and if such a man covets nothing, and is lifted up by no vain joy of mind, what can prevent his being happy? And if these are the effects of virtue, why cannot virtue itself make men happy?
| A. |
But the other of these two propositions is undeniable, that they who are under no apprehensions, who are noways uneasy, who covet nothing, who are lifted up by no vain joy, are happy: and therefore I grant you that. But as for the other, that is not now in a fit state for discussion, for it has been proved by your former arguments that a wise man is free from every perturbation of mind. |
| M. |
Doubtless, then, the dispute is over, for the question appears to have been entirely exhausted. |
| A. |
I think, indeed, that that is almost the case. |
| M. |
But yet that is more usually the case with the mathematicians than philosophers. For when the geometricians teach anything, if what they have before taught relates to their present subject, they take that for granted which has been already proved, and explain only what they had not written on before. But the philosophers, whatever subject they have in hand, get together everything that relates to it, notwithstanding they may have dilated on it somewhere else. Were not that the case, why should the Stoics say so much on that question—Whether virtue was abundantly sufficient to a happy life?—when it would have been answer enough that they had before taught that nothing was good but what was honorable. For, as this had been proved, the consequence must be that virtue was sufficient to a happy life, and each premise may be made to follow from the admission of the other, so that if it be admitted that virtue is sufficient to secure a happy life, it may also be inferred that nothing is good except what is honorable. They, however, do not proceed in this manner, for they would separate books about what is honorable, and what is the chief good. And when they have demonstrated from the one that virtue has power enough to make life happy, yet they treat this point separately, for everything, and especially a subject of such great consequence, should be supported by arguments and exhortations which belong to that alone. For you should have a care how you imagine philosophy to have uttered anything more noble, or that she has promised anything more fruitful or of greater consequence, for—good Gods!—does she not engage that she will render him who submits to her laws so accomplished as to be always armed against fortune, and to have every assurance within himself of living well and happily—that he shall, in short, be forever happy? But let us see what she will perform. In the meanwhile, I look upon it as a great thing that she has even made such a promise. For Xerxes, who was loaded with all the rewards and gifts of fortune, not satisfied with his armies of horse and foot, nor the multitude of his ships, nor his infinite treasure of gold, offered a reward to anyone who could find out a new pleasure; and yet, when it was discovered, he was not satisfied with it, nor can there ever be an end to lust. I wish we could engage anyone by a reward to produce something the better to establish us in this belief. |
| A. |
I wish that, indeed, myself. But I want a little information. For I allow that in what you have stated the one proposition is the consequence of the other: that as, if what is honorable be the only good, it must follow that a happy life is the effect of virtue, so that if a happy life consists in virtue, nothing can be good but virtue. But your friend Brutus, on the authority of Aristo and Antiochus, does not see this, for he thinks the case would be the same even if there were anything good besides virtue. |
| M. |
What, then? do you imagine that I am going to argue against Brutus? |
| A. |
You may do what you please, for it is not for me to prescribe what you shall do. |
| M. |
How these things agree together shall be examined somewhere else, for I frequently discussed that point with Antiochus, and lately with Aristo, when during the period of my command as general I was lodging with him at Athens. For to me it seemed that no one could possibly be happy under any evil, but a wise man might be afflicted with evil, if there are any things arising from body or fortune deserving the name of evils. These things were said, which Antiochus has inserted in his books in many places: that virtue itself was sufficient to make life happy, but yet not perfectly happy; and that many things derive their names from the predominant portion of them, though they do not include everything, as strength, health, riches, honor, and glory: which qualities are determined by their kind, not their number. Thus a happy life is so called from its being so in a great degree, even though it should fall short in some point. To clear this up is not absolutely necessary at present, though it seems to be said without any great consistency. For I cannot imagine what is wanting to one that is happy to make him happier, for if anything be wanting to him, he cannot be so much as happy. And as to what they say, that everything is named and estimated from its predominant portion, that may be admitted in some things. But when they allow three kinds of evils—when anyone is oppressed with every imaginable evil of two kinds, being afflicted with adverse fortune, and having at the same time his body worn out and harassed with all sorts of pains—shall we say that such a one is but little short of a happy life, to say nothing about the happiest possible life?
This is the point which Theophrastus
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