After what has been already said of the twofold relation of idea in the philosophy of Descartes, it is unnecessary to add much by way of explanation of the term “objective reality.” This, as we have said, denotes that aspect of a representative thought in which it is considered in relation to the object represented; hence the object is said to possess objective reality in so far as it exists by representation in thought (quatenus objicitur intellectui). This use of the term objective, it will be remarked, is precisely opposed to the more modern (Kantian) acceptation of the same word, and corresponds, to a certain extent, with the counter-term subjective; for objective reality (i.e., the reality of representation) is in truth a subjective reality.
It may be of importance to note the two relations from which the representative reality of an idea is distinguished in Cartesian literature, with their appropriate designations. In the first place, the representative perfection (being) of an idea, was distinguished from the object of the idea in so far as it possessed an absolute existence, or existence independent of thought. In this relation the object was said to possess realitas actualis, formalis, as opposed to realitas objectiva. (Con. Med. ili. pp. 100, 101; Med. VI p. 133.) The object as it exists in nature was by other philosophers, and among these by some of the Cartesians, called ens principale, reale, fundamentale (quasi fundamentum ideae).
In the second place, the representative being of an idea was distinguished from its relation to the mind of which it is the act, and in this aspect idea, so far as act, was said to possess esse reale, materiale, formale (q. forma quaedam mentis, and this in contrast with objectivum), proprium; in relation to the object represented, it was said to possess esse intentionale, formale (and this in contrast with materiale), objectivum, vicarium; these are the strictly contrasted appellations. The esse objectivum was also called representativum, cognitum, in mente, tanquam in imagine, per imitationem. Con. Claub. Op. P. II pp. 607–617. Hamilton’s Reid, pp. 806, 807. ↩
“From the senses, that is, from sight, by which I first perceived light, and then by its aid colours, figures, magnitudes, and all similar things; through the senses, that is, through hearing, in apprehending the words of men.”—Claubergius, in h. loc. Op. P. II p. 1182. ↩
Thought (cogitatio, pensée), in the Cartesian phraseology, applied to designate all that takes place within us, of which we are immediately conscious, i.e., all the modifications of the mind or thinking principle. Thought is thus but another term for consciousness, and embraces all the acts of the will, the intellect, the imagination, and senses.—Med. III p. 97; Prin. of Phil. P. I § 9; Resp. ad. Sec. Object. Def. I (Appendix, p. 229).
“Thought,” says De la Forge, “I take for that perception, consciousness, or internal knowledge which each of us feels immediately by himself when he perceives what he does or what passes in him.”—De l’Esprit, chap. III p. 14, chap. VI p. 54. Arnauld, Des Vraies et des Fausses Idées, chap. V, Def I.
“Mens,” says Claubergius, “si vult cogitat, si non vult cogitat, si amat cogitat, si odit cogitat, si affirmat cogitat, si negat cogitat, si dubitat cogitat, si demonstrat cogitat, somniando cogitat, vigilando cogitat, sentiendo cogitat, imaginando cogitat, etc., atque ita in qualibet ejus functione cogitatio involvitur.” Op. Prin. p. 600; P. I p. 188; Log. P. I § 102.
Consciousness is thus, in the doctrine of the Cartesians, the general condition of our mental modifications, and in no way really distinct from the activities and passivities of which it is the condition. Though, in a sense already explained (as opposed to volition), perception is said to be contained under consciousness as its genus, they are yet nearly convertible terms. The difference between the two forms of expression seems to be, that thought, while embracing all the modifications of mind, whether volitions or perceptions, is not distinguished from the former as a passivity, while perception is. Thought, as thus denoting a mental modification both in its active and passive relation, marks the opposition and contrast of the modification to its negative, the extended, i.e., matter, while viewed as a perception the phenomenon is regarded mainly in reference to its simple
