The Ulster Defence Regiment has been a particular target for assassination. Of the 159 members of the Regiment killed between its formation and the end of 1986, 129 were off duty. In recent years the IRA has sought to justify these attacks by drawing attention to the links between UDR soldiers and loyalist paramilitary groups. But the very fact that the UDR is such an overwhelmingly Protestant force is due in part to the fact that many Catholic UDR members were killed by the IRA in the early 1970s, with the intention of intimidating others into leaving.
Many of the killings have happened in circumstances where the victim was defenceless. A female UDR soldier was shot dead as she lay in bed. Others have been killed in front of their children or mothers. Delivery people have been ambushed on their rounds. These attacks have the effect of hardening members of the security forces, often making them callous to the plight of Catholics claiming harassment or other infringements of their civil liberties. IRA claims that members were defenceless when shot by the SAS are met by security forces members with rejoinders about the IRA’s own standards of ‘fairness’ in shooting people dead on their front doorsteps. Although senior officers recognize the moral danger in drawing parallels between their own behaviour and that of the Provisionals, they accept that for many of the soldiers running night-time roadblocks the realities are different.
The selection of soft targets also carried with it an implicit admission by the IRA of its increased difficulties in attacking soldiers on patrol. In 1973 or 1974, for example, the number of British soldiers killed exceeded the number of locally recruited (UDR or RUC) people. But the Provisionals understood both the greater role being played by these forces as a result of Police Primacy and the fact that it had become more and more dangerous for them to take pot shots at regular Army patrols. In 1983 five regular British Army soldiers were killed, compared to ten UDR members and eighteen RUC members; and in 1984 nine regular Army soldiers were killed compared to ten UDR members and eight police officers. Most of the UDR murders and many of those of RUC members took place when they were off-duty.
Cumulatively, attacks on soft targets had the effect of ‘needling’ people – making soldiers and police more likely to overreact, thus handing propaganda success to the paramilitaries. The tactic would, in turn, make many others leave the UDR or police, and draw others into loyalist terrorism. The covert operators were well aware of the effect of such killings on morale but found it hard to pre-empt such attacks. The number of people who know in advance about an attack on an off-duty UDR soldier or RUC officer is small compared to that required for many other types of operation. The two or three terrorists carrying out the attack and their ASU commander might be the only people who knew who was going to be attacked, when and where. ‘Dickers’ might have a good idea of the target but no clue as to when he or she would be killed. Those sent to hijack the getaway car could give a clue to the timing but probably have no clue as to why the vehicle was needed. A quartermaster might know when it would happen, but not the target.
Security chiefs had decided by 1983 to devote significant resources to the task of trying to protect soft targets. The Intelligence and Security Group was involved, as were the Close Observation Platoons which were part of various infantry battalions serving in Ulster. The COPs were given their duties by the TCG operations centres. Some of their missions were based on informer intelligence identifying a specific threat to an individual, but high-grade information of that kind was normally given to the Int and Sy Group, leaving the COPs with little better to operate on than local hearsay and the guesswork of intelligence officers.
An insight into the work of the Close Observation Platoon which was part of the Queen’s Own Highlanders, based at Aldergrove during the years 1983 to 1985, was provided by the Regiment’s magazine. The COP commander reported: ‘Tasking kept us employed, providing soft-target protection for off-duty UDR men. This was accomplished in varying styles with some patrols living on premises and others under dung heaps and hedges.’
The Highlanders did not encounter the IRA during these duties – like most covert operators their many hours spent lying-in-wait had passed without incident. Only the best intelligence could make possible a different outcome.
Late in 1984 the Special Branch obtained a very unusual tip-off. The SB learnt about a planned IRA attack on a part-time UDR member near Dungannon. In the fuzzy world of counter-terrorist intelligence, all of the details are rarely present. Intelligence chiefs did however believe the tip was sufficiently reliable to make a covert operation worthwhile.
Int and Sy Group surveillance experts and SAS men were directed by the local TCG to formulate a plan to catch the UDR man’s would-be killers in the act. The area around the junction, where a haulage contractor called Capper and Lambe is based, was placed out of bounds to other units – a standard procedure in covert operations designed to keep patrols who did not need to be briefed on the operation away from danger and to prevent a ‘blue on blue’, an accidental engagement between soldiers or police officers. It is not possible to say with certainty why this
