This early enthusiasm for the supergrass system was backed by evidence which seemed to indicate that a long prison sentence was a good deterrent: government figures showed that only about 15 per cent of those imprisoned for terrorist offences were reconvicted – a much lower rate than for many other crimes. In the republican estates someone who had served time was considered to have done his or her bit, with many no longer taking any active part in terrorism. Many police officers and soldiers who support the ambushing of terrorists, on the other hand, say they find it hard to accept that the number of people returning to terrorism is so low.
During the latter part of 1981 and 1982 more than 200 people were arrested on the evidence of supergrasses. The arrests offered the RUC the chance to cut right through the terrorist infrastructure in parts of Ulster. In effect, it was a more discriminating form of internment. Supergrasses were not confined to the Provisionals: there were also several in the INLA and the loyalist Ulster Volunteer Force, organizations with less discipline and more factionalism than the IRA.
Moving against the UVF allowed the RUC to show that they were not pursuing informers in a sectarian way. Some seventy loyalists were convicted on the words of Joseph Bennett, William Allen and James Crockard, the three UVF supergrasses. Most of these convictions were upheld, all except the fourteen loyalists imprisoned on the word of Bennett – a higher success rate than that gained against republican terrorists.
In January 1982 Kevin McGrady, a one-time IRA member who had been living in the Netherlands, voluntarily returned to Northern Ireland and put himself in police custody. McGrady had killed several people, and had seen his brother wrongly convicted of the murder of one of them. His guilt about these events mounted until, having become involved with a religious sect, he could bear it no longer and chose to return. McGrady was therefore unique among the supergrasses in that he was not in police custody at the time he made his decision to inform.
Given the seriousness of his crimes, the police would not agree to grant him immunity, although he was subsequently released after serving six years of a life sentence. However, in court McGrady’s testimony was patchy, several times confusing individuals who he said had been involved in crimes.
In August 1982 Raymond Gilmour, his wife and two children, left their home on Londonderry’s Creggan estate, telling neighbours they were going on holiday. In fact they were taken into protective custody prior to a series of RUC swoops in which more than forty people were arrested. Gilmour, like Black, said he had evidence which could implicate senior Provisionals in terrorist crimes, including murder. Although Black became the more famous of the two, Gilmour’s testimony was arguably a greater threat to the IRA since its structure in Londonderry is smaller and more closely knit.
By late 1982 many members of the IRA were close to panic. Sinn Fein began to orchestrate a closing of ranks in the nationalist community. It referred to the supergrasses as ‘paid perjurers’ and sought ways to pressurize them into retracting their testimony. For some people the appearance of an angry crowd in the public gallery of a court was enough to give them second thoughts. In other cases family members were told that deals could be arranged protecting the safety of the informer if he would withdraw his evidence.
In August 1983 Clifford McKeown, a UVF member, changed his mind and retracted his evidence. This was followed in September by rowdy scenes at a preliminary hearing in Belfast, following which Sean Mallon – an alleged IRA man – withdrew his evidence against several men from Armagh. As he walked from the court some of those who had earlier screamed abuse at Mallon shook his hand saying, ‘We will not forget what you have done.’
Patrick Gilmour, the sixty-one-year-old father of Raymond, was taken from his home by hooded men in November. The IRA hoped that a threat to Patrick Gilmour’s life might force his son to retract his evidence. The problems faced by families of supergrasses were such that his father was believed to have co-operated with the ‘kidnap’ plan, hoping it would end their isolation in the community. But although the ploy failed to deter his son, all the people charged were eventually acquitted. The Derry Brigade took a heavier blow with the defection of another supergrass, Robert Quigley. Ten people were convicted on his evidence.
Shortly after Patrick Gilmour’s abduction, Jackie Goodman, a senior INLA man, withdrew his evidence. Goodman had been wounded in an internal feud and then arrested on the word of another supergrass. It is believed that the police exploited his feelings of betrayal by fellow INLA members and as a result he agreed to give evidence against twenty-seven people. While in protective custody in England, awaiting the trial of his associates, Goodman underwent a change of heart. His wife returned to Belfast and obtained assurances that the INLA would allow him to return to Ireland unharmed if he retracted his evidence.
Despite the collapse in the second half of 1982 of the McKeown, Mallon and Goodman cases, there were still many other cases brought as a result of supergrass evidence going through the courts. Nevertheless, by the end of 1982, many in the RUC expressed growing reservations about the wisdom of bringing any
