The judgement of witches who deny the faith would be the same; that when they wish to return they should be received as penitents, but otherwise they should be left to the secular Court. But they are by all means to be received back into the bosom of the Church when they repent; and are left to the secular Court if they will not return; and this is because of the temporal injuries which they cause, as will be shown in the methods of passing sentence. And all this may be done by the Ordinary, so that the Inquisitor can leave his duties to him, at least in a case of apostasy; for it is otherwise in other cases of sorcerers.
The fifth condition necessary for a man to be rightly thought a heretic is that he should obstinately and stubbornly persist in his error. Hence, according to S. Jerome, the etymological meaning of heresy is Choice. And again S. Augustine says: Not he who initiates or follows false doctrines, but he who obstinately defends them, is to be considered a heretic. Therefore if anyone does not evilly persist in believing some false doctrine, but errs through ignorance and is prepared to be corrected and to be shown that his opinion is false and contrary to Holy Scripture and the determination of the Church, he is not a heretic. For he was ready to be corrected when his error was pointed out to him. And it is agreed that every day the Doctors have various opinions concerning Divine matters, and sometimes they are contradictory, so that one of them must be false; and yet none of them are reputed to be false until the Church has come to a decision concerning them. See art. 24, q. 3, qui in ecclesia.
From all this is is concluded that the sayings of the Canonists on the words “savour manifestly of heresy” in the chapter accusatus do not sufficiently prove that witches and others who in any way invoke devils are subject to trial by the Inquisitorial Court; for it is only by a legal fiction that they judge such to be heretics. Neither is it proved by the words of the Theologians; for they call such persons apostates either in word or in deed, but not in their thoughts and their hearts; and it is of this last error that the words “savour of heresy” speak.
And though such persons should be judged to be heretics, it does not follow from this that a Bishop cannot proceed against them without an Inquisitor to a definite sentence, or punish them with imprisonment or torture. More than this, even when this decision does not seem enough to warrant the exemption of us Inquisitors from the duty of trying witches, still we are unwilling to consider that we are legally compelled to perform such duties ourselves, since we can depute the Diocesans to our office, at least in respect of arriving at a judgement.
For this provision is made in the Canon Law (c. multorum in prin. de haeret. in Clem.). There it says: As a result of a general complaint, and that this sort of Inquisition may proceed more fortunately and the inquiry into this crime be conducted more skilfully, diligently, and carefully, we order that this kind of case may be tried by the Diocesan Bishops as well as by the Inquisitors deputed by the Apostolic See, all carnal hatred or fear or any temporal affection of this sort being put aside; and so either of the above may move without the other, and arrest or seize a witch, placing her in safe custody in fetters and iron chains, if it seems good to him; and in this matter we leave the conduct of the affair to his own conscience; but there must be no negligence in inquiring into such matters in a manner agreeable to God and justice; but such witches must be thrust into prison rather as a matter of punishment than custody, or be exposed to torture, or be sentenced to some punishment. And a Bishop can proceed without an Inquisitor, or an Inquisitor without a Bishop; or, if either of their offices be vacant, their deputies may act independently of each other, provided that is is impossible for them to meet together for joint action within eight days of the time when the inquiry is due to commence; but if there be no valid reason for their not meeting together, the action shall be null and void in law.
The chapter proceeds to support our contention as follows: But if the Bishop or the Inquisitor, or either of their deputies, are unable or unwilling, for any of the reasons which we have mentioned, to meet together personally, they can severally depute their duties to each other, or else signify their advice and approval by letters.
From this it is clear that even in those cases where the Bishop is not entirely independent of the Inquisitor, the Inquisitor can depute the Bishop to act in his stead, especially in the matter of passing sentence: therefore we ourselves have decided to act according to this decision, leaving other Inquisitors to other districts
