Merlyn Rees, the Northern Ireland Secretary at the time, later reflected that the commitment of the Regiment, which had gained a fearsome reputation in the counter-insurgency campaigns that accompanied the dissolution of the British Empire, had not been clearly thought out: ‘It was more presentational and mystique-making than anything else.’
But by sending the SAS to south Armagh Harold Wilson also provided the Army with a valuable resource for covert warfare. Army chiefs wanted to use the SAS not to separate feuding communities but to prosecute their struggle against the highly effective armed republican movement. One IRA unit in south Armagh seemed able to kill soldiers with impunity – forty-nine had been shot or blown up there since the commitment of the Army to Northern Ireland in August 1969.
However, the arrival of the SAS further complicated the struggle between the police and the Army for control in Ulster – a struggle dominated by the personalities of the security chiefs. The SAS’s mission in Northern Ireland was to be governed by the interaction of key figures in these establishments and by their differing interpretations of how the troops under their command could use lethal force yet remain, or appear to remain, within the law. Confusion about the exact role of the SAS even extended to some Army officers. One, writing anonymously in The Times, stated that the SAS would be ‘told to do what the Army has so far failed to do, kill terrorists’. However, he went on to explain that ‘to anyone who knows [the SAS] well, the IRA claim that they have been used as undercover assassins in Northern Ireland is absurd’. Such a confident distinction between an assassin and a soldier carrying out an order to kill terrorists is less than clear, given that a simple order to eliminate terrorists whenever possible would be against the law in Britain.
There was even uncertainty as to who should command the troops. On paper the Army’s chain of command was clear. Initially, the SAS Squadron was under the control of the head of the local regular Army unit, a lieutenant colonel commanding the battalion based in south Armagh on a four-month tour. But those in authority higher up the security forces hierarchy tried to exert their own influence. As the sensitivity of the Squadron’s operations became apparent, the local battalion commander would increasingly refer them to his superior for approval – to the commander of 3 Brigade in Portadown, or even to the Commander Land Forces, the officer responsible for all Army operations in Ulster.
Although the Squadron was under the Army’s jurisdiction, it soon became clear that the initiative for using it often came from the police, especially as the RUC’s informer network provided the SAS with the best intelligence for its operations. A system of liaison officers was set up to make the Army the executive arm of police Special Branch intelligence, but the lack of clear lines of authority and continuing personality clashes hampered matters. Two years later, in 1978, special regional centres were created to control SAS activities; their evolution will be described in Chapter 10.
During the early months of the SAS presence in Northern Ireland, there was a scarcity of intelligence good enough to use for covert operations. The Bessbrook Squadron undertook duties much like those of the more conventional Army units posted to the area. SAS troops went out on patrols lasting several days, mounting observation posts, checking cars and moving across country with the intention of countering terrorists in action. But in time the Squadron came to specialize in surveillance and ambushes based on the highest quality intelligence available to the security forces.
A series of SAS operations in 1976 and 1977 led to the killing of two IRA men, Peter Cleary and Seamus Harvey, and to the arrest of several more. Army chiefs regarded these operations as successes and officers were keen to point to the alarming rate of sectarian murders before 22 SAS’s D Squadron arrived and the absence of such crimes in south Armagh during the remainder of 1976.
Although Army commanders were under strict orders not to cross the Irish border, some apparently chose to do so. In March 1976 Sean McKenna, identified by the Army as a key local IRA commander, was taken from his home in the Republic of Ireland and deposited in Northern Ireland, where an Army patrol promptly arrested him. The IRA said he had been abducted by the SAS, a charge denied at the time by Army headquarters at Lisburn. However, a British officer involved in undercover operations in south Armagh at the time confirms that McKenna was indeed ‘lifted’ by the SAS.
In April Peter Cleary was killed by soldiers in D Squadron. Army intelligence said he was an important Provisional who had been living in the Republic, crossing the border for operations as well as social engagements. On the night in question he had been visiting his fiancée near Forkill, 50 metres north of the border. A four-man SAS team had been observing the house for some days, in two observation posts. The four soldiers had had little sleep and were exposed to the elements. When Cleary arrived they arrested him and radioed for a helicopter to pick them up. According to the Army, three of the soldiers went to light a landing zone for the helicopter while one stood guard over the prisoner. It was then, the soldiers said, that Cleary tried to overpower his guard and was shot during the struggle.
The IRA
