Katyushas and mortars at the Persian collaborators.”

“You agreed to General Furzyenko’s recommendation to send the ‘Hornet’ missile to Iran, Director,” Zevitin pointed out.

“I agreed that the Hornet missile should be used to attack Persian army and air force bases with high- explosive and mine-laying warheads, sir,” Truznyev said, “not to just fire them indiscriminately into the city. The launch point was at the very edge of the rocket’s maximum range to hit the Doshan Tappeh air base, which was the target they told us they were going to strike. The Hezbollah crew also reportedly dragged their feet launching the missile — they even let children come around and watch the launch. This has been reported many times.”

“We will obviously have to instruct the insurgents to adjust tactics now that we know about this new American weapon,” General Darzov said.

“Will you also instruct them not to put their own homemade poison brews in the warhead?” Truznyev asked.

“What are you talking about, Director?”

“The Hezbollah insurgents loaded the Hornet missile’s warhead up with some sort of chemical weapon concoction, similar to mustard gas but much more effective,” the FSB chief said perturbedly. “The gas killed a dozen people on the street and injured several dozen others.”

“They cooked up their own mustard gas?”

“I do not know where the hell they got it, sir — Iran has a lot of chemical munitions, so maybe they stole it or had it secretly stored away,” Truznyev said. “The stuff went off when the American missile hit. But the point is, they violated our directives and attacked an unauthorized target with an unauthorized warhead. There are only a few truck-launched missiles that have the fusing necessary to carry out a chemical weapon attack — it will not be hard for the Americans to discover we supplied the Iranians with the Hornet missiles.”

“Get Mohtaz on the phone, now,” Zevitin ordered. Chief of staff Orlev was on the phone in an instant.

“Now that the Pasdaran has brought in foreign fighters from all over the world to join this damned jihad against Buzhazi’s coup,” Truznyev said, “I do not think the clerics have very tight control over their forces.” The Ayatollah Hassan Mohtaz, the former Iranian national defense adviser — and the most senior member of the former Iranian government to survive Buzhazi’s bloody purge of Islamists — had been proclaimed president-in-exile, and he called upon all the Muslims of the world to come to Iran and fight against the new military-monarchist government. The anti-Persia insurgency grew quickly, spurred on by tens of thousands of Shi’a Muslim fighters from all over the world who answered the fatwa against Buzhazi. Many of the insurgents had been trained by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps, the Pasdaran, so their fighting effectiveness was even greater. Within days after Mohtaz’s call to arms went out, most of the cities of the new Persia were embroiled in bitter fighting.

But part of the chaos in Persia was due to the fact that the coup leader, General Hesarak al-Kan Buzhazi, inexplicably refused to form a new government. Buzhazi, the past chief of staff and former commander of the paramilitary Internal Defense Forces that battled the Revolutionary Guards Corps, had led a stunningly successful coup, killing most of Iran’s theocratic rulers and sending the rest fleeing to neighboring Turkmenistan. It had been assumed that Buzhazi, together with former chief of staff Hoseyn Yassini, the officers of the regular armed forces, and supporters of one of Iran’s past royal families, the Qagevs, would take control of the capital city of Tehran and form a government. A name had even been chosen — the Democratic Republic of Persia, indicating a clear direction the people wanted to take — and the country was now referred to by its historic name, “Persia,” instead of the name “Iran,” which was the name decreed to be used by Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1935. Only supporters of the theocracy still used the name “Iran.”

“But I do not think we should stop arming the insurgents,” General Darzov said. “Every successful attack against the Persians will weaken them. We need patience.”

“And every time the jihadis launch another missile into the city and kill innocent women and children, the insurgency suffers the same fate — it gets weakened, as does Russia, General,” foreign minister Alexandra Hedrov said. Tall, dark-haired, and as alluring as any woman in the senior echelons of Russian government could be, Alexandra Hedrov was the highest-ranking woman to ever serve in the Kremlin. Like Zevitin, she came from an international finance background, but as a lifelong resident of Moscow and a married mother of two, she didn’t have the jet-setting reputation of her superior. Serious and sharp and without extensive political connections, Hedrov was widely considered the brains behind the presidency. “We look even worse if we are seen supporting baby-killers.”

She turned to Zevitin. “Mohtaz has got to find a way to tone down the jihadis, Mr. President, without relieving the pressure on Buzhazi and Qagev to give up and evacuate the country. We cannot be seen supporting mass murder and instability — that makes us look unstable ourselves. If Mohtaz continues on this path, the only recourse we have is to support Buzhazi.”

“Buzhazi?” Zevitin asked, confused. “Why support Buzhazi? He turned to the Americans for help.”

“That was our fault — he acted out of desperation, and we were not there for him when he needed us, so he turned to McLanahan,” Hedrov explained. “But Washington inexplicably has not thrown its support behind Buzhazi, and this creates an opportunity for Russia. We secretly support Mohtaz because Russia benefits from the instability in the region with higher oil prices and greatly increased arms sales. But if we end up backing a loser, we should reverse course and support whom I believe will be the eventual winner: Buzhazi.”

“I disagree, Minister,” Darzov said. “Buzhazi is not strong enough to destroy Mohtaz.”

“Then I suggest you get out of your airplanes and laboratories and take a look at the world as it really is, General,” Hedrov said. “Here is the real question, Mr. President: Whom do you want to win, Buzhazi or Mohtaz? That is who we should be supporting. We support Mohtaz because the chaos in the Middle East keeps America from meddling in our affairs in our own spheres of influence. But is a theocratic Iran a better choice for Russia? We know Buzhazi. You and I have both met with him; we supported him for many years, before, during, and after his removal as chief of staff. We still supply each other with intelligence information, although he is keeping information about the American presence in Iran closely guarded and more expensive to obtain. Maybe it is time to increase the level of contact with him.”

The phone vibrated beside Orlev, and he picked it up and moments later put it on hold. “Mohtaz on the line, sir.”

“Where is he?”

“Iranian embassy in Ashkhabad, Turkmenistan,” Orlev replied, anticipating the question.

“Good.” When the Ayatollah Mohtaz and his advisers fled Iran, he unexpectedly holed up in the Russian embassy in Ashkhabad, demanding protection from Buzhazi’s forces and the so-called monarchist death squads. That created a lot of curiosity and questions from most of the rest of the world. It was well known that Moscow was an ally of Iran, but would they go so far as to protect the old regime? What if elections were held and the theocrats were voted out? Would the clerics and Islamists become an albatross around Russia’s neck?

As a concession to the rest of the world, Zevitin had Mohtaz leave the embassy, but quietly guaranteed his safety with Russian FSB units stationed in and around the Iranian compound. At first he thought the Islamist wouldn’t leave the embassy — or, worse, threaten to expose Russia’s involvement in Iran if he was forced out — but thankfully things didn’t reach that stage. He knew Mohtaz could always produce that card in the future, and he needed to decide what to do if he tried to play it.

Zevitin picked up his phone. “President Mohtaz, this is Leonid Zevitin.”

“Please stand by for His Excellency, sir,” a heavily Persian-accented voice said in Russian. Zevitin rolled his eyes impatiently. It was always a game with weak men like Mohtaz, he thought — it was always so damned important to try to gain the smallest advantage by making the other party wait, even over something as simple as a phone call.

A few moments later, the voice of a young translator said, “The Imam Mohtaz is on the line. Identify yourself please.”

“Mr. President, this is Leonid Zevitin calling. I hope you are well.”

“Praise be to God for his mercy, it is so.”

No attempt to return pleasantries, Zevitin noted — again, typical of Mohtaz. “I wanted to discuss the recent air attack by the Americans in Tehran against a suspected Hezbollah rocket launcher.”

“I know nothing of this.”

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