A short time thereafter, Admiral Boyes, the British Naval Attaché, arrived. His visit was to have a serious effect on Norwegian expectations and preparations. Boyes asked Steen to report to Admiral Diesen that he had reason to believe that a British fleet was on its way to meet the German naval forces that were reported at sea. Captain Steen assumed that the admiral was speaking about the German naval units in the Kattegat and Skagerrak, but the British in fact had no intention of meeting those units. Instead, Boyes may have meant the German naval forces that the British had sighted on a northerly course in the North Sea the previous day (see later in this chapter). The Norwegian Naval Staff did not know about this sighting.
The information provided by Admiral Boyes led Admiral Diesen and his staff to conclude that they could expect a major collision between German and British naval forces within a short time and they expected the Germans to be driven back with heavy losses. Admiral Diesen passed this information on to the 1st Naval District.
New information from the Swedish Defense Staff, received around noon, confirmed the earlier reports about strong German naval units heading north. The Swedes also reported that infantry and artillery units were observed near Rendsburg, heading north towards the Danish border. The Swedes intended to conduct aerial reconnaissance over the Kattegat and report the results to the Norwegians but no further reports were received.
There were several incidents during April 8 which, taken together with the flow of intelligence reports of German naval and troop movements, should have energized the Norwegians to take immediate precautions. The first incident was the sinking of the German transport Rio de Janeiro in international waters off the southern coast of Norway by the Polish submarine Orzel. This happened at 1115 hours. Rio de Janeiro was one of the 15 merchant ships in the 1st Sea Transport Echelon that had departed German ports on April 4. This ship was carrying troops and equipment destined for Bergen. It was exactly the type of incident the SKL had feared would negate the element of surprise and the reason they had so strenuously opposed the early sailing of the ships in the 1st Sea Transport Echelon.
The destroyer Odin, the patrol ship Lyngdal, and Norwegian fishing vessels brought about 100 survivors from the sinking ship into Kristiansand and other harbors during the day. These turned out to be uniformed soldiers and naval personnel who reported they were on their way to Bergen to help the Norwegians in accordance with a request from the Norwegians.
The second incident was the sinking of Posidonia at 1330 hours in international waters at the mouth of Oslofjord by the British submarine Trident. Posidonia was not part of the German operation. However, a small tanker, Stedingen, scheduled to bring fuel to Stavanger also fell victim to Trident on the same day. Finally, a British submarine intercepted Kreta of the 1st Sea Transport Echelon and it sought refuge in Norwegian territorial waters. Kreta, on its way to Kristiansand, was hailed by a Norwegian patrol boat but allowed to proceed. Kreta arrived in Kristiansand on April 13, four days late.
The Norwegian Naval Staff received two messages during the afternoon from their contact person in the Danish Navy. They received the first message at 1535 hours: “Two ships of the Gneisenau class, one of the Deutschland class, one of the Emden class and three torpedo boats of the Möwe class passed Anholt at 1205 on a northerly course and two auxiliary or mining ships painted a gray color passed Korsør at 1500 on a northerly course.” The second message at 1820 hours read:
A division consisting of Gneisenau, Deutschland [Deutschland had been renamed Lützow but was still referred to in intelligence reports by its former name], Emden and three torpedo boats of the Möwe class passed Hirtsholm at 1715 hours on a northerly course. Two armed 6,000-ton merchant ships passed through Storebelt on a northerly course. Many people observed on board, possibly troops. Seventeen trawlers also passed that location.
Twenty minutes earlier, a telegram from the British Admiralty via the Norwegian Embassy in London arrived at the Norwegian naval headquarters:
German naval forces were observed in the North Sea traveling in the company of what is believed to be a merchant ship, possibly troop transport. Their leading elements were observed this morning outside the Norwegian coast on a northerly course. It is assumed for certain that the goal is to undertake operations against Narvik and they could arrive there before midnight. Admiral Phillips [vice chief of the British Naval Staff] added that the Germans could be in Narvik at 10 P.M. today.
This was the only warning message the British sent the Norwegians on April 8. Faced with all these alarming reports and incidents, why did the Norwegians not take immediate precautions to meet an obvious threat? While there were divided views about the purpose of the German naval movements, the consensus was that these activities had nothing to do with an attack on Norway. Such an eventuality was ruled unrealistic in view of the Allies’ estimation of German capabilities and overwhelming British superiority at sea.
A final intelligence report from Denmark seemed to support this conclusion. At 2311 hours the Danes reported that three large warships were observed at
