families. But we do know them as able, dedicated, and loyal Americans, whose resilience and character, and, yes, their sense of humor will see them through this crisis…. To now describe these representatives of the United States as spies and agents of espionage is a travesty of the facts and an insult to human intelligence, both American and Iranian.
Many of the families weren’t buying it. Some were panicky.
“People are getting angrier,” said one.
“We’re heading for another Vietnam War,” said another, fearful of the use of military force.
One of the women asked if paying a ransom had been considered. Newsom said that was not under consideration. “The last thing to do is pass money around,” he said.
Shaplen wrote: “The meeting broke up shortly after a discussion of the press, which some of the wives condemned for overpublicizing the militant captors and further arousing passions in America. ‘We’re very conscious of the level of hysteria,’ Newsom said, in conclusion. ‘For that reason, we’re trying to step up visits to the hostages, to make them feel more secure and quiet things down here.’”
In the earlier session with just a few of the families that Carter had attended, the president had pledged not to “take any military action that would cause bloodshed or arouse the unstable captors of our hostages to attack them or punish them.” Those present had been heartened by the words “our hostages.”
At that meeting, Rosen had taken advantage of a brief moment with the president to hand him snapshots of her two daughters, and told him, “If you consider using guns, I hope you will think of the chance Barry will have.” Carter put the photos in his pocket.
For his part, Brzezinski avoided those meetings. He did not want the emotions to interfere with his judgment, or, perhaps more to the point, to interfere with his ability to advocate placing the national interest above the lives of the hostages. Vance urged the president to get the shah out of the country, something the dethroned monarch had graciously volunteered to do already. Brzezinski counseled that such a move amounted to pure capitulation.
At a foreign policy breakfast with the president on November 9, the national security adviser had warned against allowing the crisis to “settle into a state of normalcy.”
“If you do, it could paralyze your presidency,” he had said. “I hope we never have to choose between the hostages and our nation’s honor in the world but, Mr. President, you must be prepared for that. If they’re still in captivity at Thanksgiving, what will that say about your presidency and America’s image in the world?”
Vance continued to urge patience. He mentioned President Johnson’s calm handling of the
“But that went on for a year!” said Brzezinski.
“And Johnson wasn’t in the middle of a reelection campaign,” said Jordan.
Brzezinski’s position gained strength when the U.S. embassy in Islamabad was overrun by a mob and burned on November 21, killing two Americans and two Pakistani employees. A few weeks later, a mob in Tripoli attacked the U.S. embassy there and burned part of it, along with the cars parked outside. The fourteen Americans at that mission escaped unharmed. Vance told TV reporters that he did not see a pattern in these events, but he was probably the only one who didn’t.
Carter was determined not to let his hopes for reelection dictate his handling of the matter, and no matter how it played politically he trod a careful line between his two advisers. The fact that it was virtually impossible to rescue the hostages made the decision easier. He had little choice but to pursue a negotiated solution, and to find ways to put more pressure on Iran, but every move seemed simply to worsen matters. There was apparently no way to even initiate dialogue. The crisis was at a complete impasse.
Carter’s anger was kept under tight rein in public, but it showed in private. He ordered the military to draw up detailed plans for air strikes against Iran if and when the hostages were released.
“I want to punish them,” he said. “Really hit them. They must know that they can’t fool around with us.”
Such strikes in advance of getting the hostages home safely might mollify public opinion but would only worsen matters. Brzezinski played out the scenario in his head: Iran would certainly retaliate by giving the hostages show trials and executing some of them. Apart from the appalling personal tragedy that would entail, it would compel an even more aggressive American response, which might bring the Soviets in on the side of the Iranians and lead to an uncontrollable conflict. No matter how much America cared about the hostages, their fate was not worth the risk of an all-out nuclear exchange. Such thoughts sketched out the recklessness of Iran’s behavior.
The dilemma centered on one of the most basic and Gordian questions of democratic society: Which was more important, the individual or the state? Should Carter’s priority be the larger national interest, or should national interest take a backseat to the fate of several score American citizens? These were, most of them, volunteers who had sought out hazardous postings. Brzezinski and Vance ably represented both sides of this question, but Carter was, above all else, a pragmatist. When possible, pragmatists avoid confronting the hardest questions. For a nation like revolutionary Iran, which saw itself as divinely inspired, the question was easy. The will of the state was the will of Allah. Millions might be blithely sacrificed in His name. But for America there could never be a clear answer. The preeminence of the individual was a bedrock principle of the state, yet all but the most fanatical libertarians knew of instances, say, in times of war or natural catastrophe, when the government was compelled to disregard it. Carter did not yet face war or catastrophe. He told his staff that so far as he was concerned the interests of the state and the well-being of the American hostages in Iran were one and the same, so there was no dilemma. The only sensible option was to wait and see if somebody in Tehran was willing to talk.
Waiting might have big political costs for Carter. The image of a timid, hog-tied president was too tempting for his political enemies to resist. Kennedy flailed around rhetorically, probing for a way to capitalize on Carter’s predicament. He held a press conference to denounce the shah’s regime, exaggerating its sins, criticizing Carter for allowing him into the United States, and calling for an “open debate” over America’s role in propping up and sustaining his regime.
“The shah ran one of the most violent regimes in the history of mankind,” Kennedy said. “How do we justify the United States on one hand accepting that individual [the shah] because he would like to come here and stay here with his umpteen billions of dollars that he has stolen from Iran, and at the same time say to Hispanics who are here illegally that they have to wait nine years to bring their children into this country.” Kennedy said the administration should have known that admitting the shah would lead to a confrontation with the revolutionary leaders of Iran.
His comments were front-page news in Tehran and were warmly received, but they proved a bad miscalculation of the American mood. Iranian applause was political poison at home, where it smelled like capitulation, and Kennedy was criticized from every quarter. Stung, he promptly withdrew his proposals and said that a long conversation with Secretary of State Vance had convinced him that they were premature.
Henry Kissinger, whose advocacy on behalf of the shah had helped precipitate the crisis, surfaced on
“This is a situation where we are all obliged to support the people handling it,” he said, in a somewhat tepid endorsement of Carter, and then, dodging his own role in the affair, “There is no point in second-guessing it.” He finished with a subtle stab at the White House, hinting at presidential timidity. “When this is over we should find out what it is that makes foreign leaders think they can deal with the United States in this manner.”
Journalist Stephen S. Rosenfeld wrote in the
He wrote: “The administration’s real vulnerability, I think, lies in its expectation—hardheaded in pursuit of oil, softheaded in its pursuit of Third World favor—that things were settling down in Iran, that the moderates were prevailing; that the extremists could be trimmed to size; that the United States could gain more from betting on the future (by providing its presence, arms, grain, heating fuel, schooling, etc.) than from cutting itself out of the game…. I sense a new rage, a disgust, building in this country against the president. He will pay.”
Even though the polls did not yet bear out Rosenfeld’s prediction, Carter knew that unless something
