“The Russians have one missile with that kind of range: the AS-17, code name ‘Krypton,’ ” Patrick went on. “The AS-17 is an antiradar weapon designed to exceed the range and performance numbers of the Patriot antiaircraft missile. However, the AS-17 was not originally designed to be fired from the Tupolev-22M. One AS-17 apparently malfunctioned and crashed in the desert in Kazakhstan.”
“CIA will undoubtedly send out teams to recover data on that lost missile,” Houser said. “I’ll have the info as soon as they get it.”
“Sir, we’ve heard from CIA, and because of the strike against their base, they’re not prepared to mount a covert mission into Kazakhstan to retrieve the missile,” Patrick said. “Colonel Griffin has put together a mission plan for your approval. He can deploy with a team, or we can brief a team based in—”
“So Griffin wants to lead another covert-ops team into Central Asia, eh?” Houser asked derisively. “He obviously thinks he’s the newest action hero now.”
“Sir, no other agencies have offered to get that data for us,” Patrick said, daring to show his exasperation at Houser’s remark, “and if I may remind you, we have very few military or intelligence assets in place in that region since the United Nations Security Council ordered us to leave so they could install peacekeeping forces. If we want a chance to get that data, Colonel Griffin needs an execution order immediately. We can have him and his team deploy immediately to—”
“I think Colonel Griffin has stirred up enough shit in Central Asia for the time being,” Houser interjected. “Although we certainly applaud him for successfully retrieving General Turabi of Turkmenistan, who has proved to be an extremely valuable source of information on the Russians’ advance into Mary, it is clear now that the Russians felt threatened and retaliated against what they thought was a CIA operation. In addition, I personally feel that I was led astray by General Luger at Battle Mountain. Colonel Griffin took an awful risk by going on this mission, an especially unnecessary risk considering all the forces Battle Mountain had available.”
“Sir, Colonel Griffin’s plan utilizes forces based in—”
“General Houser said he’d discuss this with you later, General McLanahan,” Samson cut in irritably. “Can we get on with the briefing, please?”
“Yes, sir,” Patrick said. “The antiradar missiles flew for approximately one hundred and thirty miles. Speed of each missile was in excess of Mach three. They were on a ballistic flight path at first, but during descent the radar operators said the missiles made minute course changes that placed them precisely on target, indicating that perhaps the missiles were operator-or GPS-guided, not just inertially guided. This matches the AS-17’s flight profile. They scored direct hits on the Uzbek radar sites.
“As far as the attack on Bukhara itself — it’s still a mystery, sir,” Patrick admitted. “Observers near the impact points there, including a couple surviving CIA operatives, reported the explosions were tremendous, perhaps five-hundred-pound high-explosive warheads.”
“You have
“We’re investigating a few uncorrelated bits of data, sir,” Patrick replied. “Greatly increased air traffic in eastern Siberia and a few rocket launches from test-launch sites in Siberia detected by DSP satellites apparently shot into the Kazakh missile-test ranges. So far nothing that could give us any clues on the attack all the way west in Uzbekistan.”
“Then maybe you shouldn’t be wasting your time on these other ‘uncorrelated bits of data,’ as you call them,” Samson said. “Any conclusions at all to report to us?”
“Sir, it appears that the missiles shot from the Backfire were intended to screen the real attack on the CIA headquarters in Uzbekistan,” Patrick went on. “The AS-17 is designed to be launched from tactical fighter-bombers, so the existence of these weapons on large bombers is a new development for the Russians: using tactical precision-guided weapons on strategic bombers instead of just long-range subsonic cruise missiles. It appears that the Russians had excellent intel and acted on it remarkably quickly. They knew exactly when and where to hit. They probably loaded those bombers within hours of the mission to exfiltrate Turabi and launched the attack immediately.
“I feel that this indicates a substantial increase in the capabilities and effectiveness of the Russian heavy- bomber forces. Wherever these bombers came from, they were highly modified and their crews trained to levels of proficiency and tactical coordination that rival our own. They obviously used sophisticated covert bases, perhaps underground or well-camouflaged facilities, and a supply system that is many times faster and more efficient than —”
“General McLanahan, I know you’re new to the Air Intelligence Agency and the Nine-sixty-sixth Wing, so I’ll give you a pass on this one,” Gary Houser said. “But in the future when you brief the command or battle staffs, we expect facts, not interpretation. And the facts are that you still don’t know where those bombers came from or where they went. That’s what we need to know. Is that clear, General?”
“Yes, sir,” Patrick responded. Houser looked at the darkened glassed-in booth where the communications officers sat and drew a finger across his throat. Moments later the link between Barksdale and Lackland was terminated.
“Let’s go on with the status of forces,” Samson said, giving the screen on which McLanahan had appeared one last disgusted glance that was very apparent, even across the secure videoconference network. “General?”
Conducting his briefing from his seat, in Samson’s preferred style, the Eighth Air Force deputy commander for operations and the acting vice commander, Brigadier General Charles C. Zoltrane, pressed a button on his console to call up his first PowerPoint slide. “Yes, sir. Currently all wings are reporting one hundred percent conventional- combat-ready.”
“Conventional only? What’s the nuclear side looking like?”
“Due to our conventional mission commitments, the lack of airframes and crews, and lower funding levels, we can meet approximately sixty percent taskings for Single Integrated Operations Plan missions, sir,” Zoltrane said. “The crews and the planes are simply not available for certification. The B-2 stealth bombers are in the best shape at seventy percent, but the B-52s are at only fifty percent — and I think that’s being generous.”
Samson thought about the news for a moment, then shrugged. “Well, if STRATCOM wants more planes ready for SIOP missions, they’re going to have to send me more money and more airframes,” he said. STRATCOM, or U.S. Strategic Command, was the unified military command in charge of planning and fighting a nuclear conflict. STRATCOM did not “own” any aircraft — like every unified command, STRATCOM “gained” aircraft from other major commands, such as nuclear bombers, intelligence-gathering aircraft, and strategic command-and-control planes, from Eighth Air Force.
“We can bring some planes out of flyable storage to have available for SIOP planning if necessary,” Zoltrane said. The fly-stores, or “flyable storage,” were the planes held in a sort of maintenance limbo — it was a way to save costs while maintaining a large fleet capable of fighting with minimal preparation. Two-thirds of the long-range bombers allocated to both Eighth and Twelfth Air Forces were in flyable storage at any one time.
“How many planes were we budgeting to come out of fly-store this year?”
“Through the normal rotation? Thirty-six B-52s and—”
“No, I meant planes coming out of fly-store to
“Well…none, sir,” Zoltrane responded. “But we’re technically non-mission-ready if STRATCOM wants to put any bombers on alert. We’d have to—”
“That’s STRATCOM’s problem, not mine,” Samson said. “They know hour by hour how many planes we have available. If they notice our shortage, they’re not saying anything, which means they don’t want to deal with the budget crunch either.”
“Sir, we
“Okay, okay, Charlie, I get the picture,” General Samson said irritably. “Have the wings start pulling fly-stores out right away — see if they can put it under an exercise budget, or if they’re close enough to their cycle periods anyway, have them pull their allotments early.” Planes in flyable storage had to be rotated out every six months, brought back up to full combat readiness, and flown for a specified number of hours before being put back in fly- store. Because of arms-control limitations and other political considerations, there was usually no rush to do this,
