And we have an example of this in the actions of natural things. For although the corruptions and defects which occur in natural things are contrary to the purpose of that particular thing (as when a thief is hanged, or when animals are killed for human food), they are yet in accordance with the universal purpose of nature (as that man’s life and property should be kept intact); and thus the universal good is preserved. For it is necessary for the conservation of the species that the death of one should be the preservation of another. For lions are kept alive by the slaughter of other animals.
It is explained with regard to the Divine Permission, that God would not make a Creature to be Naturally without Sin.157
Secondly, God in His justice permits the prevalence of evil, both that of sin and that of pain, and especially now that the world is cooling and declining to its end; and this we shall prove from two propositions which must be postulated. First, that God would not—or let us rather say, with the fear of God, that (humanly speaking) it is impossible that any creature, man or Angel, can be of such a nature that it cannot sin. And secondly, that it is just in God to permit man to sin, or to be tempted. These two propositions being granted, and since it is a part of the Divine providence that every creature shall be left to its own nature, it must be said that, according to the premises, it is impossible that God does not permit witchcraft to be committed with the help of devils.
And that it was not possible to communicate to a creature a natural incapacity for sin, is shown by S. Thomas (II, 23, art. 1). For if this quality were communicable to any creature, God would have communicated it; for He has, at least in kind, communicated all other graces and perfections to His creatures that are communicable. Such is the personal union of two natures in Christ, the Maternity and Virginity of Immaculate Mary, the blessed companionship of the elect, and many other things. But we read that this quality was not given to any creature, either man or Angel; for it is said: Even in His Angels He found sin. Therefore it is certain that God will not communicate to man a natural incapacity for sin, although man may win to this through grace.
Again, if this were communicable, and were not communicated, the universe would not be perfect. And its perfections consists in the fact that all communicable good qualities of creatures are communicated in kind.
Neither is it valid to argue that God, being omnipotent, and having made men and Angels in His likeness, could also have caused his creatures to be by nature impeccable: or even that He would make that condition of Grace, which is the cause of confirmation in goodness, an essential part of the nature of Angels and men, so that through their natural origin and natural condition they would be so confirmed in goodness that they would not be able to sin.
For the first argument will not hold. Since, although God is all-powerful and all-good, yet he will not bestow this quality of impeccability; not because of any imperfection in His power, but because of the imperfection of the creature; and this imperfection lies chiefly in the fact that no creature, man or Angel, is capable of receiving this quality. And for this reason: that, being a creature, its being depends upon its Creator, just as an effect depends on the cause of its being. And to create is to make something out of nothing, and this, if left to itself, perishes, but endures so long as it preserves the influence of its cause. You may take, if you wish, an example from a candle, which burns only so long as it has wax. This being so, it is to be noted that God created man, and left him in the hand of his own counsel (Ecclesiasticus 17). And so also He created the Angels in the beginning of Creation. And this was done for the sake of Free will, the property of which is to do or to omit doing, to recede or not to recede from its cause. And since to recede from God, from free will, is to sin, therefore it was impossible for man or Angel to receive, and God did not will to give, such a natural quality that he should at the same time be endowed with free will and also be incapable of sin.
Another imperfection by reason of which this quality cannot be communicated to man or Angel is that it implies a contradiction; and since a contradiction is by its nature impossible, we say that God will not do this thing. Or rather we should say that His creatures cannot receive such a quality. For example, it is impossible that anything can be at one and the same time alive and dead. And so it would imply this contradiction: that a man should have free will, by which he would be able to depart from his Creator, and that he should also be unable to sin. But if he were unable to sin, he would be unable to depart from his Creator. For this is sin: to despise the incommutable good and cleave to things that are variable. But to despise or not to despise is a matter of free will.
The second argument also is not valid. For if the confirmation of grace were so essential a part of the original creation that
