Admitting his premises—and these premises are the universally accepted axioms of international politics the world over—who shall say that he is wrong?
II
The Axioms of Modern Statecraft
Are the foregoing axioms unchallengeable?—Some typical statements of them—German dreams of conquest—Mr. Frederic Harrison on results of defeat of British arms and invasion of England—Forty millions starving.
Are the axioms set out in the last chapter unchallengeable?
Is it true that the wealth, prosperity and well-being of a nation depend upon its military power, or have necessarily anything whatever to do therewith?
Can one civilized nation gain moral or material advantage by the military conquest of another?
Does conquered territory add to the wealth of the conquering nation?
Is it possible for a nation to “own” the territory of another in the way that a person or corporation would “own” an estate?
Could Germany “take” English trade and Colonies by military force?
Could she turn English Colonies into German ones, and win an overseas empire by the sword, as England won hers in the past?
Does a modern nation need to expand its political boundaries in order to provide for increasing population?
If England could conquer Germany tomorrow, completely conquer her, reduce her nationality to so much dust, would the ordinary British subject be the better for it?
If Germany could conquer England, would any ordinary German subject be the better for it?
The fact that all these questions have to be answered in the negative, and that a negative answer seems to outrage common sense, shows how much our political axioms are in need of revision.
The literature on the subject leaves no doubt whatever that I have correctly stated the premises of the matter in the foregoing chapter. Those whose special vocation is the philosophy of statecraft in the international field, from Aristotle and Plato, passing by Machiavelli and Clausewitz down to Mr. Roosevelt and the German Emperor, have left us in no doubt whatever on the point. The whole view has been admirably summarized by two notable writers—Admiral Mahan, on the Anglo-Saxon side, and Baron Karl von Stengel (second German delegate to the First Hague Conference) on the German. Admiral Mahan says:
The old predatory instinct that he should take who has the power survives … and moral force is not sufficient to determine issues unless supported by physical. Governments are corporations, and corporations have no souls; governments, moreover, are trustees, and as such must put first the lawful interests of their wards—their own people. … More and more Germany needs the assured importation of raw materials, and, where possible, control of regions productive of such materials. More and more she requires assured markets and security as to the importation of food, since less and less comparatively is produced within her own borders by her rapidly increasing population. This all means security at sea. … Yet the supremacy of Great Britain in European seas means a perpetually latent control of German commerce. … The world has long been accustomed to the idea of a predominant naval power, coupling it with the name of Great Britain, and it has been noted that such power, when achieved, is commonly often associated with commercial and industrial predominance, the struggle for which is now in progress between Great Britain and Germany. Such predominance forces a nation to seek markets, and, where possible, to control them to its own advantage by preponderant force, the ultimate expression of which is possession. … From this flow two results: the attempt to possess and the organization of force by which to maintain possession already achieved. … This statement is simply a specific formulation of the general necessity stated; it is an inevitable link in the chain of logical sequences—industrial markets, control, navy bases.3 …
But in order to show that this is no special view, and that this philosophy does indeed represent the general public opinion of Europe, the opinion of the great mass which prompts the actions of Governments and explains their respective policies, I take the following from the current newspapers and reviews ready to my hand:
It is the prowess of our navy … our dominant position at sea … which has built up the British Empire and its commerce.
—London Times leading article
Because her commerce is infinitely vulnerable, and because her people are dependent upon that commerce for food and the wages with which to buy it. … Britain wants a powerful fleet, a perfect organization behind the fleet, and an army of defence. Until they are provided
