary groups had been hopelessly inaccurate. In particular the SB had overestimated the importance of the Official IRA and known little about the emerging power of the Provisionals.
Intelligence, particularly that gained from informers, is the lifeblood of anti-terrorist operations. The SB had the largest network of informers of the various information-gathering agencies in Ulster – that in itself was enough to give it considerable power. But the RUC’s assumption of overall control of operations in 1976 gave the branch a pivotal role in the struggle against the Provisionals.
During the early 1970s the SB had taken a series of blows following inquiries into its interrogation methods. By the mid 1970s many Army officers had a low opinion of it. To one battalion commander the SB were ‘emasculated’; while to the Chief of the General Staff they were a force with poor morale and the taint of association with Protestant terrorist groups.
As a result of the SB’s disgrace, the CID had taken over interrogation at the main centre, Castlereagh near Belfast, and at subsidiary points at Gough Barracks in Armagh and Strand Road police station in Londonderry. The CID had improved the organization of interrogation and the collators of the information thus assumed a highly important role in the campaign of the mid 1970s.
Castlereagh attained a fearsome reputation among republicans. Many police officers, to this day, argue that most prisoners were treated fairly there; however, not all police officers have taken this view. Michael Asher, the SPG man who later wrote about his experiences in Shoot to Kill, remembers the reaction of one suspect: ‘Taggarty blanched when Castlereagh was mentioned. It had a grim reputation. Suspects were held there in windowless cubes for up to one week. They might be denied sleep, stripped, beaten or humiliated. No one wanted to be taken to Castlereagh.’
Just as the CID’s bureaucratic fortunes had been boosted by outside inquiries into their rival, so they would themselves be diminished by them. In 1978 Amnesty International, the independent human rights monitoring group, published a report which was highly critical of the methods employed in police interrogation centres. Following its appearance Kenneth Newman and the government agreed that they should open the doors of Castlereagh to an inquiry headed by Harry Bennett QC, a respected judge. The Bennett Report was published early in 1979 and did not give the clean bill of health for which Newman had hoped.
It stated that most police officers were carrying out their duties correctly but came to the conclusion that some prisoners had injuries which ‘were not self-inflicted and were sustained in police custody’. Following this admission that some prisoners were being beaten up, steps were taken to protect suspects’ rights. Closed circuit TV cameras were fitted in interrogation rooms and prisoners were given medical checks. The RUC took such steps well before most of the British police forces – albeit a change which was forced on them. Subsequently new legislation under the PTA gave detectives three or even seven days to interrogate suspects and elicit information or confessions, reducing the pressure on them to resort to illegal and violent means. Allegations of ill-treatment did not end but there was a recognition – even by many republicans in private – that physical coercion became rarer in the holding centres.
But the benefit that the SB gained from the CID’s reversal of fortunes in the late 1970s was only one of the reasons why it was beginning to inspire new confidence. In 1976 Assistant Chief Constable Mick Slevin took over as Head of Special Branch (HSB). He had served previously as a chief superintendent in charge of plain-clothes work in Belfast. Slevin had become something of a hero among his fellow detectives: during the early days of the Troubles he had personally defused two bombs, receiving a gallantry award and, in 1973, an OBE. He had already been in the force for thirty-one years when he was appointed HSB.
Assistant Chief Constable Slevin, an Ulsterman, did much to rebuild the department. He increased its resources and brought it to the centre of the intelligence establishment as refashioned in the late 1970s. After several years of bitter conflict with British Army intelligence, the new HSB soothed the atmosphere. A senior figure at Lisburn comments, ‘We had excellent relations with him.’
During the late 1970s and early 1980s the RUC SB, or E Department, was split into its current five divisions. E1, Administration Division, carries out routine administrative functions: it maintains the Department’s cars, vets its personnel and ensures the security of its buildings. E2, Legal Division, is closely involved with the CID in preparing cases against suspects and in overseeing the remaining SB contingent in interrogation centres. E3 is the Intelligence Division, the central organizing and analysis body of the Department. E4, Operations Division, carries out surveillance, runs the Department’s library and collects relevant press cuttings. E5, Collation Division, updates the data on suspects and incidents, and analyses it in an attempt to establish connections between individuals as well as incidents.
Of these divisions E3 and E4 are the most important. The Intelligence Division is subdivided into E3A, E3B and E3C which oversee operations respectively against republican groups, loyalist organizations, and leftist groups which are considered subversive. E4A became well known as the surveillance group within the Branch – the watchers who follow suspects and mount observation posts. It is backed up by E4B which is involved in technical surveillance, installing bugging and tracking equipment. E4C and E4D are believed to be involved in specialist photographic surveillance.
The central organization is augmented by a headquarters in each of three regions
