13 Further confirmation of plans for a fully automatic retaliatory system is contained in an internal Soviet defense document in Katayev, Hoover. Oleg Belyakov, who worked in Katayev’s department, complained in a 1985 memo that not enough attention had been paid “to a proposal, extremely important from the military and political point of view, to create a fully-automated retaliatory strike system that would be activated from the top command levels in a moment of crisis (with a notification to the adversary).” The comment about a “super-project” is from Katayev, Some Facts. Hines quotes Viktor M. Surikov, who had spent thirty years in building, designing and testing missiles, as saying the Dead Hand was designed by his team and approved by the Central Committee, but a fully automatic system was later rejected by Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, chief of the General Staff. Hines et al., Soviet Intentions 1965–1985, BDM Federal Inc., vol. 2, pp. 134–135.
14 This description is from Yarynich interviews with the author, as well as C3, p. 156; Korobushin interview, Hines, vol. 2, p. 107; Bruce Blair, Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces, Brookings Occasional Papers (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1995), pp. 43–56.
15 The United States was the chief adversary, but Western European or other targets might also have been included. China had a relatively small nuclear force.
16 Yarynich details the test on p. 170 in C3. The delay was described in an interview with the author.
CHAPTER 7: MORNING AGAIN IN AMERICA
1 Reagan, An American Life, p. 589.
2 Massie first met with Reagan January 17, 1984, before the trip. She reports meeting him twenty-two times in his second term, and taught him the Russian proverb Doveryai no proveryai, or “Trust, but Verify.” See http://www.suzannemassie.com. Also see Deborah Hart Strober and Gerald S. Strober, The Reagan Presidency: An Oral History of the Era (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2003), pp. 222–228. Reagan’s diary, March 1, 1984.
3 Jack F. Matlock Jr., Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended (New York: Random House, 2004), p. 88.
4 Reagan diary, March 2, 1984.
5 Reagan, An American Life, pp. 594–597.
6 Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story (New York: HarperCollins, 1990), p. 602.
7 Andrew and Gordievsky, pp. 603–604.
8 NSDD 119, Jan. 6, 1984. Christopher Simpson, National Security Directives of the Reagan and Bush Administrations: The Declassified History of U.S. Political and Military Policy, 1981–1991 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 374–378.
9 Peter Grier, “The Short Happy Life of the Glick-Em,” Air Force magazine, Journal of the Air Force Association, vol. 85, no. 7, July 2002.
10 Anatoly Chernyaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev (University Park, Pa.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), p. 9.
11 Herbert E. Meyer, vice chairman, National Intelligence Council, “What Should We Do About the Russians?” June 28, 1984, NIC 03770-84.
12 Matlock, p. 95.
13 Reagan diary, April 9, 1984.
14 David Hoffman, “Chernenko ‘Disappointed’ White House,” Washington Post, April 10, 1984, p. 9.
15 Reagan, An American Life, p. 602. Also see SNIE 11-9-84, Soviet Policy Toward the United States in 1984, Aug. 9, 1984.
16 Seweryn Bialer, The Soviet Paradox: External Expansion, Internal Decline (New York: Knopf, 1986), see Ch. 6.
17 George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), p. 480.
18 Shultz, p. 484. Gromyko recounted the moment to Dobrynin as if it had been more an exchange of slogans. Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents (New York: Times Books, 1995), p. 556.
19 Shultz, p. 484; Andrei Gromyko, Harold Shukman, trans., Memories(London: Hutchison, 1989), p. 307.
20 Don Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a New Era (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), p. 93.
21 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), p. 102.
22 Andrew and Gordievsky, p. 604.
23 Shultz, p. 477. Andropov had proposed a unilateral moratorium on space weapons the previous year, just before the KAL shoot-down.
24 Nigel Hey, The Star Wars Enigma: Behind the Scenes of the Cold War Race for Missile Defense (Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books, 2006), p. 136.
25 The New York Times raised questions Aug. 18, 1993, about whether the test was rigged. The General Accounting Office found no evidence that it was, though the playing field was slightly tilted by heating the target so it would be easier for the interceptor to discover and turning the target sideways. The investigation revealed that the United States had also devised a deception program that would have exploded the target regardless to spook the Soviets. However, the deception program was not used in the June 1984 test. It had been readied in the first two experiments, but the interceptor and rocket missed by such a wide margin that the deception explosion was not used. “Ballistic Missile Defense: Records Indicate Deception Program Did Not Affect 1984 Test Results,” United States General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-94-219, July 1994.
26 George Raine, “Creating Reagan’s Image; S.F. Ad Man Riney Helped Secure Him a Second Term,” San Francisco Chronicle, June 9, 2004, p. C1.
27 Shultz, p. 478.
CHAPTER 8: “WE CAN’T GO ON LIVING LIKE THIS”
1 Except where otherwise noted, Margaret Thatcher’s recollections are from her memoir, The Downing Street Years (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), pp. 452–453, and 459–463. Mikhail Gorbachev’s recollections are chiefly from his Memoirs in English and in Russian, Zhizn’ i reformi, two vols. (Moscow: Novosti, 1995). In some cases, as noted, Gorbachev’s comments are from the author’s interview in 2006; and Conversations with Gorbachev, transcribed interviews with himself and Zdenek MlynaaY (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). Raisa Gorbachev mentioned the Chernenko permission in her memoir I Hope: Reminiscences and Reflections (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), p. 125.
2 Geoffrey Howe, interview with BBC’s “The Westminster Hour,” May 2005.
3 Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 77.
4 Gordievsky, interview, August 29, 2005; and Next Stop, pp. 305–313.
5 Gorbachev told a British official during the visit that the first modern English novel he read was Snow’s Corridors of Power. Archie Brown, Seven Years That Changed the World:
