What, then, is the principle determining the advantageous and the disadvantageous employment of force?
Preceding the outline sketch just referred to is another sketch indicating the real biological law of man’s survival and advance; the key to that law is found in cooperation between men and struggle with nature. Mankind as a whole is the organism which needs to coordinate its parts in order to insure greater vitality by better adaptation to its environment.
Here, then, we get the key: force employed to secure completer cooperation between the parts, to facilitate exchange, makes for advance; force which runs counter to such cooperation, which attempts to replace the mutual benefit of exchange by compulsion, which is in any way a form of parasitism, makes for retrogression.
Why is the employment of force by the police justified? Because the bandit refuses to cooperate. He does not offer an exchange; he wants to live as a parasite, to take by force, and give nothing in exchange. If he increased in numbers, cooperation between the various parts of the organism would be impossible; he makes for disintegration. He must be restrained, and so long as the police use their force in such restraint they are merely insuring cooperation. The police are not attempting to settle things by force; they are preventing things from being settled in that way.
Now, suppose that this police-force becomes the army of a political Power, and the diplomats of that Power say to a smaller one: “We outnumber you; we are going to annex your territory, and you are going to pay us tribute.” And the smaller Power says: “What are you going to give us for that tribute?” And the larger replies: “Nothing. You are weak; we are strong; we gobble you up. It is the law of life; always has been—always will be to the end.”
Now that police-force, become an army, is no longer making for cooperation; it has simply and purely taken the place of the bandits; and to approximate such an army to a police-force, and to say that because both operations involve the employment of force they both stand equally justified, is to ignore half the facts, and to be guilty of those lazy generalizations which we associate with savagery.88
But the difference is more than a moral one. If the reader will again return to the little sketch referred to above, he will probably agree that the diplomats of the larger Power are acting in an extraordinarily stupid fashion. I say nothing of their sham philosophy (which happens, however, to be that of European statecraft today), by which this aggression is made to appear in keeping with the law of man’s struggle for life, when, as a matter of fact, it is the very negation of that law; but we know now that they are taking a course which gives the least result, even from their point of view, for the effort expended.
Here we get the key also to the difference between the respective histories of the military empires, like Spain, France, and Portugal, and the more industrial type, like England, which has been touched upon in the preceding chapter. Not the mere hazard of war, not a question of mere efficiency in the employment of force, has given to Great Britain influence in half a world, and taken it from Spain, but a radical, fundamental difference in underlying principles however imperfectly realized. England’s exercise of force has approximated on the whole to the role of police; Spain’s to that of the diplomats of the supposititious Power just referred to. England’s has made for cooperation; Spain’s for the embarrassment of cooperation. England’s has been in keeping with the real law of man’s struggle; Spain’s in keeping with the sham law which the “blood and iron” empiricists are forever throwing at our heads. For what has happened to all attempts to live on extorted tribute? They have all failed—failed miserably and utterly89—to such an extent that today the exaction of tribute has become an economic impossibility.
If, however, our supposititious diplomats, instead of asking for tribute, had said: “Your country is in disorder; your police-force is insufficient; our merchants are robbed and killed; we will lend you police and help you to maintain order; you will pay the police their just wage, and that is all;” and had honestly kept to this office, their exercise of force would have aided human cooperation, not checked it. Again, it would have been a struggle, not against man, but against the use of force; the “predominant Power” would have been living, not on other men, but by more efficient organization of man’s fight with nature.
That is why, in the first section of this book, I have laid emphasis on the truth that the justification of past wars has no bearing on the problem which confronts us: the precise degree of fighting which was necessary a hundred and fifty years ago is a somewhat academic problem. The degree of fighting which is necessary today is the problem which confronts us, and a great many factors have been introduced into it since England won India and lost part of North America. The face of the world has changed, and the factors of conflict have changed radically: to ignore that is to ignore facts and to be guided by the worst form of theorizing and sentimentalism—the theorizing that will not recognize the facts. England does not need to maintain order in Germany, nor Germany in France; and the struggle between those nations is no part of man’s struggle with nature—has no justification in the real law of human struggle; it is an anachronism; it
