On the assumption which no one supports and even the most optimistic fear to be unplausible, that Germany can pay the full charge for interest and sinking fund from the outset, the annual payment would amount to $2,400,000,000. ↩
Under Para. 13 of Annex II unanimity is required (i) for any postponement beyond 1930 of installments due between 1921 and 1926, and (ii) for any postponement for more than three years of instalments due after 1926. Further, under Art. 234, the Commission may not cancel any part of the indebtedness without the specific authority of all the Governments represented on the Commission. ↩
On July 23, 1914, the amount was $339,000,000. ↩
Owing to the very high premium which exists on German silver coin, as the combined result of the depreciation of the mark and the appreciation of silver, it is highly improbable that it will be possible to extract such coin out of the pockets of the people. But it may gradually leak over the frontier by the agency of private speculators, and thus indirectly benefit the German exchange position as a whole. ↩
The Allies made the supply of foodstuffs to Germany during the Armistice, mentioned above, conditional on the provisional transfer to them of the greater part of the Mercantile Marine, to be operated by them for the purpose of shipping foodstuffs to Europe generally, and to Germany in particular. The reluctance of the Germans to agree to this was productive of long and dangerous delays in the supply of food, but the abortive Conferences of Trèves and Spa (January 16, February 14–16, and March 4–5, 1919) were at last followed by the Agreement of Brussels (March 14, 1919). The unwillingness of the Germans to conclude was mainly due to the lack of any absolute guarantee on the part of the Allies that, if they surrendered the ships, they would get the food. But assuming reasonable good faith on the part of the latter (their behavior in respect of certain other clauses of the Armistice, however, had not been impeccable and gave the enemy some just grounds for suspicion), their demand was not an improper one; for without the German ships the business of transporting the food would have been difficult, if not impossible, and the German ships surrendered or their equivalent were in fact almost wholly employed in transporting food to Germany itself. Up to June 30, 1919, 176 German ships of 1,025,388 gross tonnage had been surrendered, to the Allies in accordance with the Brussels Agreement. ↩
The amount of tonnage transferred may be rather greater and the value per ton rather less. The aggregate value involved is not likely, however, to be less than $500,000,000 or greater than $750,000,000. ↩
This census was carried out by virtue of a Decree of August 23, 1918. On March 22, 1917, the German Government acquired complete control over the utilization of foreign securities in German possession; and in May, 1917, it began to exercise these powers for the mobilization of certain Swedish, Danish, and Swiss securities. ↩
| 1892 | Schmoller | $2,500,000,000 |
| 1892 | Christians | 3,250,000,000 |
| 1893–4 | Koch | 3,000,000,000 |
| 1905 | v. Halle | 4,000,000,000169 |
| 1913 | Helfferich | 5,000,000,000170 |
| 1914 | Ballod | 6,250,000,000 |
| 1914 | Pistorius | 6,250,000,000 |
| 1919 | Hans David | 5,250,000,000171 |
I have made no deduction for securities in the ownership of Alsace-Lorrainers and others who have now ceased to be German nationals. ↩
In all these estimates, I am conscious of being driven by a fear of overstating the case against the Treaty, of giving figures in excess of my own real judgment. There is a great difference between putting down on paper fancy estimates of Germany’s resources and actually extracting contributions in the form of cash. I do not myself believe that the Reparation Commission will secure real resources from the above items by May, 1921, even as great as the lower of the two figures given above. ↩
The Treaty (see Art. 114) leaves it very dubious how far the Danish Government is under an obligation to make payments to the Reparation Commission in respect of its acquisition of Schleswig. They might, for instance, arrange for various offsets such as the value of the mark notes held by the inhabitants of ceded areas. In any case the amount of money involved is quite small. The Danish Government is raising a loan for $33,000,000 (kr. 120,000,000) for the joint purposes of “taking over Schleswig’s share of the German debt, for buying German public property, for helping the Schleswig population, and for settling the currency question.” ↩
Here again my own judgment would carry me much further and I should doubt the possibility of Germany’s exports equaling her imports during this period. But the statement in the text goes far enough for the purpose of my argument. ↩
It has been estimated that the cession of territory to France, apart from the loss of Upper Silesia, may reduce Germany’s annual prewar production of steel ingots from 20,000,000 tons to 14,000,000 tons, and increase France’s capacity from 5,000,000 tons to 11,000,000 tons. ↩
Germany’s exports of sugar in 1913 amounted to 1,110,073 tons of the value of $65,471,500, of which 838,583 tons were exported to the United Kingdom at a value of $45,254,000. These figures were in excess of the normal, the average total exports for the five years ending 1913 being about $50,000,000. ↩
The necessary price adjustment, which is required, on both sides of this account, will be made en bloc later. ↩
If the amount of the sinking fund be reduced, and the annual payment is continued over a greater number of years, the present value—so powerful is the operation of compound interest—cannot be materially increased. A payment of $500,000,000 annually in perpetuity, assuming interest, as before, at 5 percent, would only raise the present value to
