Doctor Goebbels: His Life & Death

has intervenedand propose a Six Power conference. A cease-fire until then. The Führer says he’s notdisinclined to go along, once he gets his hand on something worthwhile. Thus allmilitary efforts are concentrated on shutting off the Corridor.’13The civilian minister, Goebbels, had real cause to fear that the military would henceforthcommand Hitler’s undivided attention. Although his diary had frequently displayedreal admiration for the junior officer corps, he detested the older, knucklebrainedarmy generals and found words of admiration only for Blomberg and Fritsch.14When Polish machine-gun bullets shortly ended Fritsch’s life, Goebbels demonstrativelyattended the state funeral while Keitel, Himmler, and the S.S. generals stayedaway.15HIS fear that war would marginalize him proved well-founded. He was invited to visitHitler’s field headquarters only twice during the entire Polish campaign.16 In Hitler’sabsence, Goebbels’ critics became more vociferous. ‘The party veterans reject himto a man,’ wrote Rosenberg. ‘Gauleiters tell me that if the Führer would only dumphim, they’d eat him for breakfast.’17 The tension between Goebbels and his colleagueswas evident whenever Göring’s ministerial Reich Defence Committee met. Presidingbuddha-like over these cabinet-style meetings, Göring did nothing to protectGoebbels. ‘Goebbels appears to be finished,’ wrote one rival happily after seeing thefield marshal. ‘What a blessing.’18 That Göring had the upper hand was evident onDay Two, as he unexpectedly ordered most of Goebbels’ radio stations to shut downin the evenings so that the enemy air force could not use them as radio beacons.19The conflict of personalities became plain on the very first day of war, September1, 1939. Since Hitler’s dream of nationwide cable radio was still unfulfilled, Goebbelshad circulated that midday a proposed new law making it a criminal, even capital,offence to listen to foreign radio broadcasts and calling for all radio sets to be turnedover to the authorities.20 He met an immediate storm of protest from other ministers.Justice Minister Gürtner pointed to the damning effect it would have at home564 GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICHand abroad on the credibility of their own propaganda, besides creating an army ofpetty snoopers and informers.21 The Göring committee unanimously turned downGoebbels’ proposal, citing obvious technical difficulties.22 The next day however theminister of the interior Dr Frick persuaded Hitler to accept a ban on listening toforeign political broadcasts, and that evening Goebbels’ radio announced the new‘law.’23 As both Frick and Rudolf Hess pointed out to Hitler that if Goebbels called ineverybody’s radio sets the people would be unable to hear their Führer, that suggestion—which was surely one of Goebbels’ less intelligent plans—was abandoned.The confiscation was restricted to Jewish owned radios.24 He circularised all partyofficials that ‘under the Reich Defence Committee ordinance of September 1’ eventhey were forbidden to tune in to foreign broadcasts.25 He found it hard to prevail onother issues too. He objected that printing the party’s eagle emblem onto rationcards would link it too closely with an unpopular measure. ‘I fear, Dr Goebbels,’retorted Darré sarcastically, ‘that this is a war which is not going to be won by popularity.’26‘The Russian military mission arrives in Berlin,’ he noted on September 3. ‘A greatadvantage for us.’ But his jubilation was short-lived, as London dictated an ultimatumto Hitler at nine A.M., timed to expire at eleven. ‘Straight over to the ReichChancellery,’ he recorded. ‘The Führer is indignant and has no intention of acceptingthe ultimatum. He dictates a biting memorandum in which he justifies this.’ Evenafter listening to Chamberlain’s radio declaration of war Goebbels was still asking:‘Will London really go for broke?’In a discussion with Hitler shortly after, he mapped out his propaganda tactics. Hewould try to detach Chamberlain, Churchill, and Eden from their people. They wouldspare France for the time being. Before departing for the ‘eastern front’ that evening,Hitler reassured him that he anticipated only a phoney war in the west. Goebbelswas sceptical: ‘Now that Churchill is known to be in the Cabinet [as First Lord of theAdmiralty] I find that hard to believe.’ Göring too had his doubts, he discovered in alengthy conversation with the field marshal that night: economically and militarily,GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH 565Germany could see it through—but even Göring secretly wondered whether theGerman people would.27For a few days, Goebbels was overwhelmed by the new problems of propaganda ina shooting war. Hearing of the sinking of the Athenia (‘it can’t have been us,’ heassured his private diary28), he dismissed it at once as ‘a fresh bluff and propagandatrick by Churchill & Co’ and started ‘the denial machine’ rolling. When Poland claimedthat Nazi troops had destroyed the Madonna of Czestochowa, Goebbels flew Americanjournalist Louis Lochner thither in a bomber to see that it was a lie. He had eighthundred banners erected along the western front proclaiming to the French, ‘Wewon’t shoot if you don’t. We’ve no quarrel with you!’29 Leopold Gutterer, one of hismost imaginative men, suggested they cascade tons of forged pound notes over Britain—thirty percent of its entire currency. Goebbels liked the idea until it occurredto him that the British might well retaliate in kind.30 A file of Goebbels’ phone conversationswith his Italian counterpart confirms his early tactics. He suggested theItalians concentrate on driving the British and French apart, reserving their mosthostile language for Churchill, Eden, and Chamberlain; he asked that if he issued adenial, the Italian press should give it prominence too; to counter the Polish atrocity-claims, he urged the Italians to report fully the Polish massacre of thousands ofGerman civilians at Bromberg in Poland on the first Sunday of the war.31At air staff headquarters outside Potsdam on the fifth, and Göring assured him thatthey would soon have a strategic breakthrough in Poland. He was livid withRibbentrop, who had been too inflexible in stating German demands; and outragedat the Italians, telling Goebbels that they deserved only contempt. Sitting under thetrees, the two Nazis discussed Germany’s plight if a full scale world war resulted.Churchill’s appointment had shocked them both—but Goebbels hoped the Britishmight still be bluffing.32 On the seventh he flew in a bomber to Hitler’s headquartersnear Gross-Born to discuss Ribbentrop’s take-over of foreign propaganda:The Führer [he recorded] is living in an armoured train in the middle of a