6 Bernhard von Lossberg, Im Wehrmachtführungs-stab. Bericht eines Generalstabsoffiziers (Hamburg: H. H. Nölke, 1949), p. 70.
7 3. Gebirgsdivision Kriegstagesbuch (hereinafter 3GDKTB), April 17, 1940.
8 Major Omdal, one lieutenant, one sergeant, and seven soldiers managed to escape on May 19. Two soldiers were caught trying to cross into Sweden. Major Omdal rejoined Norwegian forces further north on May 20 and took command of the 1/15th Infantry on May 24. The other seven apparently made good their escape to Sweden.
9 Olof Sundell, 9. april (Stockholm: Sohlmans, 1949), p. 227.
10 3GDKTB, 04261130. These, and later specialists, were mostly camouflaged military personnel. A message from Group XXI (Nr. 298 dated May 22, 1940 at 1900 hours) reads, “40 machinegun and mortars specialists are leaving Berlin for Narvik via Sweden at 1000 hours on May 23. A further 80 specialists will follow in about 3 days. Appropriate attire will be worn for the purpose concealment.”
11 Büchner, Narvik, p. 52.
12 Reports by Major General Dahl in 1946 and Captain Olav Løvland in 1941 as quoted in Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 1, p. 240.
13 Arne Dagfin Dahl, Med Alta bataljon mot tyskerne (Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co., 1945), p. 60.
14 Ibid, p. 53. He writes, “… A determined advance by the hitherto un-noticed concentration of three rested enemy battalions in the Elvenes area would have encountered a precarious Group Windisch and could have opened the road to Bjerkvik. It is thanks to the determined attack by the 1/139, under the command of Major Stautner that this did not happen. Because of his surprise attack, the Norwegians were forced into a more careful tactical mode that was noticeable repeatedly until the end of the fighting and thereby he secured for Group Narvik a gain of decisive significance.”
15 Hovland, Fleischer, p. 126.
Chapter 10
1 Lindback-Larsen, Kriegen, p. 66.
2 Ziemke, The German Northern Theater, p. 70.
3 Bernard Fergusson, The Watery Maze (London: Collins, 1961), p. 44.
4 Dudley Clarke, Seven Assignments (London: Jonathan Cape, 1948), p. 88.
5 Derry, The Campaign in Norway, Appendix A, p. 251.
6 Ibid, p. 99.
7 Kersuady, Norway, p. 116.
8 Tamelander and Zetterling, Niende april, p. 164.
9 Jørgen Jensen, Krigen på Hedemark (Oslo: Tanum, 1947), p. 138.
10 See, for example, Tamelander and Zetterling, Niende april, p. 165 and Derry, The Campaign in Norway, p.111. Morgan was not present when the Germans attacked. He had traveled to Åndalsnes where the 15th Brigade was landing the following day.
11 Gudbrand Østbye, Krigen i Norge 1940. Operasjonene på Vestsiden av Mjøsa–Follebu-Gausdal (Oslo: Forsvarets Krigshistoriske Avdeling, 1960), pp. 231-233, 250-251 and Lindbäck-Larsen, Krigen, p. 95.
12 Tage Ellinger, Den Forunderlige Krig (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1960), pp. 27-28
13 As quoted in Derry, The Campaign in Norway, p. 122.
14 Lindbäck-Larsen, Krigen, p. 94.
15 Kersuady, Norway, p. 154.
16 As quoted in Tamelander and Zetterling, Niende april, p. 165.
17 MacLeod and Kelly, Time Unguarded, p. 287.
18 As quoted in Kersuady, Norway, p. 167.
19 Ibid, p. 176.
20 Norwegian Broadcasting System (NRK) interview with Major General Roscher-Nielsen on January 18, 1965 as quoted in Kersuady, Norway, p. 170.
21 Ash, Norway 1940, p. 100, after describing the troops’ lack of essential equipment, notes how they were issued lavish personal kits “to make up for everything…” which they had to carry due to lack of transportation and “General Carton de Wiart declared with some heat that the men could not carry all their kit, while if they put it on they looked like paralysed bears and were unable to move.”
22 Since ammunition for Norwegian weapons was not produced outside Norway and because they were cut off from their source in southern Norway, the solution was to supply them with British weapons. About 7,000 rifles and 250 Bren guns with ammunition finally arrived in the transport Chobry on April 28 but off-loading priority was given to French antiaircraft batteries (despite that day’s evacuation order). The Norwegian weapons and ammunition sailed away on the transport. This may have been deliberate since the British did not want these weapons to fall into German hands.
23 Ole Berg Getz, Fra krigen i Nord-Trøndelag 1940 (. Oslo: Aschehoug & Co., 1940), p.139.
24 Ibid, p. 144.
25 Kersuady, Norway, p. 181.
26 As quoted in Kersuady, Norway, p. 125.
Chapter 11
1 Karol Zbyszewski, The Fight for Narvik: Impressions of the Polish Campaign in Norway (London: L. Drummond, 1041), p. 3. While styled Chasseurs de Montagne or Chasseurs du Nord, many of the troops had never seen any mountains and they were definitely not trained for arctic winter warfare.
2 Raymond Sereau, L’Expedition de Norvège 1940 (Baden-Baden: Regie Autonome des Publications Officielles, 1949), p. 48.
3 Ibid, p. 51 and an 11-page manuscript in Norwegian titled “Rapport–General Bethouart,” p. 3.
4 3GDKTB, 04281945, 04300930, and 05011900.
5 Ibid, 05020330, 05030230, and 05031420.
6 Munthe-Kaas, Kriegent, p. 109, note.
7 Ibid, p. 109 and Johan Helge Berg and Olav Vollan, Fjellkrigen 1940. Lapphaugen-Bjørnefjell (Trondheim: Wennbergs Trykkeri A.S., 1999), pp. 142-143.
8 3GDKTB, 04290930.
9 “Rapport–General Bethouart”, p. 3.
10 Sereau, L’Expedition, p. 54 and “Rapport–General Bethouart”, p. 3.
11 As quoted in Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 2, p. 54.
13 3GDKTB, 05042010.
14 Trygve Lie, Leve eller dø. Norge i Krig (Oslo: Tiden norsk forlag, 1955), p. 206.
15 Quoted in Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 2, p. 67.
16 Hovland, Fleischer, p.157.
17 Ibid, p. 227.
18 Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 2, pp. 114, 69.
19 Ruge, Felttoget, p. 130.
Chapter 12
1 Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 2, pp. 60-61, n. 4.
2 Lindbäck-Larsen, Rapport, Section 8:3-4 and Getz, Nord-Trøndelag 1940, pp. 115-116, entries for 1225 hours on April 28 (Message 329 from 6th Division) and 1330 hours same day (letter Nr. 125 from Getz to Fleischer).
3 Getz, Nord-Trøndelag 1940, pp. 122-123, entry 1130 hours April 29.
4 Ibid, p. 116, entry for 1300 hours April 28 and Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 2, pp. 60-61, n. 4.
