The Free World Loses China with Her 450 Million People
At this same time there also came to the free world powers one of the most bitter lessons they had to learn in dealing with World Communism—the loss of China.
After fighting the Japanese militarists for fourteen years, China had approached the end of World War II with high hopes. The war had been fought under a dictatorship led by Chiang Kai-shek but his Nationalist Government had promised to set up a democratic constitution as soon as national unity would permit. As the war ended Chiang Kai-shek ordered the restoration of civil rights and inaugurated freedom of the press.
The Chinese leaders knew their greatest threat to peace was the small but well-trained army of Chinese Communists in the northwest; nevertheless, they went right ahead with their plans for a constitution which would allow the Communists, full representation but would require them to disband their armed forces. There was confidence that a representative government could be worked out for all parties in China if armed insurrection were eliminated. In fact, Chiang Kai-shek invited the Communist leader, Mao Tse-tung, to come to the capital and see if they could reach a peaceful settlement of their difference.
Mao came. He promised to cooperate in setting up a democracy but Chiang Kai-shek and his aides were not at all impressed with his superficial display of professed sincerity. Chiang later promised his nervous associates that he would never relinquish his dictatorial powers until he was completely satisfied that the government was safely in the hands of a substantial majority of the people—not just some noisy militant minority.
Effect of the Yalta Agreement on Post-War China
An early blow to China’s hopes for a post-war peace came when it was learned that back in February, 1945, British and American diplomatic leaders at Yalta had agreed to give Russia extensive property rights in Manchuria if the Soviets would join in the war against Japan. Chiang Kai-shek was outraged by this unilateral arrangement (China was never consulted) and he never ceased to blame much of the subsequent disaster on this initial blunder.
The Yalta agreement allowed Russia to come racing into Manchuria (and North Korea) just six days before the Japanese capitulated. After a typically brutal Russian occupation, the Soviet troops fixed the Communist grip on this territory which the Japanese had extensively industrialized and which was one of the richest agricultural regions in all China. In fact, it was Manchuria that the Nationalists were expecting to use as the working base in bolstering China’s battered economy.
However, after taking Manchuria, Stalin suddenly and unexpectedly agreed to withdraw his troops and recognize the Nationalist Government of China as the legal sovereign of that territory providing China would acknowledge Russia’s property rights in Manchuria which Stalin had previously demanded at Yalta. This consisted of half ownership in the Manchurian railroads and the right to lease Port Arthur as a Russian naval base. Under strong pressure from the United States and Great Britain, China signed this agreement with Russia on August 14, 1945.
Almost immediately Chiang Kai-shek knew this was a serious mistake. The treaty was nothing but a Russian tool of strategy which legally codified the mistakes at Yalta. As Chiang Kai-shek had feared, the Russians operated the Manchurian railroads as though they owned them outright. They not only set up a naval base at Port Arthur, but arrogantly refused to allow the Chinese to use their own port of Dairen. Instead of evacuating Manchuria, the Soviets began looting the entire region of all its heavy industry and shipping it to Russia as “war booty.” This represented a stunning blow to China’s future economic recovery.
But even more important than this was the Russians’ strategy of delaying the removal of their troops by various pretexts until the Chinese Communists could come in from the northwest and occupy Manchuria. As the Communists came in, the Russians turned over to them the vast quantities of ammunition and war material which they had seized from the Japanese.
Consequently, when the Nationalists arrived to take over Manchuria, they were outraged to find that the Chinese Communists were already dug in. Immediately civil war loomed up as an inescapable consequence.
Chiang Kai-shek Attempts to Create A Democracy in China
All of this was happening right at the time the Nationalists were trying to prepare China for a constitutional form of government. On his own initiative Chiang had set May 5, 1946, as the first meeting of the Chinese National Assembly in which all parties were to take part. But, of course, this entire program to unify and democratize China was seriously jeopardized by the outbreak of war in Manchuria. At this point the U.S. diplomats decided to take a hand.
They had planned the United Nations to preserve world Peace and had insisted from the beginning that the Red leaders were potentially peaceful and had no territorial ambitions. Assuming this to be true they denounced Chiang for resisting the Chinese Reds. They accused him of creating new world tensions. General George C. Marshall was therefore sent over to China to stop the civil war.
General Marshall arrived in January, 1946. What happened after that is a long series of incidents, each one tragically demonstrating the error of trying to incorporate the ideas of world revolutionists within the framework of representative government.
The Communists demanded a coalition government but insisted on keeping their own private army. They wanted a voice in the government of all China, but would not allow the central government to have a voice in the affairs of Communist-occupied areas of China. They agreed to a cease-fire and then launched aggressive attacks as soon as it served their own advantage to do so. They agreed to help set up a State Council representing all parties and then advised at the last moment that they would not participate.
When the date for the first National Assembly was postponed so the Communists could participate, they used it as an excuse to accuse Chiang Kai-shek of setting the new date without proper authorization. After a second postponement, with the Communists still refusing to participate, the National Assembly finally convened on November 15, 1946, and a democratic constitution was approved and adopted on Christmas Day. But the Communists would have no part of it.
Chiang Kai-shek became completely convinced that the Communists would never negotiate a peaceful settlement but were out to win the whole domain of China by military conquest. He also believed the Communists could never represent the interests of China because their policies were created and imposed upon them by Moscow.
Time was to prove this analysis correct, but U.S. diplomatic strategists were the last to be convinced—and then only after the Chinese mainland had been lost. Furthermore, Chiang could not convince the U.S. diplomatic corps that he was justified in striking back when the Communists attacked him. When he tried to regain the territory recently seized by Communists, it was described in Washington as “inexcusable aggression.”
Disaster Strikes Down an Old U.S. Ally
Finally, in the summer of 1946, when the Communists had repeatedly violated the truce agreement, the Nationalists decided to vigorously counterattack and penetrate deep into Manchuria. The diplomats frantically ordered Chiang to stop, but he refused to do so. He said another truce would only allow the Communists time to re-group and come back even more fiercely than before. He also said it was his intention to continue the campaign to forcibly disarm the Communists and restore them to civilian status so that China could get on with her program
