women under my command during Desert Shield and Storm and I would not have been combat-effective without them. To a Marine, they were superb. As the Commandant, however, I am tasked to train, equip, and provide fighting forces to the regional commanders-in-chief. I have to consider this as we select and procure the right equipment and train the right people to do the job the nation expects of us. It is also my responsibility to ensure the we maximize the effective utilization of those resources. I do not believe that I am maximizing the utilization of the limited resources of the Marine Corps by putting women at the point of a rifle platoon or in units that engage in direct ground combat.
One of the hallmarks of the 1990s has been that as U.S. forces have gotten smaller, they have also gotten busier. Higher operational tempos (Optempos) have resulted in some notable difficulties, even for the Marines. General Krulak has been forced to deal with some unique problems in the areas of morale, as well as some surprising quality-of-life issues. Let's hear what he has to say.
Tom Clancy: Morale always seems to be an issue in the military. Can you talk some about the challenges this presents for you?
General Krulak: First of all, I have not encountered the kinds of morale problems in 1995 that we had in the past. The morale problems of 1995 are minuscule compared with those, for example, of the 1970s. Nevertheless, the first thing I am doing for morale is to show the individual Marine that their Commandant cares about them, as individuals. So when members of Congress asked what they could do for me as I made my in-calls, I asked for an additional ten to twenty million dollars for things like rain gear and boots instead of dollars for additional amphibious shipping, aircraft, and vehicles. When they said, 'What are you talking about?' I said, 'What I want to give my Marines is field equipment that is of newer design than the Korean War!' I think they thought I was somewhat 'off the-wall,' but the bottom line is that the first thing that Marines saw from this Commandant was new boots, rain gear, and the new load-bearing equipment system and backpack.
With the exception of the woodland camouflage pattern, the field jacket that we use today is the same design that our Marines wore in the 1950s. You have sportsmen walking around in state-of-the-art boots, and our current boots are terrible! Our rain suits are made of rubber, which does not breathe, so the Marine wearing it is as wet on the inside as he is outside. Today if a Marine's sleeping bag gets wet, it weighs over 40 1b/18 kg, and we use tents designed back in World War II! Everyone talks about being worried about the 'quality of life,' but what they fail to understand is that the bulk of an infantryman's life is spent in the field. In the fleet, many Marines spend more time in the field than they do at home. For our forward-deployed Marines, like those in the MEU (SOC)s, this is especially true. We spend money on new barracks and other base facilities, but don't buy our Marines the basic clothing and equipment they need to survive and be comfortable in the field. Secondly, there is the matter of my style of leadership. I don't have many pretenses, so the last thing I want when I stop somewhere is a lot of preparation and fanfare over my visits. Now, there are people who disagree with this philosophy and feel that a visit from the Commandant is cause for a major out-pouring of effort, but the onus ends up on the enlisted Marines who need to be spending their time being Marines, not preparing for my visit. So I try to fly in unannounced; and that precludes excess preparation work and allows me to see my Marines as they are. I want them to know that their Commandant is coming to see them. They now know that, and I learn a lot from my visits talking with the troops. In my discussions with Marines, I hear the usual about what I call external morale issues [barracks, recreational facilities, etc.] and we are already working on these things. What I focus on, however, are the more deep-seated, internal things, such as pride in the organization and making sure that our leaders have what John A. Lejeune [the 13th Commandant of the Corps] called 'a self-sacrificing love for the Marine Corps.' Those are things that we can always positively influence, regardless of the budget, so those are the areas we need to concentrate on. I have to tell you that Marines, whatever their rank, will respond to this type of approach. They have to know that they will all be treated fairly, and that nobody above them is going to harm them by ruining their career automatically because of a mistake. At the same time, though, that Marine has to know that we will not tolerate lying, cheating, or stealing. As warfighters we must understand the dimensions of physical courage. There are no greater supporters of peace than those who are sworn to risk their lives when war occurs. However, our profession also demands moral courage — the strength of character and the integrity to do what is right. Acts of moral torpitude have no place in the Marine Corps.
While the new Commandant has strong ties to the history and traditions of the Marine Corps, he has a keen appreciation of the usefulness of modern technology to help his Marines. In particular, he has used electronic mail and the Internet to open up direct lines of communications with his Corps. Let him tell you about it.
Tom Clancy: One of your major initiatives has been to open the lines of communication with Marines of all ranks. To accomplish this, you even obtained an address on the Internet. Could you please talk about your new communications systems with your Marines?
General Krulak: It is phenomenal! Some of our best ideas and initiatives originate with the lance corporal and corporals who work, live, eat, and sleep Marine Corps twenty-four hours a day. I don't think a Commandant can effectively lead the Corps without input from Marines. So with this E-Mail and Internet access, they can send their ideas directly to me, and they do. I get messages from corporals to gunnery sergeants, with suggestions telling us how we can do things better in the Marine Corps. I want to focus their suggestions, so I have asked them to think about and address three questions: 'What are we doing now that we shouldn't be doing?' 'What aren't we doing now that we should be doing?' and 'What are we doing now that we could be doing better and how?'
They are answering those questions, and we have made major changes in the Corps today based on their input. We have, or are, considering changes in training, in the promotion system, and in our performance evaluation system. The changes are driven by lance corporals through colonels dialing up and dropping me a note with an idea. You have to see the quality of what they are saying to appreciate just how intelligent they are and how much they care about improving the Corps. It is truly motivating!
One of the most difficult tasks facing General Krulak and the Marine Corps as they head into the 21st century is the need to modernize their equipment during a time when there is very little money and even less support around Washington, D.C., to do so. With their modernization budget (for new and replacement equipment, as well as upgrades/conversions) slashed to almost historic lows, the challenges for the Commandant are immense. Let's hear his thoughts on this.
Tom Clancy: Could you talk now about the Marine Corps modernization budget? Obviously you're making due with an absurdly small amount, compared with the other services. What is the outlook?
General Krulak: Let me preface my comments with some background about our budget. Procurement and modernization for some equipment [Marine aviation, amphibious shipping, and landing craft] are funded by the Department of the Navy. The shortfall you are referencing has to do with what we call 'green dollars,' or dollars earmarked specifically for Marine Corps procurement. With that as background, the Marine Corps needs a 'green' modernization budget between $1 billion and $1.2 billion. That is one of my biggest challenges. We had $474 million in FY-95; and that's less than half of the historic average; and that means we have had to sacrifice either readiness or modernization, because we can't have both at that level. If I don't get that budget up to the necessary level, we'll be in real trouble.
In fact, we're in trouble right now. We have 5-ton trucks that are almost twenty years old. You don't drive a car that is that old, but we'll be sending Marines into combat in those vehicles. Our amphibious assault vehicles [the AAV-7s] are twenty to twenty-five years old. There are problems on the aviation-dollar side as well — we are flying CH-46 medium-lift helicopters that are headed into their fourth decade of service as we are sitting here! We have some real modernization problems that we need to come to grips with as a service and a nation.
Tom Clancy: With that introduction, I'd like to run some of the key modernization programs by you, and get some of your comments on them. Tell me about the V-22.
General Krulak: The V-22 is critical to the nation and Marine Corps. We're going to get it, and get it quicker than anyone thinks we will. Once other services realize the capability that tilt-rotor technology brings, I believe that they will join us in procuring this aircraft. It has all the capabilities of a helicopter in terms of vertical flight, but has the speed and distance more akin to a fixed-wing aircraft. Imagine how useful this aircraft would have been in places like Somalia or Burundi, or might be in Bosnia. We're currently programmed to get the first squadron of V-22s in 2001, but I would like to be able to buy two or three squadrons a year [twenty-four to thirty-six airframes], as opposed to the current planned buy rate of fourteen airframes per year. Again, I believe that once people understand and appreciate how incredibly capable this aircraft is, the buy will be accelerated.
