Washington sent the following circular letter to his general officers on December 3, 1777:
WHITEMARSH
Sir;
I wish to recall your attention to the important matter recommended to your consideration sometime ago—namely the advisability of a Winter’s Campaign, and practicability of an attack upon Philadelphia with the aid of a considerable body of Militia, to be assembled at an appointed time and place—Particular reasons urge me to request your Sentiments on this matter by the morning, and I shall expect to receive them in writing accordingly by that time.8
Surviving responses to the circular include letters from Generals Cadwalader, Duportail, Greene, Kalb, Knox, Lafayette, Stirling, and Varnum on December 3 and from generals Armstrong, Irvine, Maxwell, Muhlenberg, Patterson, Poor, Potter, Scott, Smallwood, Sullivan, Wayne, Weedon, and Woodford on December 4. Joseph Reed also presented an opinion on December 4.
Duportail analyzed the situation and provided a concise response in less than an hour in his memorial:
I have examined anew with all the attention of which I am capable, the Project of attacking the English and it still appears to me too dangerous,—the great body of Militia with which we might be reinforced for this purpose does not give me any additional hope of succeeding—it is not the number of troops which is of importance in this case, but it is the quality, or rather, their nature and manner of fighting. The Troops wanted are such as are capable of attacking with the greatest vivacity, the greatest firmness—Troops that are not astonished at suffering a considerable loss at the first onset, without causing any to the Enemy—for this must be the case in an attack of Intrenchments—although when the Works are carried the Chance turns and the loss is on the side of the intrenched.—now, are the Militia or even our Continentals capable of undergoing this trial, in which the best Troops in the world cannot always support themselves—I am very sorry, in giving the motives for my opinion to be obliged to speak so unfavorably of our Army But the Battle of German Town ought to be a Lesson to us—if our Army had proceeded with vigour on that occasion, would not the English have been completely defeated? The Disposition was excellent—Your Excellency in that instance really conquered General Howe, but his troops conquered yours—if then notwithstanding the advantage of a complete Surprise, notwithstanding the advantages of ground we were repulsed—what would happen before a Line of Redoubts well disposed in all appearance, and the Intervals of which are closed with Abbatis.
There is, however, a case in which I think we might attack the Enemy with Success—I mean if the Schuylkill should be sufficiently frozen below their left to admit of our throwing our greatest Force on their Rear at the same time that we should make an attack in front. Gentlemen acquainted with the Country must decide this point—if indeed the Schuylkill is sufficiently frozen every year to afford a passage for Columns of Troops with Artillery—my opinion is fixed—I think the Army ought to be marched to the other side of the Schuylkill, to be reinforced with all the militia that can be collected, while we wait for the favorable moment.
I would go more minutely into the Subject, if Your Excellency did not order me to send my Answer this morning I did not receive Your Excellency’s letter until half after twelve and it is now half after one.9
The lesson was “Patience, and train your army before you attempt deliberately to attack seasoned troops.” Duportail and the ministry in France both realized that the Americans possessed, in General Washington, not only a military genius but also a man of such character that he could endure apparent defeat with equanimity and that his foundation principles were such that he could be relied on to lead the army through all difficulties to final success.
While the army was waiting at Whitemarsh, uncertain regarding the movements of the British, Duportail went to reconnoiter the positions at Chester and Darby for possible fortification. Two undated pencil sketches from his hand, with explanations, are in the Washington papers in the Library of Congress. The report was not sufficiently favorable for these locations to receive further attention.
On Monday afternoon, December 8, 1777, after having hovered about for several days as though intending to attack Washington, General Howe “changed front and by two or three routes marched his army back to Philadelphia.”10 Washington left Whitemarsh on the twelfth. The engineers first constructed a bridging train during the night of December 11–12, 1777. It consisted of two bridges over the Schuylkill River at Swede’s Ford. One comprised a roadbed laid across floating rafts; the other involved thirty-six wagons in the shallow water of the ford with rails across them. The engineers later constructed more sophisticated flat-bottomed pontons with special wheeled carriages at Albany. (These pontons accompanied the troops to Yorktown in 1781.)
The artillery park at Valley Forge was placed at the center of the inner line of defense so the guns could be moved quickly to wherever they were needed. Photo courtesy of the author.
GULPH MILLS
By sunrise, the army had crossed the river and stopped at a place known as the Gulph Mills. Here, General Washington decided on Valley Forge for winter quarters. His camp overlooked a bleak and desolate winter landscape with a beating rain driving in on the men, who had pitched tents to make themselves a little more comfortable. Heartbroken at abandoning his plan of action for 1777 and fully realizing the hardships they both already endured and were yet to face, he wrote an address to the army with heart and mind buoyed by confidence. Nowhere does the simplicity and moral grandeur of the character of this
