I can give no further account of Mr. Peirce’s ideas in this note, but I earnestly advise all students of Bergson to compare them with those of the French philosopher.
Endnotes
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Bailey: Letters on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, First Series, p. 52. ↩
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Smaller Logic, § 194. ↩
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Exploratio Philosophica, Part I, 1865, pp. XXXVIII, 130. ↩
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Hinneberg: Die Kultur der Gegenwart: Systematische Philosophie. Leipzig: Teubner, 1907. ↩
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The difference is that the bad parts of this finite are eternal and essential for absolutists, whereas pluralists may hope that they will eventually get sloughed off and become as if they had not been. ↩
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Quoted by W. Wallace: Lectures and Essays, Oxford, 1898, p. 560. ↩
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Logic, tr. Wallace, 1874, p. 181. ↩
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Logic, tr. Wallace, 1874, p. 304. ↩
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Contemporary Review, December, 1907, vol. 92, p. 618. ↩
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Metaphysic, sec. 69 ff. ↩
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The World and the Individual, vol. I, pp. 131–132. ↩
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A good illustration of this is to be found in a controversy between Mr. Bradley and the present writer, in Mind for 1893, Mr. Bradley contending (if I understood him rightly) that “resemblance” is an illegitimate category, because it admits of degrees, and that the only real relations in comparison are absolute identity and absolute non-comparability. ↩
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Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic, p. 184. ↩
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Appearance and Reality, 1893, pp. 141–142. ↩
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Cf. Elements of Metaphysics, p. 88. ↩
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Some Dogmas of Religion, p. 184. ↩
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For a more detailed criticism of Mr. Bradley’s intellectualism, see Appendix A. ↩
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Hegel, Smaller Logic, pp. 184–185. ↩
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Cf. Hegel’s fine vindication of this function of contradiction in his Wissenschaft der Logik, Bk. II, sec. 1, chap. II, C, Anmerkung 3. ↩
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Hegel, in Blackwood’s Philosophical Classics, p. 162. ↩
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Wissenschaft der Logik, Bk. I, sec. 1, chap. II, B, a. ↩
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Wallace’s translation of the Smaller Logic, p. 128. ↩
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Joachim, The Nature of Truth, Oxford, 1906, pp. 22, 178. The argument in case the belief should be doubted would be the higher synthetic idea: if two truths were possible, the duality of that possibility would itself be the one truth that would unite them. ↩
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The World and the Individual, vol. II, pp. 385, 386, 409. ↩
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The best uninspired argument (again not ironical!) which I know is that in Miss M. W. Calkins’s excellent book, The Persistent Problems of Philosophy, Macmillan, 1902. ↩
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Cf. Dr. Fuller’s excellent article, “Ethical Monism and the Problem of Evil,” in the Harvard Journal of Theology, vol. I, No. 2, April, 1908. ↩
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Metaphysic, sec. 79. ↩
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Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic, secs. 150, 153. ↩
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The Nature of Truth, 1906, pp. 170–171. ↩
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The Nature of Truth, 1906, p. 179. ↩
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The psychological analogy that certain finite tracts of consciousness are composed of isolable parts added together, cannot be used by absolutists as proof that such parts are essential elements of all consciousness. Other finite fields of consciousness seem in point of fact not to be similarly resolvable into isolable parts. ↩
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Judging by the analogy of the relation which our central consciousness seems to bear to that of our spinal cord, lower ganglia, etc., it would seem natural to suppose that in whatever superhuman mental synthesis there may be, the neglect and elimination of certain contents of which we are conscious on the human level might be as characteristic a feature as is the combination and interweaving of other human contents. ↩
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The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, p. 227. ↩
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Fechner: Über die Seelenfrage, 1861, p. 170. ↩
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Fechner’s latest summarizing of his views, Die Tagesansicht gegenüber der Nachtansicht, Leipzig, 1879, is now, I understand, in process of translation. His Little Book of Life After Death exists already in two American versions, one published by Little, Brown & Co., Boston, the other by the Open Court Co., Chicago. ↩
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Mr. Bradley ought to be to some degree exempted from my attack in these last pages. Compare especially what he says of nonhuman consciousness in his Appearance and Reality, pp. 269–272. ↩
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Royce: The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, p. 379. ↩
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The World and the Individual, vol. II, pp. 58–62. ↩
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I hold to it still as the best description of an enormous number of our higher fields of consciousness. They demonstrably do not contain the lower states that know the same objects. Of other fields, however this is not so true; so, in the Psychological Review for 1895, vol. II, p. 105 (see especially pp. 119–120), I frankly withdrew, in principle, my former objection to talking of fields of consciousness being made of simpler “parts,” leaving the facts to decide the question in each special case. ↩
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I abstract from the
