The police and Army had realized for some time that there was considerable scope for mishandling of information held in the system of card indexes and that the amount of time required to keep the information up-to-date was escalating. They introduced a computer known simply as ‘3072’, its model number, which was intended to improve the situation. Like many early experiments with computers, it soon became apparent that the machine did not have the memory or speed to be effective. As a result police stations and Army bases retained their card indexes, and the computer had little real impact on their intelligence-collating activities.
During the early 1980s a new system was developed to replace ‘3072’. In 1987 125 Intelligence Section, the data-processing department of 12 Intelligence and Security Company based at Lisburn, took delivery of a new computer. The new machine, which had a memory many times the size of ‘3072’ was code-named CRUCIBLE. The Army hoped that CRUCIBLE would at last allow it to exploit the possibilities of the information revolution.
CRUCIBLE does not only store information on people and incidents but also contains data on the movements of individuals, fed in from dozens of terminals in the intelligence cells of units around Ulster. The introduction of the new computer brought some complaints from intelligence officers who resented the amount of time which their men had to spend feeding information into it. Luddite elements in the intelligence world felt the input of information into the computer absorbed more time and effort than was necessary with a system of cards and a skilled collator. Although it may reduce the number of people subjected to the attention of the intelligence-gatherers, computerization of information can compound mistakes, and the consequences – being detained at roadblocks or having homes searched – for people entered erroneously in the computer as terrorist suspects are potentially very damaging to the security forces.
Computerizing records has not brought any miraculous changes to intelligence work. CRUCIBLE has various levels of access, with those at the lower levels spending much time putting information in, but not being able to access the best intelligence themselves. According to an officer who has used the system, only the highest level of access provides the user with information significantly better than written records.
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In 1973 the Reconnaissance Interpretation Centre (RIC) was established at RAF Aldergrove in Northern Ireland. The RIC is used to channel requests for aerial photography. This work is often undertaken by high altitude passes by RAF Canberra aircraft flying from England. The pictures are useful for simple mapping purposes but can also be valuable for establishing whether equipment in an enclosed area has been moved or if large weapons storage pits are being dug.
The Army Air Corps has also deployed Gazelle helicopters equipped with a specially stabilized TV camera mounting. These ‘heli-telly’ missions became a near constant presence over Belfast and Londonderry and at events such as republican funerals. Heli-telly pictures were used in 1989 in the successful prosecution of several men who had killed two corporals after they had accidentally driven into a republican funeral.
During the late 1970s and early 1980s the Army Air Corps ran an operation to find command wire bombs and arms caches through the use of infra-red imaging equipment which could detect disturbances in the earth. The equipment was too sensitive to work properly in a helicopter because of the vibrations. Instead it was fitted in the Corps’ ancient Beaver spotter planes, small propellor aircraft with several seats. Such sorties from Aldergrove went on through the early 1980s, often over border areas where the IRA mounted command wire bomb attacks. The Beavers were retired in the late 1980s, for by then a new generation of thermal imagers was being carried in helicopters. One model, often used by special forces, provided high quality images at night at a distance of several miles.
Technology was also used to reduce the burden of running covert OPs. This task presented serious risks and the number of people trained to do it was limited. Newly invented sensors, which did not require personnel to run them, appeared to offer help. Devices which sensed approaching footsteps could be planted in the ground. Special cameras were developed which could be left by one of the many unstaffed border crossings and would be triggered by movement. These devices could then be recovered several days later. Cameras were also fitted in the headlight cavities of cars which were left parked opposite a suspect’s house or other area of interest.
Provisional newspapers revealed that the cumulative effect of physical surveillance, heli-telly, spotter planes, bugging and computerization was making many IRA volunteers fearful of carrying out operations. A senior IRA member said in an interview with the newspaper An Phoblacht/Republican News:
There is their vast array of forts, barracks and spy-posts which bristle with antennae and communications masts, listening devices and other hi-tech equipment. Behind this visible presence there is also the frightening level of undercover and covert surveillance. Recently [1989] on this front there has been a dramatic increase in the use of hidden surveillance cameras in both urban and rural areas … there is also the bugging of cars and even certain open locations in republican strongholds.
The IRA member concluded, ‘Ultimately it is a battle of wits, every operation must be meticulously planned, taking account of the obstacles.’
Hi-tech bugging equipment offered extraordinary possibilities to the covert operators especially as, by 1979, the security forces faced a dilemma over what to do when they found an arms cache. The policy of using the SAS to confront terrorists at arms caches or at the scene of a planned attack had been abandoned,
