A Treatise of Human Nature

from the bodies make with each other. It is certain, that these angles are not known to the mind, and consequently can never discover the distance. The second error may be found in Book I, Part III, sect. 7, where I say, that two ideas of the same object can only be different by their different degrees of force and vivacity. I believe there are other differences among ideas, which cannot properly be comprehended under these terms. Had I said, that two ideas of the same object can only be different by their different feeling, I should have been nearer the truth.

Endnotes

1. Mr. Locke, my Lord Shaftesbury, Dr. Mandeville, Mr. Hutchinson, Dr. Butler, etc. ↩

2. I here make use of these terms, impression and idea, in a sense different from what is usual, and I hope this liberty will be allowed me. Perhaps I rather restore the word, idea, to its original sense, from which Mr. Locke had perverted it, in making it stand for all our perceptions. By the terms of impression I would not be understood to express the manner, in which our lively perceptions are produced in the soul, but merely the perceptions themselves; for which there is no particular name either in the English or any other language, that I know of. ↩

3. Part III, sect. 5. ↩

4. Dr. Berkeley. [Introd.: to Principles of Human Knowledge, secs. 18 etc. Cf. also Introd. to this volume paragraphs 183 and ff.

   —⁠Ed.

   ] ↩

5. It is evident, that even different simple ideas may have a similarity or resemblance to each other; nor is it necessary, that the point or circumstance of resemblance should be distinct or separable from that in which they differ. Blue and green are different simple ideas, but are more resembling than blue and scarlet; though their perfect simplicity excludes all possibility of separation or distinction. It is the same case with particular sounds, and tastes and smells. These admit of infinite resemblances upon the general appearance and comparison, without having any common circumstance the same. And of this we may be certain, even from the very abstract terms simple idea. They comprehend all simple ideas under them. These resemble each other in their simplicity. And yet from their very nature, which excludes all composition, this circumstance, in which they resemble, is not distinguishable nor separable from the rest. It is the same case with all the degrees in any quality. They are all resembling and yet the quality, in any individual, is not distinct from the degree. ↩

6. It has been objected to me, that infinite divisibility supposes only an infinite number of proportional not of aliquot parts, and that an infinite number of proportional parts does not form an infinite extension. But this distinction is entirely frivolous. Whether these parts be called aliquot or proportional, they cannot be inferior to those minute parts we conceive; and therefore cannot form a less extension by their conjunction. ↩

7. Mons. Malezieu. ↩

8. Mr. Locke. ↩

9. Sect. 5. ↩

10. L’Art de Penser

    . ↩

11. See Dr. Barrow’s mathematical lectures. ↩

12. As long as we confine our speculations to the appearances of objects to our senses, without entering into disquisitions concerning their real nature and operations, we are safe from all difficulties, and can never be embarrassed by any question. Thus, if it be asked, if the invisible and intangible distance, interposed betwixt two objects, be something or nothing: It is easy to answer, that it is something, viz. a property of the objects, which affect the senses after such a particular manner. If it be asked whether two objects, having such a distance betwixt them, touch or not: It may be answered, that this depends upon the definition of the word, touch. If objects be said to touch, when there is nothing sensible interposed betwixt them, these objects touch: If objects be said to touch, when their images strike contiguous parts of the eye, and when the hand feels both objects successively, without any interposed motion, these objects do not touch. The appearances of objects to our senses are all consistent; and no difficulties can ever arise, but from the obscurity of the terms we make use of.

    If we carry our enquiry beyond the appearances of objects to the senses, I am afraid, that most of our conclusions will be full of scepticism and uncertainty. Thus if it be asked, whether or not the invisible and intangible distance be always full of body, or of something that by an improvement of our organs might become visible or tangible, I must acknowledge, that I find no very decisive arguments on either side; though I am inclined to the contrary opinion, as being more suitable to vulgar and popular notions. If the Newtonian philosophy be rightly understood, it will be found to mean no more. A vacuum is asserted: That is, bodies are said to be placed after such a manner, is to receive bodies betwixt them, without impulsion or penetration. The real nature of this position of bodies is unknown. We are only acquainted with its effects on the senses, and its power of receiving body. Nothing is more suitable to that philosophy, than a modest scepticism to a certain degree, and a fair confession of ignorance in subjects, that exceed all human capacity. ↩

13. Part I, sect. 7. ↩

14. Part IV, sect. 2. ↩

15. Part I, sect. 5. ↩

16. Part IV, sect. 5. ↩

17. Mr. Hobbes. ↩

18. Dr. Clarke and others. ↩

19. Mr. Locke. ↩

20. We may here take occasion to observe a very remarkable error, which being frequently inculcated in the schools, has become a kind of established maxim, and