Endnotes
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In Schweighaeuser’s edition the title is “Επικτήτου ἐγχειρίδιον. Epicteti Manuale ex recensione et interpretatione Joannis Uptoni. Notabiliorem Lectionis varietatem adjecit Joh. Schweighaeuser.” There are also notes by Upton, and some by Schweighaeuser. ↩
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This passage will be obscure in the original, unless it is examined well. I have followed the explanation of Simplicius, iv. (i 4.) ↩
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Appearances are named “harsh” or “rough” when they are “contrary to reason and overexciting and in fact make life rough (uneven) by the want of symmetry and by inequality in the movements. Simplicius, v. (i 5.) ↩
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See the notes in Schweig.’s edition. ↩
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Upton proposes to read ἐφ’ ἱπποῦ ἀγαφῷ instead of ἐπὶ ἵππῳ ἀγαφῷ. The meaning then will be “elated at something good which is in the horse.” I think that he is right. ↩
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The text has τὰ γενόμενα: but it should be τὰ γινόμενα. See Upton’s note. ↩
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He means, Do not chastise your slave while you are in a passion, lest, while you are trying to correct him, and it is very doubtful whether you will succeed, you fall into a vice which is a man’s great and only calamity. Schweig. ↩
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The passage seems to mean, that your slave has not the power of disturbing you, because you have the power of not being disturbed. See Upton’s note on the text. ↩
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Τέλειν is used here, as it often is among the Stoics, to “wish absolutely,” “to will.” When Epictetus says “you would have badness not to be badness,” he means that “badness” is in the will of him who has the badness, and as you wish to subject it to your will, you are a fool. It is your business, as far as you can, to improve the slave: you may wish this. It is his business to obey your instruction: this is what he ought to wish to do; but for him to will to do this, that lies in himself, not in you. Schweig. ↩
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This is obscure. “It is true that the man is wretched, not because of the things external which have happened to him, but through the fact that he allows himself to be affected so much by external things which are placed out of his power.” Schweig. ↩
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It has been objected to Epictetus that he expresses no sympathy with those who suffer sorrow. But here he tells you to show sympathy, a thing which comforts most people. But it would be contrary to his teaching, if he told you to suffer mentally with another. ↩
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Compare Antoninus, xi 6, xii 36. ↩
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Note, ed. Schweig. ↩
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“If I yet pleased men, I should not be the servant of Christ.” Gal. 1:10. Mrs. Carter. ↩
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See the text. ↩
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The sixth part of a drachma. ↩
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“Price” is here τὸ διαφέρον. ↩
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See Schweig.’s note. ↩
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This passage is explained in the commentary of Simplicius, (xxxiv, in Schweig.’s ed. xxvii p. 264), and Schweighaeuser agrees with the explanation, which is this: Nothing in the world (universe) can exist or be done (happen) which in its proper sense, in itself and in its nature is bad; for everything is and is done by the wisdom and will of God and for the purpose which he intended: but to miss a mark is to fail in an intention; and as a man does not set up a mark, or does not form a purpose for the purpose of missing the mark or the purpose, so it is absurd (inconsistent) to say that God has a purpose or design, and that he purposed or designed anything which in itself and in its nature is bad. The commentary of Simplicius is worth reading. But how many will read it? Perhaps one in a million. ↩
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“Compare iii 15, from which all this passage has been transferred to the Enchiridion by the copyists.” Upton. On which Schweighaeuser remarks, “Why should we not say by Arrian, who composed the Enchiridion from the Discourses of Epictetus?” See the notes of Upton and Schweig. on some differences in the readings of the passage in iii 15, and in this passage. ↩
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See ii 22, 13, iv 5, 9. ↩
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“It is plain enough that the philosopher does not say this, that the reckoning of our private advantage ought to be the sole origin and foundation of piety towards God.” Schweig., and he proceeds to explain the sentence, which at first appears rather obscure. Perhaps Arrian intends to say that the feeling of piety coincides with the opinion of the useful, the profitable; and that the man who takes care to desire as he ought to do and to avoid as he ought to do, thus also cares after piety, and so he will secure his interest (the profitable) and he will not be discontented.
In i 27, 14 (p. 81) it is said ἐὰν μὴ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ᾖ τὸ εὐσεβὲς καὶ συμφέρον, οὐ δύναται σωφῆναι τὸ εὐσεβὲς ἔν τινι. This is what is said here (s. 31). ↩
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The story is told by Aelian (iii c. 44), and by Simplicius in his commentary on the Enchiridion (p. 411, ed. Schweig.). Upton. ↩
