Equally near to Aeschylus is Aristotle’s famous discussion of the difference between legal justice and that higher justice which he calls Epieikeia (Equity). “It is the correction of the law where it fails owing to its generality” (Ethics, V p. 1137 b, 26), and the correction has to be applied by the “wise man.” In Aeschylus as in these two philosophers the ultimate justice is to be found in an appeal from a law to a person.
This appeal plays an important role in the history of Greek thought, and consequently in that of all modern Europe. The other philosophic schools of the Hellenistic Age, Cynic, Stoic, and Epicurean, made even greater use than Plato and Aristotle of the idea of the Wise Man, rather than the Law, as the judge and embodiment of right conduct. In a grosser form the idea invaded practical politics. We find the Hellenistic world escaping from the conflict of constitutions and systems of law by the deification of Alexander and his successors, and cutting its juridical knots by the legal fiction of the divine will. Nay, even before Aeschylus set to work upon it, the same conception was really implicit in the anthropomorphism of the classical Olympian religion. As I have tried to show elsewhere,2 the great advance made by that system as compared with the welter of primitive taboos and terrors which it tried, however artificially and inadequately, to supersede, lies in this same humanizing of the nonhuman. It brought to man the Good News that, as Plutarch expresses it, “the world is not ruled by fabulous Typhons and Giants”—nor, we may add, by blind mechanical laws—“but by One who is a wise Father to all.” It sought to make religion humane at the expense of making it anthropomorphic.
It is more interesting still to realize that the Aeschylean doctrine is in essence an early and less elaborate stage of the theological system which we associate with St. Paul: the suppression of the Law by a personal relation to a divine person, and a consequent disregard for the crude coarse test of a man’s “works” or “deeds” in comparison with the one unfailing test of the spirit, its “faith” or “faithfulness” towards God. Aeschylus would have understood Paul’s exhortation to escape beyond the “beggarly elements” to Him who made them, beyond the Creation to the Creator; and Paul would have understood Aeschylus’ insistence on the forgiveness of the suppliant, that is, of him who believes and repents and prays. It is noteworthy, indeed, that Paul made one great concession to primitive thought which Aeschylus had entirely rejected. When Orestes is pardoned by the will of Zeus, the Furies yield; the Law is deemed to be satisfied; there is no talk of its demanding to be paid off with another victim. But in Paul, when man is to be forgiven, the sin still claims its punishment, the blood will still have blood; and the only way to appease it is for the Divine King, himself or his son, to “die for the people.” Thus the pollution is cleansed and sin duly paid with blood, though it happens to be the blood of the innocent. Aeschylus, as a poet, was familiar with that conception. He knew how Codrus died, and Menoikeus and Macaria, how Agamemnon and Erechtheus and other kings had given their children to die. But for him such practices belonged to that primitive and barbaric world which Hellenic Zeus had swept away, so he hoped, forever.
A modern reader is more likely to ask why, if Orestes only fulfilled the command of Zeus, he should be punished at all. Why is there any talk of suffering and forgiveness? The answer is quite straightforward. He has after all broken the Law; he has offended against Themis and Moira, and he must suffer. In modern language, a man who kills his mother, even if he is amply justified in doing so, is bound to suffer acute grief and distress; if he did not, he would really deserve to be punished. It is only in the end that Zeus can overrule and make good, just as he did with Io and with Prometheus. It is in the end, after suffering and struggle, after cleansing and supplication, that union is achieved between the Law which acts like blind fate and the Father who understands.3
Thus at last the offender who deserves pardon can be pardoned. But that is not all. The Law that can pardon and understand can itself be understood and loved. Its ministers are no longer alien and hostile beings, proud of the agonies which they righteously inflict and the hatred which they naturally inspire. They are accepted by Athena as fellow-citizens, and their Law recognized as an inward aspiration, a standard of right living which men consciously need and seek. The “Furies” have become “Eumenides.”
Dramatis Personae
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The Pythian Prophetess
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Orestes
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The God Apollo
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The Goddess Pallas Athena
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The Ghost of Clytemnestra
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Chorus of Furies (Eumenides)
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Chorus of Athenian Citizens
The Eumenides
The Scene represents the front of the Temple of Apollo at Delphi; great doors at the back lead to the inner shrine and the central Altar. The Pythian Prophetess is standing before the Doors.4
| Prophetess |
First of all Gods I worship in this prayer5 He left his isle, he left his Delian |
