fundamental maxim, That whoever acts as if things were so, or not so, does by his acts declare, that they are so, or not so as plainly as he could by words, and with more reality. And if the things are otherwise, his acts contradict those propositions which assert them to be as they are.33

IV. No act (whether word34 or deed) of any being to whom moral good and evil are imputable, that interferes with any true proposition or denies anything to be as it is, can be right. For,

  1. If that proposition, which is false, be wrong,35 that act which implies such a proposition, or is founded in it, cannot be right, because it is the very proposition itself in practice.

  2. Those propositions which are true, and express things as they are, express the relation between the subject and the attribute as it is; that is, this is either affirmed or denied of that according to the nature of that relation. And further, this relation (or, if you will, the nature of this relation) is determined and fixed by the natures of the things themselves. Therefore nothing can interfere with any proposition that is true, but it must likewise interfere with nature (the nature of the relation, and the natures of the things themselves, too), and consequently be unnatural, or wrong in nature. So very much are those gentlemen mistaken, who by following nature mean only complying with their bodily inclinations, though in opposition to truth or at least without any regard to it. Truth is but a conformity to nature, and to follow nature cannot be to combat truth.36

  3. If there is a supreme being, upon whom the existence of the world depends, and nothing can be in it but what He either causes or permits to be, then to own things to be as they are is to own what He causes, or at least permits, to be thus caused or permitted: and this is to take things as He gives them, to go into His constitution of the world, and to submit to His will, revealed in the books of nature.37 To do this, therefore, must be agreeable to His will. And if so, the contrary must be disagreeable to it, and, since (as we shall find in due time) there is a perfect rectitude in His will, certainly wrong.

    I desire that I may not be misunderstood in respect to the actings of wicked men. I do not say: it is agreeable to the will of God that what is ill done by them, should be so done, i.e. that they should use their liberty ill; but I say: when they have done this and committed some evil, it is agreeable to His will, that we should allow it to have been committed, or, it would be disagreeable to His will, that we should deny it to have been committed.

    As the owning of things, in all our conduct, to be as they are, is direct obedience:38 so the contrary, not to own things to be or to have been, that are or have been, or not to be what they are, is direct rebellion against Him who is the Author of nature. For it is as much as to say, “God indeed causes such a thing to be, or at least permits it, and it is; or the relation that lies between this and that, is of such a nature, that one may be affirmed of the other, etc.⁠—this is true, but yet to me it shall not be so: I will not endure it, or act as if it were so; the laws of nature are ill-framed, nor will I mind them or what follows from them; even existence shall be nonexistence when my pleasures require.” Such an impious declaration as this attends every voluntary infraction of truth.

  4. Things cannot be denied to be what they are, in any instance or manner whatsoever, without contradicting axioms and truths eternal. For such are these: everything is what it is; that which is done, cannot be undone; and the like. And then if those truths be considered as having always subsisted in the Divine mind, to which they have always been true, and which differs not from the Deity himself, to do this is to act not only in opposition to His government or sovereignty, but to His nature,39 also: which, if He be perfect, and there be nothing in Him but what is most right, must also upon this account be most wrong.

    Pardon these inadequate ways of speaking of God. You will apprehend my meaning, which perhaps may be better represented thus: If there are such things as axioms, which are and always have been immutably true, and consequently have been always known to God to be so,40 the truth of them cannot be denied any way, either directly or indirectly, but the truth of the Divine knowledge must be denied too.

  5. Designedly to treat things as being what they are not is the greatest possible absurdity. It is to put bitter for sweet, darkness for light, crooked for straight, etc. It is to subvert all science, to renounce all sense of truth, and flatly to deny the existence of anything. For nothing can be true, nothing does exist, if things are not what they are.

    To talk to a post, or otherwise treat it as if it was a man, would surely be reckoned an absurdity, if not distraction.41 Why? because this is to treat it as being what it is not. And why should not the converse be reckoned as bad; that is, to treat a man as a post,42 as if he had no sense, and felt not injuries which he does feel; as if to him pain and sorrow were not pain; happiness not

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