visible.
When we entered the meeting room, a large one with high ceilings, there were several other people already waiting. I recognized Casey, Arnold Kyle, and Benny. Four other men and one woman looked unfamiliar. In the center of the room was a big nineteenth-century-style dining table. We sat around it. I counted the participants. We were ten in all.
Arnold started. “The work of all the teams ended sooner than expected. That’s a good sign. We’re here today to review the various options following the recent developments in the Chameleon case, which now seems more than ever to be connected to Iran’s terror financing.”
“Chameleon?” I muttered to Benny, who sat next to me. “Since when is he using that name?”
“Dan, you’re a lawyer. You know as well as anyone that you haven’t secured trademark protection for that name,” he said, grinning.
“The purpose of this meeting is to explore whether a recommendation should be made to our respective governments to take additional measures. But before we begin, Jack Randolph, our security officer, will say a few words.”
A man in his late fifties with a shaven head and dressed in a blue blazer addressed us. “Good intelligence is the best weapon in the battle against international terrorism. However, gathering intelligence about the identities, intentions, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of terrorists is extremely difficult. On top of that, we’ve realized that leaks of intelligence and law-enforcement information, some due to negligence and carelessness, but some intentionally stolen-or worse, secretly and illegally transferred- have endangered sources, alienated friendly nations, and inhibited their cooperation, thereby jeopardizing the U.S. government’s ability to obtain further information. Therefore, I insist that each and every one of you understand the gravity of this issue. Particular security measures are undertaken concerning this meeting and the operation planned. Please respect these limitations, and protect all information received and treat it as top secret. I’ll go over the security instructions before the conclusion of this session. Thank you.”
Kyle proceeded to provide us with a brief history of the battle against terror financing. Then we went into specific cases, and finally, when I was about to lose interest, he discussed our case, mostly using the report Nicole and I had submitted earlier. “This report is an early-stage operational road map. I say early stage, because there’s a lot of work to be done here. For starters, I need your input on two points: risk/benefit analysis of such an operation, and whether, how, and where to enter Iran-and once entered, the ways and means of achieving our ultimate goals.”
He paused. “We’re here to look at operational aspects. Any suggestions?”
“Dan, any ideas?” nudged Benny.
I spoke up. “If we want to crack the mystery of Atashbon or Department 81-if they are in fact separate entities-we just can’t exclusively rely on ELINT/SIGINT. We must have HUMINT. We need someone with a pulse, an informer, or for one of us to get it independently.”
“Not that I disagree with you,” said Kyle, “but look at the results that NSA has brought. It’s all ELINT based. They’ve just been intercepting electronic transmissions.”
“Sure, but did they tell us where the Chameleon is? Did they tell us whether there are other sleeper cells in the U.S.? They just brought us the ladder. Now we need a person to climb it,” I said. “We must have the human touch to bring in the smoking gun. If we can do it by remote control, then I’m all for it. But if we can’t-and I do believe that to be the case here-then we should do the job ourselves, even if that means penetration into Iran.” I was sounding more decisive than I actually was. I hoped I wasn’t going too far.
“You do realize that such a mission could get you killed,” said Bob Holliday. It was more of a statement than a question. “Is it worth it just to get even with someone who stole money?”
Though I was initially surprised, I realized with a quick flash of eye contact that he was handing me the ball to score. Maybe working for this guy wasn’t going to be so stiff after all.
“It started as a case of stolen money,” I said. “No longer. This is a case that concerns U.S. national security. For the first time we’ve got evidence to suggest that there could be Iranian sleeper cells in the U.S. If the suspicion is established as fact, do you think their hibernation will continue forever? We tentatively concluded that the Chameleon was assigned by his controllers to steal money. We know from the physical description of the other perpetrators of the banking fraud in the U.S. that there are probably other members of Department 81 in the U.S., because they didn’t look like the Chameleon. Do we know, in case there are additional sleeper cells in the U.S., what their missions are? Do we even know that they were in fact asleep during the past twenty years? Maybe some of the unsolved mysteries during those two decades were connected to one or more of them. Remember, the U.S. is called the Great Satan by the Iranian ayatollahs, while Israel is the Small Satan. The Iranian message is, don’t play with Satan-kill him.”
“So you’re suggesting we get the still-missing information regarding their identity directly in Iran,” said Arnold.
I nodded. “Yes. But I want to make clear that my support for the recommendation for penetration is contingent upon identifying and finding a potential source, or a plan that could provide us with the necessary information or be a conduit to others who could give us that. I’m not suggesting we enter first and then start looking around. I hope you give me credit for not being that unprofessional and careless. We suggested a preliminary plan in our team’s report.”
“Have you also done a risk assessment?” asked Casey.
“No. I was asked to deal with finding the Chameleon. Another team made the assessment. But since you asked, I agree that there are significant risks involved in penetration, even under our proposed plan, and I understand them. If caught, whoever goes there has little or no chance of walking away from it alive. But a more accurate risk assessment must be made once a plan is in place. And we don’t have an approved plan yet.”
I took a deep breath. “But if there’s a good plan, I’m willing to volunteer to be a singleton for that mission.” I knew that I’d fare better as a lone wolf in an operation designed for a single operative. During my military service I’d realized that many would volunteer for a mission until it was time to go. But not here; I was willing.
Benny, who sat next to me, said quietly in Hebrew, “Dan, you’re crazy.”
Everyone else just silently stared at me. We continued discussing various options for three more hours until Kyle said, looking at his watch, “OK, I think we’ve accomplished something today. I ask for your summary operational suggestions by the end of the week. I’m going back to the U.S., and we’ll review the options there. Benny, any suggestions?”
“Not at this time,” said Benny. “I need to talk to the director of the Mossad before we continue. In general, I’ve got his blessing, but when concrete plans are drawn that assume our participation, we must revisit the entire matter.”
When everyone was about to leave, Kyle asked Bob, Benny, Casey, Nicole, and me to stay behind.
“Let’s talk shop,” he said. “For the kind of detail I want to get into, we don’t need the whole assembly. Under what guise do you think an entry into Iran could succeed?”
“There are two ways,” I said. “The legal and the illegal. Well, both are illegal. What I call legal is an entry through the international airport of Tehran, with a cover story.”
“And the illegal entry?”
“Through one of the extremely long borders Iran has with its seven neighbors. Preferably penetration through Turkey, or from Turkmenistan.”
“If penetration isn’t through the international airport, whoever we send has to be physically fit,” said Nicole. “I’m sure you’re aware of the distances, the heights, the lack of transportation, and the rivalry between various factions living in these areas that don’t particularly like snooping strangers, regardless of their nationality.”
“I know that. We submitted a general plan, which may or may not be plausible,” I said. “But just two comments in that regard. One, we don’t have to dwell on that now, because it’s not our mandate to determine means of penetration. The operation departments of the CIA and Mossad are better qualified to recommend that. Also, the Mossad has an excellent long-term relationship with the Kurds, as we heard from Benny in Giverny, so maybe we could have a route here. But for the sake of our mock war game, and as suggested in our plan, let’s assume entry through Tehran’s airport. It has a lot of advantages.”
“Such as what?” asked Bob.
“Such as support for the legend. Let’s say, for example, that our men enter Iran posing as representatives of European companies selling pharmaceuticals to Iranian drug importers. Would their cover story make sense if
