What if…?
As Billy’s father and relatives agreed, Malo hadn’t intended to kill Billy. I asked Malo and Gideon what would have happened if Malo really had murdered Billy intentionally, or if Malo had at least been unequivocally negligent.
Malo and Gideon replied that, in that case, the matter could still have been settled by the same compensation process. The result would just have been more uncertain, the situation more dangerous, and the required compensation payment larger. There would have been a greater risk that Billy’s relatives would not have awaited the outcome of compensation negotiations, or else would have refused payment and instead would have carried out a so-called payback killing: preferably by killing Malo himself, or else someone of his close family if they didn’t succeed in killing Malo, or else a more distantly related fellow clansman of Malo’s if they couldn’t kill a member of his immediate family. If, however, Billy’s relatives could have been prevailed on to await the outcome of the compensation process, they would have demanded much higher compensation. Malo estimated for me the required compensation (if he had been clearly responsible for Billy’s death) as approximately five pigs, plus 10,000 kina (equal to about $3,000), plus a quantity of local food including a bunch of bananas, taro, sweet potatoes, sago, garden vegetables, and dried fish.
I also wondered what would have happened if Malo hadn’t been a driver for a company but just a private New Guinean, and thus if the company hadn’t been involved. Malo answered that the compensation negotiations from his side would then not have been handled by his office colleague Yaghean, but instead by some of his uncles and by elders from his village. The compensation itself would not have been paid by the company, but rather by Malo’s whole village, including his family, his fellow clanspeople, and villagers belonging to other clans whom Malo might have had to call upon for help in raising the payment. Malo would thereby have incurred obligations to all those who had contributed. At some later time in his life, Malo would have had to make payments to those people for their contributions, and to his uncles for their hard work in handling the negotiations. Had Malo died before making such payments, the contributors and his uncles would have claimed payment from Malo’s family and clan. However, apart from those differences in who handled the negotiation and who made the payments, the compensation process if the company hadn’t been involved would have unfolded much as it actually did.
What the state did
The chain of events that I recounted is an example of how traditional New Guinea mechanisms can deal peacefully with a loss suffered by people at the hands of others. It contrasts with how Western state systems of justice deal with such losses. In the case of Billy and Malo, the response of the Papua New Guinea state was that the police did not concern themselves with the grieving or vengeful feelings of Billy’s relatives but did charge Malo with dangerous driving. Although Billy’s family, including his uncle Genjimp, who had actually been present at the accident scene, didn’t blame Malo’s driving, the police nevertheless claimed that Malo had been driving too fast. For many months Malo remained in his village, except for when he came into town to talk to the police. That’s because Malo was still afraid of possible retaliation by hot-headed young lowlanders. Malo’s fellow villagers remained alert and ready to protect him in case of such an attack.
After the initial police hearing, several months passed until the second hearing, at which Malo was ordered to come into town twice a week to report to the traffic officer while waiting for his case to come up for trial. Each such reporting visit ended with Malo waiting in the traffic office for between half a day and a full day. Malo’s driving license was taken away from him at the second hearing. Because Malo’s job with the company was as a driver, the loss of his license also cost Malo his job.
The dangerous-driving case against Malo finally came up for trial a year and a half later. During that time, Malo continued to live in limbo in his village, unemployed. When Malo did appear at court on the appointed date for trial, it turned out that the responsible judge was busy with a conflicting obligation, and the trial date had to be rescheduled for three months later. Again on that rescheduled second date, the judge was unable to be present, and another trial date was set three months later. That third date and still another trial date had to be postponed because of further problems involving the judge. Finally, on the fifth date set for trial, now two and a half years after the accident, the judge did appear, and the case was heard. But the police called by the prosecutor did not appear, and so the judge had to dismiss the case. That ended the state’s involvement with the matter of Billy and Malo. Lest you think that such no-shows and postponements mark the Papua New Guinea judicial system as uniquely inefficient, a close friend of mine recently on trial in Chicago experienced a similar course and outcome of his criminal proceedings.
New Guinea compensation
The traditional compensation process, illustrated by the story of Billy and Malo, has as its aims the dispute’s speedy peaceful resolution, emotional reconciliation between the two sides, and restoration of their previous relationship. This sounds simple, natural, and appealing to us, until we reflect how fundamentally it differs from the aims of our state systems of justice. Traditional New Guinea didn’t possess a state system of justice, a state government, a centralized political system, or professional leaders and bureaucrats and judges exercising decision-making powers and claiming a monopoly on the right to use force. States have their own separate interests in settling disputes and administering justice among their citizens. Those state interests don’t necessarily coincide with the interests of either participant in a dispute. Traditional New Guinea justice is, instead, of the do-it-yourself sort, arranged by the disputants themselves and by their respective supporters. The compensation process is one prong, the peaceful one, of the two-pronged system of traditional dispute resolution. The other prong (Chapters 3 and 4) is to seek personal retribution by violence, tending to escalate into cycles of counter-retribution and ultimately war.
An essential fact shaping the traditional New Guinea compensation process, and distinguishing it from Western disputes, is that the participants in almost any traditional New Guinea dispute were previously known to each other, either from already having been involved in some sort of personal relationship, or at least from knowing of each other by name or father’s name or group affiliation. For instance, even if you as a New Guinean don’t personally know the man in the village a few miles away who killed your pig while it was wandering in the forest, you surely have heard of him by name, you know of the clan to which he belongs, and you personally know some members of that clan. That’s because traditional New Guinea consisted of small-scale localized societies of a few dozen to a few hundred individuals. People traditionally maintained their area of residence for life or else moved short distances just for specific reasons, such as for marriage or to join relatives. Traditional New Guineans rarely or never encountered complete “strangers,” as do we citizens of modern state societies. But we citizens of Westernized states, unlike New Guineans, live in societies of millions, so of course we daily encounter and have to deal with previously unknown members of our own society. Even in sparsely inhabited rural areas where all the residents know each other, such as Montana’s Big Hole Basin, where I spent summers as a teen-ager, strangers routinely appear—e.g., someone driving through town and stopping to fill his car with gas. Furthermore, we move long distances for work, vacation, or just personal preference and thereby undergo almost complete turnovers of our circle of contacts repeatedly throughout our lives.
As a result, whereas in state societies most of our disputes arising from car accidents or business transactions are with strangers whom we didn’t know previously and with whom we shall never have dealings again, in traditional New Guinea any dispute is with someone with whom you will continue to have an actual or potential relationship in the future. At the maximum, your dispute will be with someone, such as a fellow villager, whom you encounter repeatedly and with whom you can’t avoid having continued daily dealings. At minimum, the other party in the dispute will be someone whom you won’t have to encounter repeatedly in the future (e.g., that
