Discourses

persons do and what we do? If you observe what they do, you will understand. And what else do they do all day long than make up accounts, enquire among themselves, give and take advice about some small quantity of grain, a bit of land, and such kind of profits? Is it then the same thing to receive a petition and to read in it: “I entreat you to permit me to export80 a small quantity of corn;” and one to this effect: “I entreat you to learn from Chrysippus what is the administration of the world, and what place in it the rational animal holds; consider also who you are, and what is the nature of your good and bad. Are these things like the other, do they require equal care, and is it equally base to neglect these and those? Well then, are we the only persons who are lazy and love sleep? No; but much rather you young men are. For we old men when we see young men amusing themselves are eager to play with them; and if I saw you active and zealous, much more should I be eager myself to join you in your serious pursuits.”

XI

Of Natural Affection

When he was visited by one of the magistrates, Epictetus inquired of him about several particulars, and asked if he had children and a wife. The man replied that he had; and Epictetus inquired further how he felt under the circumstances. “Miserable,” the man said. Then Epictetus asked: “In what respect, for men do not marry and beget children in order to be wretched, but rather to be happy.” “But I,” the man replied, “am so wretched about my children that lately, when my little daughter was sick and was supposed to be in danger, I could not endure to stay with her, but I left home till a person sent me news that she had recovered.” “Well then,” said Epictetus, “do you think that you acted right?” “I acted naturally,” the man replied. “But convince me of this that you acted naturally, and I will convince you that everything which takes place according to nature takes place rightly.” “This is the case,” said the man, “with all or at least most fathers.” “I do not deny that: but the matter about which we are inquiring is whether such behavior is right; for in respect to this matter we must say that tumours also come for the good of the body, because they do come; and generally we must say that to do wrong is natural, because nearly all or at least most of us do wrong. Do you show me then how your behavior is natural.” “I cannot,” he said; “but do you rather show me how it is not according to nature, and is not rightly done.”

“Well,” said Epictetus, “if we were inquiring about white and black, what criterion should we employ for distinguishing between them?” “The sight,” he said. “And if about hot and cold, and hard and soft, what criterion?” “The touch.” “Well then, since we are inquiring about things which are according to nature, and those which are done rightly or not rightly, what kind of criterion do you think that we should employ?” “I do not know,” he said. “And yet not to know the criterion of colors and smells, and also of tastes, is perhaps no great harm; but if a man do not know the criterion of good and bad, and of things according to nature and contrary to nature, does this seem to you a small harm?” “The greatest harm (I think).” “Come tell me, do all things which seem to some persons to be good and becoming, rightly appear such; and at present as to Jews and Syrians and Egyptians and Romans, is it possible that the opinions of all of them in respect to food are right?” “How is it possible?” he said. “Well, I suppose, it is absolutely necessary that, if the opinions of the Egyptians are right, the opinions of the rest must be wrong: if the opinions of the Jews are right, those of the rest cannot be right.” “Certainly.” “But where there is ignorance, there also there is want of learning and training in things which are necessary.” He assented to this. “You then,” said Epictetus, “since you know this, for the future will employ yourself seriously about nothing else, and will apply your mind to nothing else than to learn the criterion of things which are according to nature, and by using it also to determine each several thing. But in the present matter I have so much as this to aid you towards what you wish. Does affection to those of your family appear to you to be according to nature and to be good?” “Certainly.” “Well, is such affection natural and good, and is a thing consistent with reason not good?” “By no means.” “Is then that which is consistent with reason in contradiction with affection?” “I think not.” “You are right, for if it is otherwise, it is necessary that one of the contradictions being according to nature, the other must be contrary to nature. Is it not so?” “It is,” he said. “Whatever then we shall discover to be at the same time affectionate and also consistent with reason, this we confidently declare to be right and good.” “Agreed.” “Well then to leave your sick child and to go away is not reasonable, and I suppose that you will not say that it is; but it remains for us to inquire if it is consistent with affection.” “Yes, let us consider.” “Did you then, since you had an affectionate disposition to your child, do right when you ran off and left her; and has the mother no affection for the child?” “Certainly, she has.” “Ought then the mother also to have left her, or ought she not?” “She ought not.”