The latest aerial photographs taken over Cuba gave a grim picture of feverish work on the missile sites. At least thirty missiles with warheads had been identified and at least twenty crated Ilyushin L-28s capable of delivering bombs on American cities.
The Secretary General of the United Nations, U Thant, sent identical letters to Khrushchev and Kennedy urging suspension of the blockade and Soviet arms shipments for a period of two to three weeks. President Kennedy refused to negotiate until all missiles and their bases had been removed from Cuba.
In Moscow, William Knox, an American businessman known in Kremlin circles, was summoned to the Kremlin to deliver a message to Washington. He reported that at the interview Khrushchev looked exhausted and on the verge of collapse and was so incoherent that there was no message to pass on.
Then came the news that twenty of the Soviet ships had stopped dead in the water and further news that six ships had turned round and an hour later six more then turned back. The Ex Comm was well aware that this was only the first move in what was going to be a battle of wills. But one senior official did say, in confidence, to a colleague—“… I think the other fellow just blinked.”
The next day marked the first interception of Soviet ships. One was carrying petrol and the other a group of East German students. The President had given instructions to the Navy to allow time for the captains of intercepted vessels to contact Moscow. In both cases there was no resistance and after inspection they were allowed to carry on to Cuba.
But the highspot of the day was the clash on TV at the UN Security Council between Adlai Stevenson and the Soviet’s Valerian Zorin. Zorin openly challenged Stevenson to prove that there were missiles in Cuba. Stevenson turned on him angrily, “Do you deny that there are missiles there? Yes or no? Don’t wait for the translation, answer—yes or no?”
Zorin said angrily that he was not in an American courtroom and Stevenson seized on the statement.
“You are in the court-room of world opinion right now and you can answer yes or no.”
Zorin, backing off, said lamely, “You will have your answer in due course.”
Stevenson said angrily, “I’m prepared to wait for my answer until hell freezes over, if that’s your decision. And right now I offer this evidence to the assembly.”
Whereupon Stevenson unveiled two easels which had previously been covered. They showed big blown-up photographs of the missile sites and missiles. Zorin swept angrily from his seat with the Soviet delegation. It was a public defeat for the Soviet Union.
All that day Malloy and Aarons had sat in an annexe to the large room where the Ex Comm was in permanent session.
The following day, Friday, October 26th was a day of conflicting episodes. Early in the morning the destroyer Joseph P. Kennedy Jr had stopped the Maruda, put on board an armed, naval search party who, finding nothing offensive, allowed her to go on her way. It seemed that Moscow had instructed Soviet captains not to resist search parties.
On Cuba it was now obvious that the missiles were within hours of being ready for firing and Robert Kennedy got in touch with Ambassador Dobrynin to tell him that the President could not hold off for longer than forty-eight hours.
At lunch-time John Scali, a TV journalist who covered the State Department for ABC, got a telephone call from an acquaintance at the Soviet embassy. The caller, Alex Fomin, was on the embassy staff but was almost certainly a colonel in the KGB. Fomin seemed to be in a highly agitated state and insisted that Scali met him in ten minutes time at a restaurant on Pennsylvania Avenue.
At the restaurant, the Occidental, Fomin wanted to know if the State Department would agree to a three-part deal. The removal of the missiles from Cuba, a promise from Castro to have no offensive weapons in future, and the United States’ pledge not to invade Cuba. Scali left and the two met again at 7.30 p.m. at the coffee shop at the Statler Hilton. Scali had spoken to Rusk and told Fomin that the US government were definitely interested. Fomin left the hotel in a hurry.
Meanwhile, at 6 p.m., 1 a.m. Moscow time, a long, rambling letter from Khrushchev came through on the teletype machine that linked the US embassy in Moscow with the State Department. The letter proposed that no more missiles would be sent to Cuba, and the missiles already in Cuba would be removed or destroyed if President Kennedy agreed not to attack Cuba.
Late in the evening the Ex Comm after considering the proposal agreed to accept the proposal as if it were a formal diplomatic note. They would reply to that effect in the morning.
It was nearly midnight when the President and Robert Kennedy called in Malloy and Aarons. Robert outlined to them what had happened. Both Kennedys looked tired. It looked like a successful end to the crisis but the President seemed uneasy.
“Do you think they mean it, Andy?”
“To some extent they do.”
“What’s that mean?”
“I don’t think it was an accident or an administrative mistake that the proposal was in a teletype letter from Khrushchev.”
“Go on.”
“I think it was the first step of negotiations.”
“There’s nothing to negotiate. We agree with his proposals.”
“Have you sent off a formal acceptance to Moscow?”
“No. We’ll do that tomorrow morning.”
“I think that to delay the answer might be a mistake, Mr. President.”
“Why?”
“Because they can claim that that was just a personal letter from Khrushchev. Not a proposal but just a sounding out of possible terms. Not with the backing of the Central Committee. Not even official, or it would have come by normal diplomatic means.”
“And when we’ve shown our hands they turn us down?”
“No. I think they’d just add in a few items that they would like themselves. They’ll know that you’re ready to do a deal. You aren’t intent on invading Cuba.
