According to all this, I therefore propose the United States fortify well three ports: one in the North, another in the South, and a third between the two. The reasons for this distribution are self-evident (note C). The sites would be entirely enclosed and in a state to sustain a regular siege by land. On the other hand, I don’t know which places would be most suitable for their construction. Maybe Boston and Charlestown would be suitable. For the place in the middle, we could think of Philadelphia.
But Philadelphia would require much work and expense. It is very close to the North River which offers a very strong settlement or one which could easily be made so. I do not speak here of New York because I do not know it well enough. On the other hand, I believe, given its location, it will always belong to whoever is master of the sea.
But if the works we are constructing now at West Point were constructed solidly and with suitable modifications, instead of field works, the North River above this location all the way to Albany could provide a safe harbor for this state’s entire navy.
But we must assure that it is only a refuge. A warship or a few frigates at the mouth of the river would suffice to prevent your ships from exiting and thus render them totally useless. That is the flaw of all the ports on the rivers which are large enough for ships to remain there without being master of the shores.
Boston and Charlestown, supposing they are otherwise suitable, would not have this defect. I would desire therefore that the third fortified port not have it also. It should go straight to the sea. I hope that the coasts of Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia offer some convenient locations. That’s what needs to be studied.
Now we have another thing to consider. Suppose that we have three well-fortified ports where most of our merchant vessels, privateers, frigates, allied fleets have nothing to fear from the enemy in time of war, that they are always well supplied and have, in themselves or nearby, sufficient people to defend them, would we do nothing at all for the safety of the others?
Would we leave such cities exposed so that little enemy fleets could reach them without difficulty, take or burn the vessels there and even ravage the cities? Certainly not! But here are the principles which should guide us in this matter.
We have said that the inconvenience of constructing many fortifications in a sparsely populated land, compared to its extent, is that the enemy could find a way to seize some of these fortified locations, allowing them to remain in the region much more easily.
But if we could fortify these sites in such a way that our fortifications would give us the means to block an enemy from capturing them and not allow them to occupy them safely, it is clear that we would have attained the goal.
It is only a matter of knowing whether the matter is possible. It is certainly not everywhere, at every site, but it is at many. Let’s assure that we want to put ourselves in safety here from naval forces, fleets. Any fortification which would prevent warships from entering a port, to land nearby, would achieve our purpose without then being turned against us.
For example, I’ll cite Philadelphia. The forts which were nearby would have prevented the British from going up river to the city and when they took possession of it by land, the forts would serve them nothing to remain there. Also, they destroyed these forts. Therefore, that is the touchstone by which we would test the deployment of the fortifications for the sites under consideration.
We will ask ourselves, supposing that the enemy somehow captured these places, whether it would be convenient for them to destroy our fortifications. When we think they must do so or, in a word, that they would be useless, we will conclude that our fortifications are well-placed.
These are the principles according to which we would fortify all the other ports or important places on the American coast (except our three large ports). In this manner, supposing the worst case scenario which is that the Americans, for some reason, were not prompt and did not have the means to use the constructed works to repulse the enemy, we would at least have the pleasure of seeing that our works would be totally useless to them.
However, there is still a problem with what I propose in this memoir. Perhaps the plan of three well-fortified ports that might be the cradle of this continent’s Navy, which encompass all the arsenals etc. might go against the rights of the different states. Each of these states being sovereign, doesn’t it belong to them alone to provide for its defense as it sees fit, to build forts or not? In sum, to construct such fortifications as it pleases? Wouldn’t the construction of three fortified places arouse the jealousy of the other states against the three which possess them?
I don’t know if these inconveniences are true or false. I don’t know enough about the Constitution of the United States to make any judgment on that. All that I can say is that I believe that the strength of the United States depends on its interior union, that in regard to war, the 13 states should consider themselves as one. It would then be easy to show this truth, but I will content myself only with making it in regard to fortification.
The general Congress should not meddle, in any way, in the construction of fortifications of the continent; that each state in particular, having only limited means, be charged with working to its defense as it sees fit and you will soon see a multitude of little fortifications constructed, defective in many ways.
As it will not join forces with the neighboring states, many of these fortifications will become useless or
