The Acquisitive Society

be frozen out by action on the part of the working personnel, which itself undertakes such functions, if any, as they have performed, and makes them superfluous by conducting production without their assistance. Their proprietary interest may be limited or attenuated to such a degree that they become mere rentiers, who are guaranteed a fixed payment analogous to that of the debenture-holder, but who receive no profits and bear no responsibility for the organization of industry. They may be bought out. The first alternative is exemplified by the historical confiscations of the past, such as, for instance, by the seizure of ecclesiastical property by the ruling classes of England, Scotland and most other Protestant states. The second has rarely, if ever, been tried⁠—the nearest approach to it, perhaps, was the famous abdication of August 4th, 1789. The third is the method apparently contemplated by the building guilds which are now in process of formation in Great Britain. The fourth method of treating the capitalist is followed by the cooperative movement. It is also that proposed by the committee of employers and trade-unionists in the building industry over which Mr. Foster presided, and which proposed that employers should be paid a fixed salary, and a fixed rate of interest on their capital, but that all surplus profits should be pooled and administered by a central body representing employers and workers. The fifth has repeatedly been practised by municipalities, and somewhat less often by national governments.

Which of these alternative methods of removing industry from the control of the property-owner is adopted is a matter of expediency to be decided in each particular case. “Nationalization,” therefore, which is sometimes advanced as the only method of extinguishing proprietary rights, is merely one species of a considerable genus. It can be used, of course, to produce the desired result. But there are some industries, at any rate, in which nationalization is not necessary in order to bring it about, and since it is at best a cumbrous process, when other methods are possible, other methods should be used. Nationalization is a means to an end, not an end in itself. Properly conceived its object is not to establish state management of industry, but to remove the dead hand of private ownership, when the private owner has ceased to perform any positive function. It is unfortunate, therefore, that the abolition of obstructive property rights, which is indispensable, should have been identified with a single formula, which may be applied with advantage in the special circumstances of some industries, but need not necessarily be applied in all. Ownership is not a right, but a bundle of rights, and it is possible to strip them off piecemeal as well as to strike them off simultaneously. The ownership of capital involves, as we have said, three main claims; the right to interest as the price of capital, the right to profits, and the right to control, in virtue of which managers and workmen are the servants of shareholders. These rights in their fullest degree are not the invariable accompaniment of ownership, nor need they necessarily coexist. The ingenuity of financiers long ago devised methods of grading stock in such a way that the ownership of some carries full control, while that of others does not, that some bear all the risk and are entitled to all the profits, while others are limited in respect to both. All are property, but not all carry proprietary rights of the same degree.

As long as the private ownership of industrial capital remains, the object of reformers should be to attenuate its influence by insisting that it shall be paid not more than a rate of interest fixed in advance, and that it should carry with it no right of control. In such circumstances the position of the ordinary shareholder would approximate to that of the owner of debentures; the property in the industry would be converted into a mortgage on its profits, while the control of its administration and all profits in excess of the minimum would remain to be vested elsewhere. So, of course, would the risks. But risks are of two kinds, those of the individual business and those of the industry. The former are much heavier than the latter, for though a coal mine is a speculative investment, coal mining is not, and as long as each business is managed as a separate unit, the payments made to shareholders must cover both. If the ownership of capital in each industry were unified, which does not mean centralized, those risks which are incidental to individual competition would be eliminated, and the credit of each unit would be that of the whole.

Such a change in the character of ownership would have three advantages. It would abolish the government of industry by property. It would end the payment of profits to functionless shareholders by turning them into creditors paid a fixed rate of interest. It would lay the only possible foundations for industrial peace by making it possible to convert industry into a profession carried on by all grades of workers for the service of the public, not for the gain of those who own capital. The organization which it would produce will be described, of course, as impracticable. It is interesting, therefore, to find it is that which experience has led practical men to suggest as a remedy for the disorders of one of the most important of national industries, that of building. The question before the Committee of employers and workmen, which issued last August a Report upon the Building Trade, was “Scientific Management and the Reduction of Costs.”1 These are not phrases which suggest an economic revolution; but it is something little short of a revolution that the signatories of the report propose. For, as soon as they came to grips with the problem, they found that it was impossible to handle it effectively without reconstituting the general fabric of industrial relationships which is its setting. Why