I wondered then, and I wonder now, how far up to this time Callaghan suspected Vane-Cartwright. I believe that he did not like to avow to himself the full suspicion that he felt, and that this was why he hesitated to name him to me. I am sure that in his heart he disliked him very much; he had always seemed to do so. But I think that, to my Irish friend, Vane-Cartwright appeared the embodiment of those characteristics of the Englishman which an Irishman knows he dislikes, but thinks that he ought to respect. So I should guess that, as long as he could, he had dutifully forced himself to believe in Vane-Cartwright as a very estimable person full of English rectitude. In any case, for all the pains he took to follow up his suspicion that Thalberg was somehow connected with the crime, I know that he had not fully seen the conclusion to which this was leading him.
When I went up to dress for dinner, I reminded my wife of certain passages in Peters’ manuscripts on psychology which we had read together with very great interest. Among these was a curious paper on “Imagination, Truth-telling and Lying,” in which, beginning with the paradox that the correct perception of fact depended far more on moral qualities, and truthfulness in ordinary speech far more on intellectual qualities than was generally supposed, he proceeded to describe with great wealth of illustration some of the types under which races and individual men fall, in respect of their power of getting hold of truth and of giving it out. Scattered through these pages were a number of remarks which came to my mind in this talk with Callaghan. With most of them I will not trouble the reader, but in one passage in particular Peters had pointed out the mistake of thinking that a man who commits glaring inaccuracies is necessarily on that account not worth listening to. Ludicrous inaccuracies, even glaring falsehoods as they may seem, spring often, he insisted, from the peculiar abundance and vivacity of the impressions which a man receives from what passes before his eyes. A person with this gift may frequently in his memory put something that he has truly noticed into a wrong connection, or combine two scattered fragments of observation, true in themselves, into a single totally erroneous recollection of fact. But a man who gets things wrong in this way, is, said Peters, often more full of information than a more sober observer, because he has noticed far more, and after all, a very large part of what he has noticed is sure to be accurately retained. In another passage, which I am afraid I may mar by summarising it, Peters described how, with all men in some degree, but with some men in a wonderful degree, intellectual faculties are the servants of emotional interests, so that not only the power of inference, but even memory itself will do work at the bidding of pain or pleasure, liking or dislike, which it will not do upon a merely rational demand. Reminding my wife of this, I said I wished I knew by what test I could tell the true from the false in Callaghan’s reminiscences, and by what spell I could turn the flow of