169. In March 1944, the United Nations: “Judgment of the Chinese War Crimes Military Tribunal on Hisao Tani, March 10, 1947,” Journal of Studies of Japanese Aggression Against China (February 1991): 68.
170. During the trials: Xu Zhigeng, The Rape of Nanking, pp. 219, 223, 226, 228.
170. One of the most famous exhibits: Television documentary on Wu Xuan and Luo Jing, aired July 25, 1995, Jiangsu television station channel 1.
171. A Japan Advertiser article: Xu Zhigeng, The Rape of Nanking, pp. 215–16.
171. The focal point of the Nanking war crimes trials: Ibid., pp. 218–30.
172. The scope of the trial was staggering: For statistics on the IMTFE, see Arnold Brackman, The Other Nuremberg: The Untold Story of the Tokyo War Crimes Trials (New York: Morrow, 1987), pp. 9, 18, 22; World War II magazine, January 1996, p. 6.
173. “At the IMTFE, a thousand My Lais emerged”: Ibid., p. 9.
173. The prosecution learned: IMTFE transcript.
173. Only one in twenty-five American POWs died: Ken Ringle, “Still Waiting for an Apology: Historian Gavan Daws Calling Japan on War Crimes,” Washington Post, March 16, 1995; author’s telephone interview and electronic mail communication with Gavan Daws. According to Daws, the death-rate figure for all Allied POWs for the Japanese was 27 percent: 34 percent for Americans, 33 percent for Australians, 32 percent for the British, and under 20 percent for the Dutch. In contrast, the death rate for all Western Front Allied military POWs of the Germans (excluding Russians) was 4 percent. For more information, see Gavan Daws, Prisoners of the Japanese: POWs of World War II in the Pacific (New York: Morrow, 1994), pp. 360–61, 437.
173. “The Rape of Nanking was not the kind of isolated incident”: Brackman, The Other Nuremberg, p. 182.
174. “let loose like a barbarian horde”: IMTFE judgment.
174. “chastise the Nanking government”: IMTFE judgment.
174. To atone for the sins of Nanking: Bergamini, Japan’s Imperial Conspiracy, pp. 3–4.
175. “I am happy to end this way”: Ibid., p. 47.
175. “either secretly ordered or willfully committed”: IMTFE judgment, p. 1001.
175. Unfortunately, many of the chief culprits: Buruma, The Wages of Guilt, p. 175; Bergamini, Japan’s Imperial Conspiracy, pp. 45–48.
175. The information about Nakajima Kesago comes from Kimura Kuninori, Koseiha shogun Nakajima Kesago [Nakajima Kesago, General of the Individualist Faction]. Tokyo: Kojinsha, 1987.
176. The information about Yanagawa Heisuke comes from Sugawara Yutaka, Yamatogokoro: Fukumen shogun Yanagawa Heisuke Seidan [Spirit of Japan: Elevated Conversation from the Masked Shogun Yanagawa Heisuke]. Tokyo: Keizai Oraisha, 1971, p. 166. (Mention of his death by heart attack on January 22, 1945, is on p. 234.)
176. “Many would find it difficult”: Herbert Bix, “The Showa Emperor’s ‘Monologue’ and the Problem of War Responsibility.” The Journal of Japanese Studies, summer 1992, vol. 18, no. 2, p. 330.
177. “a priceless historical treasure”: author interview with John Young of the China Institute. In 1957, Young was a professor at Georgetown University and part of a group of scholars who had secured permission to microfilm some of the Japanese Army and Navy Ministries archives seized by American occupation forces in 1945. The following year came the abrupt decision of the United States government to return the documents to Japan—a tremendous blow to Young and the others. (“I was beyond shock, I tell you,” Young recalled. “I was flabbergasted! ”) As a result of this decision, only a small portion of the Japanese military archives were microfilmed before they were boxed up and returned to Japan in February 1958. The greatest regret of his life, Young said, was his failure to foresee this decision, which would have given him and the other scholars the time to microfilm the most important papers in the collection.
The circumstances behind the return were mysterious, and continue to baffle to this day the historians involved in the microfilm project. “This was something I could never understand,” Edwin Beal, formerly of the Library of Congress, said during a telephone interview in April 1997. “We were told that returning these documents was a matter of high policy and should not be questioned.”
Years later, John Young heard rumors that the returned documents were used by the Japanese government to purge those from their ranks who had not been sufficiently loyal to the wartime regime.
177. seriously criticized: In all fairness, it must be pointed out that many of the facts in Bergamini’s book are accurate and that he did discover, in the course of his research, many important new Japanese-language documents for World War II historians. Therefore, scholars have often found Japan’s Imperial Conspiracy to be a valuable—even if flawed and confusing— resource.
178. “In order to conquer the world”: W. Morton, Tanaka Giichi and Japan’s China Policy (Folkestone, Kent, Eng.: Dawson, 1980), p. 205; Harries and Harries, pp. 162– 63.
178. Currently no reputable historian: Letter from Rana Mitter to author, July 17, 1997.
178. “inconceivable”: Information about Herbert Bix’s opinion comes from author’s telephone interview with Bix.
179. Back in 1943, Prince Mikasa Takahito: “A Royal Denunciation of Horrors: Hirohito’s Brother—an Eyewitness—Assails Japan’s Wartime Brutality,” Los Angeles Times, July 9, 1994; Merrill Goozner, “New Hirohito Revelations Startle Japan: Emperor’s Brother Says He Reported WWII China Atrocities to Him in 1944; National Doubts Them Now,” Chicago Tribune, July 7, 1994; Daily Yomiuri, July 6, 1994, p. 7.
179. “It helps them acquire guts”: Daily Yomiuri, July 6, 1994, p. 7.
179. “bits and pieces”: Goozner, “New Hirohito Revelations Startle Japan,” Chicago Tribune, July 7, 1994.
179. “extreme satisfaction”: Asahi, Tokyo edition, December 15, 1937.
179. Prince Kanin’s telegram: Ibid.
179. silver vases: Asahi, Tokyo edition, February 27, 1938.
180. Prince Asaka, for one, retired: Bergamini, Japan’s Imperial Conspiracy , p. 46. Information about Asaka’s golf course development comes from Daijinmei Jiten [The Expanded Biographical Encyclopedia]
