The relatively small navy in 1940 consisted of two coastal defense ships (an additional two in mothballs), 10 minelayers, three older destroyers of the Draug class, four newer destroyers of the Sleipner class, three larger torpedo boats of the Trygg class, and 14 other torpedo boats. There were also six B class and three A class submarines, eight minesweepers, and six patrol ships. Another 49 leased or requisitioned vessels served as patrol boats. A significant portion of the fleet of 111 ships available in April 1940 was obsolete by the standards of the time. Only one minelayer and four destroyers could be considered modern warships. There were 5,200 officers and men on duty in the navy in April 1940.
The coastal fortifications, one of the most neglected elements of the Norwegian defense establishment, were only partially mobilized. Many of the officers earmarked for mobilization had not been on active duty since 1918 and some batteries had not fired a live round since the 1890s. Several of the main batteries were not manned and only a few of the forts had operational antiaircraft guns. The gun-pits were open and exposed to air attacks. The planned minefields were not laid. Under the full mobilization scenario, the coastal forts should have a total strength of 8,424 officers and men. The actual strength in April 1940 was only 2,403.The coastal forts also suffered from a lack of infantry to defend any inland approaches.
There was no Norwegian air force as such. All aircraft were assigned to either the army or the navy. The Army Air Corps was in the middle of reorganization and receiving new aircraft. The period of reorganization and retraining was to have been completed by July 1, 1940. The reorganization called for the establishment of two squadrons of fighters consisting of Curtis Hawk P36s purchased from the United States and two bomber squadrons consisting of Italian Ca 312s. These aircraft were delivered but they were still in their crates when the Germans attacked. Another 129 aircraft were ordered but not delivered.
The Army Air Corps consisted of 62 aircraft at the beginning of 1940 but only 19 of these were modern operational aircraft: nine British Gladiator fighters, four Italian Ca 310 bombers, and six Heinkel (He-115) torpedo aircraft.4 About 42 naval airplanes were assigned to seven coastal stations and were a mixture of reconnaissance, torpedo, and training aircraft. Again, the aircraft were old and ill suited for modern warfare. Neither the army nor the naval aircraft were capable of meeting the onslaught of the Luftwaffe and, despite valorous individual deeds, had no significant effect on operations.
Norway’s neglect of its armed forces in the inter-war period was well known to the belligerents and the poor state of its defenses, when compared to a generation earlier, served as an invitation to violate the country’s neutrality. Both the German and the British leaders viewed the Norwegian military as a minor obstacle to their plans.
A
LLIED
P
LANS
: F
LAWED
, I
NADEQUATE, AND
H
ESITANT
“I think the whole thing is hare brained.”
CHIEF AIR MARSHAL SIR CYRIL NEWALL’S COMMENT ON ALLIED PLANS FOR OPERATIONS IN SCANDINAVIA.
Plan Catherine
Winston Churchill, who turned 65 in November 1939, was appointed First Lord of the Admiralty at the outbreak of World War II. He had a fascination for the indirect approach in warfare and for striking at what he perceived to be enemy vulnerabilities or weaknesses. This fascination led to the debacle at Gallipoli and goes far to explain Britain’s preoccupation with flanking strategies in the Balkans, southern Europe, and Norway. In 1939, Churchill advocated taking strong action in response to what he perceived as German weaknesses.
Churchill had his first conceptual plan of action against the German northern flank ready the very instant he returned to his old job in the Admiralty. He discussed the plan with Admiral Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord, on September 3, 1939. The operation he had in mind is reminiscent of the Dardanelles operation that cost him the job as First Lord of the Admiralty in 1915. Churchill’s plan called for forcing an entry into the Baltic for the purpose of attacking the German fleet and cutting the German supply route from Sweden. Churchill recalled to active duty an old friend, 65-year-old Admiral of the Fleet William Boyle, who had inherited the title of Lord Cork and Orrery, for work on this project. Admiral Cork had a personality akin to that of Churchill’s. He had vast energy, an offensive spirit, and a feared temperament—and he was apparently the only one who expressed any enthusiasm for Churchill’s scheme.
By September 12, 1939, an outline plan, codenamed Catherine, was ready. In broad terms, it called for a force of two or three battleships, one aircraft carrier, five cruisers, a detachment of submarines, and two destroyer flotillas supported by a fleet of tankers and supply ships. The fleet was to remain in the Baltic for several months and it was assumed that Danish and Swedish bases would be available after the fleet had been there long enough to remove Scandinavian fears of the Germans. It was further hoped that the presence of the British fleet would cause Sweden, Denmark, and Norway to join the war on the side of
