mention an earlier and successful use of force to intimidate Georgia, could entice the Russian leaders to attempt at some point a more overt reunification. But it would be a very complicated undertaking, perhaps requiring the use of some force and at least a contrived economic crisis within Ukraine to make a formal union with an economically more resilient Russia more palatable to the Ukrainians. Russia would still risk provoking a belated nationalist reaction, especially from the Ukrainian-speaking west and center of the country. With the passage of time, Ukraine as a nation-state is gaining a deeper emotional commitment from a younger generation—whether primarily Ukrainian or Russian speaking—that increasingly views Ukrainian statehood as normal and as part of its identity. Hence time may not be working in favor of a voluntary submission by Kyiv to Moscow, but impatient Russian pressures to that end as well as the West’s indifference could generate a potentially explosive situation on the very edge of the European Union.
Devastated by nine years of extraordinarily brutal warfare waged by the Soviet Union, ignored by the West for a decade after the Soviet withdrawal, mismanaged by the medieval Taliban rulers who seized power with Pakistani assistance, and exposed during the Bush presidency to seven years of halfhearted US military operations and sporadic economic assistance, Afghanistan is a country in shambles. It has little economic output outside of its illegal narcotics trade, with 40% unemployment and a global ranking of 219th in GDP per capita. Only 15–20% of Afghans have access to electricity.
The most likely results of a rapid US disengagement brought on by war fatigue or the early effects of an American decline would be internal disintegration and an external power play among nearby states for influence in Afghanistan. In the absence of an effective and stable government in Kabul, the country would be dominated by rival warlords. Both Pakistan and India would more assertively and openly compete for influence in Afghanistan— with Iran also probably involved. As the result, the possibility of at least an indirect war between India and Pakistan would increase.
Iran would likely try to exploit the Pakistani-Indian rivalry in seeking advantage for itself. Both India and Iran fear that any increase in Pakistani influence in Afghanistan would severely affect the regional balance of power, and in India’s case compound the belligerent stance of Pakistan. In addition, adjoining central Asian states—given the presence of significant Tadjik, Uzbek, Kirghiz, and Turkmen communities in Afghanistan—could become involved in the regional power play as well. And the more players involved in Afghanistan, the more likely it is that a larger regional conflict could break out.
Second, even if a solid Afghan government is in place at the time of currently planned American disengagement—with some semblance of central control—a subsequent failure to sustain US-sponsored international involvement in the region’s stability is likely to reignite the embers of ethnic and religious passions. The Taliban could reemerge as the major disruptive force in Afghanistan—with help from the Pakistani Taliban— and/or Afghanistan could descend into a state of tribal warlordism. Afghanistan then could become a still larger player in the international drug trade, and even perhaps again a haven for international terrorism.
While Pakistan is armed with twenty-first-century nuclear weapons and is held together by a professional late twentieth-century army, the majority of its people—despite a politically active middle class and a congested urban population—are still premodern, rural, and largely defined by regional and tribal identities. Together they share the Muslim faith, which provided the passionate impulse for a separate state upon Britain’s departure from India. The resulting conflicts with India have defined Pakistan’s sense of separate national identity, while the forcible division of Kashmir has sustained a shared and profound antipathy for each other.
Pakistan’s political instability is its greatest vulnerability. And a decline in US power would reduce America’s ability to aid Pakistan’s consolidation and development. Pakistan could transform into a state run by the military, or a radical Islamic state, or a state that combines both military and Islamic rule, or a “state” with no centralized government at all. The worst-case scenarios are that Pakistan devolves into some variation of nuclear warlordism or transforms into a militant-Islamic and anti-Western government similar to Iran. The latter could in turn infect Central Asia, generating wider regional instability of concern both to Russia and to China.
In the above circumstances, America’s decline would also increase Chinese security concerns about South Asia and could intensify Indian temptations to undermine Pakistan. China’s exploitation of any clashes between Pakistan and India would also be more likely, thus potentially increasing regional instability. Ultimately, an unstable peace or a wider conflict in the region would depend almost entirely on the degree to which both India and China could restrain their own increasingly nationalistic impulses to exploit Pakistan’s instability in order to gain the regional upper hand.
In addition to specific states becoming immediately endangered, one also needs to take into account the more general probability that America’s decline would set in motion tectonic shifts undermining the political stability of the entire Middle East. Though in varying degrees, all the states in the region remain vulnerable to internal populist pressures, social unrest, and religious fundamentalism, as seen in the events of early 2011. If America’s decline were to occur with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict still unresolved, the failure to implement by then a mutually acceptable two-state solution would further inflame the region’s political atmosphere. Regional hostility to Israel would then intensify.
It is reasonable to assume that perceived American weakness would at some point tempt the more powerful states in the region, notably Iran or Israel, to preempt anticipated dangers. In these circumstances even cautious jockeying for tactical advantage could precipitate eruptions of local violence—say, involving Hamas or Hezbollah, backed by Iran, versus Israel—which could then escalate into wider and more bloody military encounters as well as new intifadas. Weak entities such as Lebanon and Palestine would then pay an especially high price in civilian death tolls. Even worse, such conflicts could rise to truly horrific levels through strikes and counterstrikes between Iran and Israel.
The latter turn of events could then draw the United States into a direct confrontation with Iran. Since a conventional war would not be a favorable option for an America fatigued by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (and by then perhaps also in Pakistan), the United States presumably would rely on its air supremacy to inflict painful strategic damage on Iran, and especially on its nuclear facilities. The resulting human toll would infuse into Iranian nationalism a lasting hostility toward America while further blending Islamic fundamentalism with Iranian nationalism. Islamic radicalism and extremism in the Middle East at large would also be inflamed, with potentially damaging consequences for the world economy. Under these circumstances, Russia would obviously benefit economically from the rise in the price of energy and politically from the concentration of Islamic passions on the United States as Muslim grievances shifted away from Russia. Turkey might become more overtly sympathetic to the Islamic sense of victimhood, and China could gain a freer hand in pursuing its own interests in the area.
In that geopolitical context, and contrary to those who believe that Israel’s long-term security would benefit from an America locked into a hostile relationship with the world of Islam, Israel’s long-term survival could be placed in jeopardy. Israel has the military capacity and the national will to repel immediate dangers to itself, and also to repress the Palestinians. But America’s long-standing and generous support for Israel, derived more from a genuine sense of moral obligation and less from real strategic congruity, could become less reliable. The inclination to disengage from the region could grow as America declines, despite public support for Israel, while much of the world would probably blame America for the regional upheaval. With the Arab masses politically aroused and more inclined to engage in prolonged violence (“people’s war”), an Israel that could become internationally viewed—to cite Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s ominous warning in 2010—as an “apartheid” state would have doubtful long-term prospects.
The vulnerability of the US–supported Persian Gulf states would also be likely to intensify. As US power in the region recedes and as Iran continues its military buildup and pursues greater influence in Iraq—which prior to the 2003 US invasion stood as a bulwark to Iranian expansion—uncertainty and insecurity within Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the UAE are likely to intensify. They may have to seek new and more effective protectors of their security. China would be an obvious and potentially economically motivated candidate, thereby altering dramatically the geopolitical configuration of the Middle East.
Just thirty-five years ago, the United States benefited from strong relationships with the four most important
