Next on the list come cereals, leather goods, sugar, paper, furs, electrical goods, silk goods, and dyes. Cereals are not a net export and are far more than balanced by imports of the same commodities. As regards sugar, nearly 90 percent of Germany’s prewar exports came to the United Kingdom.128 An increase in this trade might be stimulated by a grant of a preference in this country to German sugar or by an arrangement by which sugar was taken in part payment for the indemnity on the same lines as has been proposed for coal, dyes, etc. Paper exports also might be capable of some increase. Leather goods, furs, and silks depend upon corresponding imports on the other side of the account. Silk goods are largely in competition with the trade of France and Italy. The remaining items are individually very small. I have heard it suggested that the indemnity might be paid to a great extent in potash and the like. But potash before the war represented 0.6 percent of Germany’s export trade, and about $15,000,000 in aggregate value. Besides, France, having secured a potash field in the territory which has been restored to her, will not welcome a great stimulation of the German exports of this material.
An examination of the import list shows that 63.6 percent are raw materials and food. The chief items of the former class, namely, cotton, wool, copper, hides, iron-ore, furs, silk, rubber, and tin, could not be much reduced without reacting on the export trade, and might have to be increased if the export trade was to be increased. Imports of food, namely, wheat, barley, coffee, eggs, rice, maize, and the like, present a different problem. It is unlikely that, apart from certain comforts, the consumption of food by the German laboring classes before the war was in excess of what was required for maximum efficiency; indeed, it probably fell short of that amount. Any substantial decrease in the imports of food would therefore react on the efficiency of the industrial population, and consequently on the volume of surplus exports which they could be forced to produce. It is hardly possible to insist on a greatly increased productivity of German industry if the workmen are to be underfed. But this may not be equally true of barley, coffee, eggs, and tobacco. If it were possible to enforce a regime in which for the future no German drank beer or coffee, or smoked any tobacco, a substantial saving could be effected. Otherwise there seems little room for any significant reduction.
The following analysis of German exports and imports, according to destination and origin, is also relevant. From this it appears that of Germany’s exports in 1913, 18 percent went to the British Empire, 17 percent to France, Italy, and Belgium, 10 percent to Russia and Romania, and 7 percent to the United States; that is to say, more than half of the exports found their market in the countries of the Entente nations. Of the balance, 12 percent went to Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria, and 35 percent elsewhere. Unless, therefore, the present Allies are prepared to encourage the importation of German products, a substantial increase in total volume can only be effected by the wholesale swamping of neutral markets.
| German Trade (1913) According to Destination and Origin | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Destination of Germany’s Exports | Origin of Germany’s Imports | |||
| Million Dollars | Per cent | Million Dollars | Per cent | |
| Great Britain | 359.65 | 14.2 | 219.00 | 8.1 |
| India | 37.65 | 1.5 | 135.20 | 5.0 |
| Egypt | 10.85 | 0.4 | 29.60 | 1.1 |
| Canada | 15.10 | 0.6 | 16.00 | 0.6 |
| Australia | 22.10 | 0.9 | 74.00 | 2.8 |
| South Africa | 11.70 | 0.5 | 17.40 | 0.6 |
| Total: British Empire | 456.95 | 18.1 | 491.20 | 18.2 |
| France | 197.45 | 7.8 | 146.65 | 5.4 |
| Belgium | 137.75 | 5.5 | 86.15 | 3.2 |
| Italy | 98.35 | 3.9 | 79.40 | 3.0 |
| U.S.A. | 178.30 | 7.1 | 427.80 | 15.9 |
| Russia | 220.00 | 8.7 | 356.15 | 13.2 |
| Romania | 35.00 | 1.4 | 19.95 | 0.7 |
| Austria-Hungary | 276.20 | 10.9 | 206.80 | 7.7 |
| Turkey | 24.60 | 1.0 | 18.40 | 0.7 |
| Bulgaria | 7.55 | 0.3 | 2.00 | … |
| Other countries | 800.20 | 35.3 | 858.70 | 32.0 |
| 2,522.35 | 100.0 | 2,692.60 | 100.0 | |
The above analysis affords some indication of the possible magnitude of the maximum modification of Germany’s export balance under the conditions which will prevail after the Peace. On the assumptions (1) that we do not specially favor Germany over ourselves in supplies of such raw materials as cotton and wool (the world’s supply of which is limited), (2) that France, having secured the iron-ore deposits, makes a serious attempt to secure the blast-furnaces and the steel trade also, (3) that Germany is not encouraged and assisted to undercut the iron and other trades of the Allies in overseas market, and (4) that a substantial preference is not given to German goods in the British Empire, it is evident by examination of the specific items that not much is practicable.
Let us run over the chief items again: (1) Iron goods. In view of Germany’s loss of resources, an increased net export seems impossible and a large decrease probable. (2) Machinery. Some increase is possible. (3) Coal and coke. The value of Germany’s net export before the war was $110,000,000; the Allies have agreed that for the time being 20,000,000 tons is the maximum possible export with a problematic (and in fact) impossible increase to 40,000,000 tons at some future time; even on the basis of 20,000,000 tons we have virtually no increase of value, measured in prewar prices;129 whilst, if this amount is exacted, there must be a decrease of far greater value in the export of manufactured articles requiring coal for their production. (4) Woolen goods. An increase is impossible without the raw wool, and, having regard to the other claims on supplies of raw wool, a decrease is likely. (5) Cotton goods. The same considerations apply as to wool. (6) Cereals. There never was and never can be a net export. (7) Leather goods. The same considerations apply as to wool.
We have now covered nearly half of Germany’s prewar exports, and there is no other commodity which formerly represented as much as 3 percent of her
