Some of those who worked with the Chief Constable, however, believe his views may have hardened and changed over the years. Initially, he had taken it upon himself to be present at the funeral of every police officer killed by terrorists. In doing so, he had put himself squarely in the path of the torrent of grief which flowed from distraught spouses and children. Eventually he stopped going to all of them, sending one of his senior deputies instead. After his retirement the Chief Constable told the BBC TV’s Everyman programme, ‘I had a concern that it was eroding my capacity to perform my duty as Chief Constable with the objectivity and professionalism which was necessary.’
Whether or not Hermon’s personal attitudes had altered under this pressure from the pacific idealism of his 1980 speech, as overall director of security operations he was theoretically responsible for the ambush tactics to which the Army was returning. But Hermon also presided over another change of note in the form of Assistant Chief Constable Trevor Forbes’ promotion to Head of Special Branch. This office is so important for the direction of covert operations that the views of its incumbent could play a key role in the process of planning ambushes.
Perhaps the most compelling explanation for what the security forces sought to achieve when they returned to a policy of occasional ambushes is provided by a senior figure at Stormont. He says that the idea of mounting such operations ‘is to give the IRA an occasional rap across the knuckles, something which may deter them from carrying out more attacks’. It would appear, from the interviews I have been able to carry out, that the initiative for that change came not from ministers who might have more qualms about the political repercussions of such ‘raps’, but from within the security edifice itself.
Another explanation for the use of ambushes is given by a one-time senior officer at Lisburn. He acknowledges that such operations may provide the IRA with martyrs, but believes they can offer the chance to deal with specific individuals, saying, ‘The balance of advantage to us or them may be very questionable. There comes a time when we say, “We need a kill” – such and such a person is a thorn in our side and we’ve got to do something about him.’
Most officers involved in intelligence work in Northern Ireland tend to believe that ambushes are effective in removing particular players or units. They realize, though, that such measures may buy them limited breathing space. One RUC officer told me at a briefing, ‘We give them a bloody nose but they wipe it and come back. Sometimes we hit them hard and take out an entire Active Service Unit. There’s a lull, new faces appear and the whole thing starts up again.’
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It is apparent, talking to those who have been present during discussions of special forces operations in Ulster, that the security chiefs and ministers themselves to some extent fall prey to the mentality of the ‘clean kill’. Given that explicit discussion of eliminating IRA members was anathema to most of these people, it is worth discussing here how a typical SAS operation evolved in Ulster during the mid 1980s – a process pieced together from people who have played various parts in such dramas.
The idea of mounting a pre-emptive special forces operation against terrorists can emerge in a number of places. The initiative most often comes from a Regional Head of Special Branch or sometimes the Head of Special Branch himself, following the receipt of informer intelligence about the location of an arms cache or the target of a forthcoming attack. Information from a ‘national asset’ informer is often given by the Security Service to the SB, because it is they – through the TCG – who have the ability to do something about it. The SB may suggest a pre-emptive operation or may simply relay the information in neutral terms to the Army. It may be the brigade commander, the CLF or the commanding officer of the Intelligence and Security Group – a man selected for his experience of covert operations – who may then suggest that the tip is suitable for ‘executive action’.
A plan will then be formulated by the Int and Sy Group in close collaboration with the TCG. Their operation, by this stage given a code name, will then be referred to the CLF for approval. He may then refer it up to the GOC and chief constable and they in turn may tell the Secretary of State. This is likely to take the form of a brief conversation in which the Secretary of State is told that there is an opportunity to deal a significant blow to the terrorists. If asked, the Secretary of State usually responds that the general or senior police officer should do what they think is right. Once approved, the plan is then passed on to the surveillance teams and SAS who must carry it out.
Many of the operations approved either at ministerial or lower level come to nothing because of the unreliability of informer intelligence. The soldiers return to camp several days later without sighting the terrorists.
The process of formulation and approval of such operations may be compared in some ways to the idea of loading the rifle of one soldier in a firing squad with a blank bullet. This has sometimes been done to allow all members of the firing squad to believe that they personally were not responsible for the death of their target. In the same way a general may distance himself from what the officer quoted earlier referred to as the ‘pretty obvious’ consequences of a successful pre-emptive operation by referring the matter for higher approval. The Secretary of State may feel he or she is not responsible because it is easier to accept the advice
