The initial effect on the British was negative. Their inability to confront the Germans successfully in Norway reduced their standing as a military power and this was reinforced by the calamity in France. In a strange twist of history, Churchill, who was largely responsible for some of the most serious mistakes in Norway not only survived politically but also became Prime Minister. His eloquence and determination became factors of immense importance as he became the personification of Allied determination to prevail. Churchill himself was surprised by his political survival. In the initial draft about these events he wrote, “it was a marvel–I really do not know how–I survived and maintained my position in public esteem while all the blame was thrown on poor Mr. Chamberlain.”6
The British put their lessons from Norway to good use but there remained resistance to the recognition of the problems and the necessary corrective actions. Although Churchill had toyed with the idea of restructuring the cumbersome command structure earlier, the fiasco in Norway gave impetus to the effort. The reorganization did away with some of the maze of committees involved in planning and decision-making. A Ministry of Defense was created and a system of theater commanders was established. These reorganizations eliminated some of the most serious command structure problems that had plagued the operations in Norway.
The operational lessons were also taken to heart. British troops were not again sent into battle in the sad state that they were in Norway. There was increased emphasis on training. The problem of close air support for ground troops was addressed and it became an increasingly important factor in future operations. The British were impressed by the innovative German use of airborne and air assault forces to seize airfields and this gave an impetus to the development of similar capabilities.
While the lessons from the Norwegian campaign led to important improvements in the planning and conduct of combined operations, their importance should not be overstated. As Kersaudy points out, some of the mistakes were repeated at Dakar, Crete, and Dieppe and it was only through the resistance of military advisers, that Churchill was kept from carrying out major landings in Norway later in the war.
Improved inter-allied cooperation and coordination was forced on the British more by the developing situation than by lessons learned from Norway. As the war became worldwide, the British sometimes found themselves in the unaccustomed situation of being a junior member of a coalition of great powers. This uncomfortable position required a revision of some traditional thinking and the establishment of new command structures. The eventual success of the more compromising approach was due in large measure to the leadership of Churchill and Roosevelt. They recognized that coalition warfare requires compromises and accepted the necessity that coalition goals take precedence over more parochial ones.
The Allies obtained the willing service of the 4.8 million ton Norwegian merchant fleet. The service and sacrifice of this fleet was a vital factor in the survival of Britain, particularly in the critical period 1940-1942.
The German invasion had a profound effect on Norwegian policies over the next two generations. There was no return to the policy of neutrality. Norway embraced collective security and became a charter member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. While Norway has elected not to become a member of the European Union, there remains strong support for the traditional security system that came into being after the war.
Maps
Ships passing in the night. On April 8, 1940, German flotillas, in a surprise operation, were able to slip through the teeth of British naval superiority to begin the invasion of Norway.
Above: British warships attacking the Germans on the approaches to Narvik. Below: The Battle of Bjørnefjell on April 16 saw German troops surprising and defeating a larger Norwegian force, thus securing the all-important railway line to Sweden.
The Battle of Tretten, in which the Germans defeated a combined British-Norwegian force, and the British 148th Brigade all but ceased to exist.
The area between Trondheim, Norway’s ancient capital (bottom), and the city of Namsos (top).
The region south of Narvik along Norway’s central west coast.
The Allies repeatedly attempted to break the German grip on Narvik until events in France forced efforts to cease.
Norwegian forces persisted in attacking after the Allied evacuation had begun, but finally capitulated to the Germans on June 10, 1940.
The British evacuation that culiminated in the loss of the Glorious.
COMMAND STRUCTURES
Allied Command Structure in Norway
1 General Massy never left London but operated from the War Office. British commanders in Central Norway did not command naval or air forces associated with their operations. Those forces took their orders from their respective service.
2 Scissorforce and Colonel Gubbins remained under General Massy’s command until May 7 when the command was transferred to General Auchinleck.
3 Initially, Admiral Cork commanded only the naval forces and reported to the Admiralty. Major General Mackesy, replaced by Lieutenant General Auchinleck on May 16, reported to General Ironside. Admiral Cork assumed command of both sea and land forces on April 20.
4 All naval forces operating within 100 nautical miles of Harstad.
5 Lieutenant General Auchinleck assumed command from Major General Mackesy on May 16.
6 Brigadier Fraser commanded the 24th Guards until he was evacuated to England at which time Gubbins, promoted to brevet Brigadier General, assumed command of that unit as well as the Independent Companies.
German Command Structure for Operations in Norway
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